Ryosuke Sakai
Biographic Data
| ID | 7873303 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Ryosuke Sakai |
| GIVEN NAMES | Ryosuke |
| FAMILY NAME | Sakai |
| SIGNATURE | SAKAI R |
| AFFILIATIONS | Kyoto City Hospital |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-0656-8938 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 2 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasi-linear preferences
We consider the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at most one object (unit-demand). We focus on allocation mechanisms satisfying individual rationality, non-wastefulness, equal treatment of equals, and strategy-proofness. Extending the result of Kazumura et al. (J Econ Theory 188:105036, 2020b), we show that for an arbitrary number of agents and objects, the minimum price Walrasian is the unique ex-p…
Randomized Controlled Trial of Simple Salt Reduction Instructions by Physician for Patients with Type 2 Diabetes Consuming Excessive Salt
Objectives : We verified the clinical usefulness of an approach method in which a physician gives simple salt reduction instructions during outpatient visits to patients with type 2 diabetes. Methods : This study was an open-blind, randomized controlled trial. Subjects were outpatients with type 2 diabetes whose estimated salt intake using spot morning urine sample exceeded the target of salt intake. The control group (CG) was notified only of th…
No prominent works on this page.
Randomized Controlled Trial of Simple Salt Reduction Instructions by Physician for Patients with Type 2 Diabetes Consuming Excessive Salt
Objectives : We verified the clinical usefulness of an approach method in which a physician gives simple salt reduction instructions during outpatient visits to patients with type 2 diabetes. Methods : This study was an open-blind, randomized controlled trial. Subjects were outpatients with type 2 diabetes whose estimated salt intake using spot morning urine sample exceeded the target of salt intake. The control group (CG) was notified only of th…
Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasi-linear preferences
We consider the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at most one object (unit-demand). We focus on allocation mechanisms satisfying individual rationality, non-wastefulness, equal treatment of equals, and strategy-proofness. Extending the result of Kazumura et al. (J Econ Theory 188:105036, 2020b), we show that for an arbitrary number of agents and objects, the minimum price Walrasian is the unique ex-p…
Mathematics (2 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (1 work) · Bankruptcy (1 work) · Chemistry (1 work) · Computer Science (1 work) · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics (1 work) · Diabetes mellitus (1 work) · Economics (1 work) · Endocrinology (1 work) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (1 work)