George F Loewenstein
Biographic Data
| ID | 778748 |
|---|---|
| NAME | George F Loewenstein |
| GIVEN NAMES | George F |
| FAMILY NAME | Loewenstein |
| SIGNATURE | LOEWENSTEIN G F |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Chicago |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 589 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 8 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1988 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2001 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Risk as feelings
Virtually all current theories of choice under risk or uncertainty are cognitive and consequentialist. They assume that people assess the desirability and likelihood of possible outcomes of choice alternatives and integrate this information through some type of expectation-based calculus to arrive at a decision. The authors propose an alternative theoretical perspective, the risk-as-feelings hypothesis, that highlights the role of affect experien…
Preference reversals between joint and separate evaluations of options: A review and theoretical analysis
Arguably, all judgments and decisions are made in 1 (or some combination) of 2 basic evaluation modes-joint evaluation mode (JE), in which multiple options are presented simultaneously and evaluated comparatively, or separate evaluation mode (SE), in which options are presented in isolation and evaluated separately. This article reviews recent literature showing that people evaluated options differently and exhibit reversals of preferences for op…
Preference reversals between joint and separate evaluations of options: A review and theoretical analysis
Arguably, all judgments and decisions are made in 1 (or some combination) of 2 basic evaluation modes—joint evaluation mode (JE), in which multiple options are presented simultaneously and evaluated comparatively, or separate evaluation mode (SE), in which options are presented in isolation and evaluated separately. This article reviews recent literature showing that people evaluate options differently and exhibit reversals of preferences for opt…
Preferences for sequences of outcomes.
Existing models of intertemporal choice normally assume that people are impatient, preferring valuable outcomes sooner rather than later, and that preferences satisfy the formal condition of independence, or separability, which states that the value of a sequence of outcomes equals the sum of the values of its component parts.The authors present empirical results that show both of these assumptions to be false when choices are framed as being bet…
Utility maximization and melioration: Internalities in individual choice
How do people go about choosing between alternatives in relatively simple settings? This study explores some of the variables that past work suggests may be relevant. Volunteer subjects worked for money in six procedures in which the probability of a payment from either of two alternatives was 1.0, but the rate of pay (i.e. the speed with which a payment was delivered or the size of the payment) interacted with the subjects recent allocation of c…
Time-inconsistent Preferences and Consumer Self-Control
Why do consumers sometimes act against their own better judgment, engaging in behavior that is often regretted after the fact and that would have been rejected with adequate forethought? More generally, how do consumers attempt to maintain self-control in the face of time-inconsistent preferences? This article addresses consumer impatience by developing a decision-theoretic model based on reference points. The model explains how and why consumers…
Social utility and decision making in interpersonal contexts
Three studies examined preferences for outcomes to self and a codisputant. Studies I and 2 estimated social utility functions from judgments of with alternative outcomes. Comparing functional forms, we found that a utility function, including terms for own payoff and for positive and negative discrepancies between the parties' payoffs (advantageous and disadvantageous inequality), provides a close fit to the data. The typical utility function is …
Frames of Mind in Intertemporal Choice
Recent research has demonstrated that choices between gambles are systematically influenced by the way they are expressed. Kahneman and Tversky's Prospect Theory (Kahneman, D., A. Tversky. 1979. Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica 47(2) 363–391.) explains many of these “framing” effects as shifts in the point of reference from which prospects are evaluated. This paper demonstrates the applicability of the reference p…
Risk as feelings
Virtually all current theories of choice under risk or uncertainty are cognitive and consequentialist. They assume that people assess the desirability and likelihood of possible outcomes of choice alternatives and integrate this information through some type of expectation-based calculus to arrive at a decision. The authors propose an alternative theoretical perspective, the risk-as-feelings hypothesis, that highlights the role of affect experien…
Time-inconsistent Preferences and Consumer Self-Control
Why do consumers sometimes act against their own better judgment, engaging in behavior that is often regretted after the fact and that would have been rejected with adequate forethought? More generally, how do consumers attempt to maintain self-control in the face of time-inconsistent preferences? This article addresses consumer impatience by developing a decision-theoretic model based on reference points. The model explains how and why consumers…
Social utility and decision making in interpersonal contexts
Three studies examined preferences for outcomes to self and a codisputant. Studies I and 2 estimated social utility functions from judgments of with alternative outcomes. Comparing functional forms, we found that a utility function, including terms for own payoff and for positive and negative discrepancies between the parties' payoffs (advantageous and disadvantageous inequality), provides a close fit to the data. The typical utility function is …
Utility maximization and melioration: Internalities in individual choice
How do people go about choosing between alternatives in relatively simple settings? This study explores some of the variables that past work suggests may be relevant. Volunteer subjects worked for money in six procedures in which the probability of a payment from either of two alternatives was 1.0, but the rate of pay (i.e. the speed with which a payment was delivered or the size of the payment) interacted with the subjects recent allocation of c…
Frames of Mind in Intertemporal Choice
Recent research has demonstrated that choices between gambles are systematically influenced by the way they are expressed. Kahneman and Tversky's Prospect Theory (Kahneman, D., A. Tversky. 1979. Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica 47(2) 363–391.) explains many of these “framing” effects as shifts in the point of reference from which prospects are evaluated. This paper demonstrates the applicability of the reference p…
Social utility and decision making in interpersonal contexts
Three studies examined preferences for outcomes to self and a codisputant. Studies I and 2 estimated social utility functions from judgments of with alternative outcomes. Comparing functional forms, we found that a utility function, including terms for own payoff and for positive and negative discrepancies between the parties' payoffs (advantageous and disadvantageous inequality), provides a close fit to the data. The typical utility function is …
Time-inconsistent Preferences and Consumer Self-Control
Why do consumers sometimes act against their own better judgment, engaging in behavior that is often regretted after the fact and that would have been rejected with adequate forethought? More generally, how do consumers attempt to maintain self-control in the face of time-inconsistent preferences? This article addresses consumer impatience by developing a decision-theoretic model based on reference points. The model explains how and why consumers…
Preferences for sequences of outcomes.
Existing models of intertemporal choice normally assume that people are impatient, preferring valuable outcomes sooner rather than later, and that preferences satisfy the formal condition of independence, or separability, which states that the value of a sequence of outcomes equals the sum of the values of its component parts.The authors present empirical results that show both of these assumptions to be false when choices are framed as being bet…
Utility maximization and melioration: Internalities in individual choice
How do people go about choosing between alternatives in relatively simple settings? This study explores some of the variables that past work suggests may be relevant. Volunteer subjects worked for money in six procedures in which the probability of a payment from either of two alternatives was 1.0, but the rate of pay (i.e. the speed with which a payment was delivered or the size of the payment) interacted with the subjects recent allocation of c…
Preference reversals between joint and separate evaluations of options: A review and theoretical analysis
Arguably, all judgments and decisions are made in 1 (or some combination) of 2 basic evaluation modes-joint evaluation mode (JE), in which multiple options are presented simultaneously and evaluated comparatively, or separate evaluation mode (SE), in which options are presented in isolation and evaluated separately. This article reviews recent literature showing that people evaluated options differently and exhibit reversals of preferences for op…
Preference reversals between joint and separate evaluations of options: A review and theoretical analysis
Arguably, all judgments and decisions are made in 1 (or some combination) of 2 basic evaluation modes—joint evaluation mode (JE), in which multiple options are presented simultaneously and evaluated comparatively, or separate evaluation mode (SE), in which options are presented in isolation and evaluated separately. This article reviews recent literature showing that people evaluate options differently and exhibit reversals of preferences for opt…
Risk as feelings
Virtually all current theories of choice under risk or uncertainty are cognitive and consequentialist. They assume that people assess the desirability and likelihood of possible outcomes of choice alternatives and integrate this information through some type of expectation-based calculus to arrive at a decision. The authors propose an alternative theoretical perspective, the risk-as-feelings hypothesis, that highlights the role of affect experien…
Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics (8 works) · Psychology (6 works) · Economics (5 works) · Social Psychology (5 works) · Cognitive psychology (4 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Econometrics (4 works) · Economic and Environmental Valuation (4 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (4 works) · Microeconomics (4 works)