Angela Y Lee
Biographic Data
| ID | 79067 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Angela Y Lee |
| GIVEN NAMES | Angela Y |
| FAMILY NAME | Lee |
| SIGNATURE | LEE A Y |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Oslo |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-1899-0511 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 5 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 7 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
The Gradability of ‘Conscious’
Are some creatures “more conscious” than others? A number of consciousness researchers have aimed to answer this question. Yet some have claimed that this question does not even make sense. They claim that “conscious” (in the phenomenal sense) never occurs as a gradable adjective , meaning an adjective that permits degree expressions (“more f than,” “slightly f ,” etc.) and that is associated with a degreed property. Both sides face an explanator…
Objective Phenomenology
This paper examines the idea of objective phenomenology , or a way of understanding the phenomenal character of conscious experiences that doesn’t require one to have had the kinds of experiences under consideration. My central thesis is that structural facts about experience—facts that characterize purely how conscious experiences are structured—are objective phenomenal facts. I begin by precisifying the idea of objective phenomenology and diagn…
Degrees of consciousness
Is a human more conscious than an octopus? In the science of consciousness, it's oftentimes assumed that some creatures (or mental states) are more conscious than others. But in recent years, a number of philosophers have argued that the notion of degrees of consciousness is conceptually confused. This paper (1) argues that the most prominent objections to degrees of consciousness are unsustainable, (2) examines the semantics of ‘more conscious t…
The structure of analog representation
This paper develops a theory of analog representation. We first argue that the mark of the analog is to be found in the nature of a representational system's interpretation function, rather than in its vehicles or contents alone. We then develop the rulebound structure theory of analog representation, according to which analog systems use interpretive rules that map syntactic structural features onto semantic structural features. The theory invol…
The Neutrality of Life
Some philosophers think that life is worth living not merely because of the goods and the bads within it, but also because life itself is good. I explain how this idea can be formalized by associating each version of the view with a function from length of life to the value generated by life itself. Then I argue that every version of the view that life itself is good faces some version of the following dilemma: either (1) good human lives are wor…
Knowing what it's like
David Lewis—famously—never tasted vegemite. Did he have any knowledge of what it's like to taste vegemite? Most say ‘no’; I say ‘yes’. I argue that knowledge of what it's like varies along a spectrum from more exact to more approximate, and that phenomenal concepts vary along a spectrum in how precisely they characterize what it's like to undergo their target experiences. This degreed picture contrasts with the standard all‐or‐nothing picture, wh…
Modeling Mental Qualities
Conscious experiences are characterized by mental qualities, such as those involved in seeing red, feeling pain, or smelling cinnamon. The standard framework for modeling mental qualities represents them via points in multidimensional spaces, where distances between points inversely correspond to degrees of phenomenal similarity. This article argues that the standard framework is structurally inadequate and develops a new framework that is more p…
Modeling Mental Qualities
Conscious experiences are characterized by mental qualities, such as those involved in seeing red, feeling pain, or smelling cinnamon. The standard framework for modeling mental qualities represents them via points in multidimensional spaces, where distances between points inversely correspond to degrees of phenomenal similarity. This article argues that the standard framework is structurally inadequate and develops a new framework that is more p…
Knowing what it's like
David Lewis—famously—never tasted vegemite. Did he have any knowledge of what it's like to taste vegemite? Most say ‘no’; I say ‘yes’. I argue that knowledge of what it's like varies along a spectrum from more exact to more approximate, and that phenomenal concepts vary along a spectrum in how precisely they characterize what it's like to undergo their target experiences. This degreed picture contrasts with the standard all‐or‐nothing picture, wh…
Modeling Mental Qualities
Conscious experiences are characterized by mental qualities, such as those involved in seeing red, feeling pain, or smelling cinnamon. The standard framework for modeling mental qualities represents them via points in multidimensional spaces, where distances between points inversely correspond to degrees of phenomenal similarity. This article argues that the standard framework is structurally inadequate and develops a new framework that is more p…
Degrees of consciousness
Is a human more conscious than an octopus? In the science of consciousness, it's oftentimes assumed that some creatures (or mental states) are more conscious than others. But in recent years, a number of philosophers have argued that the notion of degrees of consciousness is conceptually confused. This paper (1) argues that the most prominent objections to degrees of consciousness are unsustainable, (2) examines the semantics of ‘more conscious t…
The structure of analog representation
This paper develops a theory of analog representation. We first argue that the mark of the analog is to be found in the nature of a representational system's interpretation function, rather than in its vehicles or contents alone. We then develop the rulebound structure theory of analog representation, according to which analog systems use interpretive rules that map syntactic structural features onto semantic structural features. The theory invol…
The Neutrality of Life
Some philosophers think that life is worth living not merely because of the goods and the bads within it, but also because life itself is good. I explain how this idea can be formalized by associating each version of the view with a function from length of life to the value generated by life itself. Then I argue that every version of the view that life itself is good faces some version of the following dilemma: either (1) good human lives are wor…
Knowing what it's like
David Lewis—famously—never tasted vegemite. Did he have any knowledge of what it's like to taste vegemite? Most say ‘no’; I say ‘yes’. I argue that knowledge of what it's like varies along a spectrum from more exact to more approximate, and that phenomenal concepts vary along a spectrum in how precisely they characterize what it's like to undergo their target experiences. This degreed picture contrasts with the standard all‐or‐nothing picture, wh…
Objective Phenomenology
This paper examines the idea of objective phenomenology , or a way of understanding the phenomenal character of conscious experiences that doesn’t require one to have had the kinds of experiences under consideration. My central thesis is that structural facts about experience—facts that characterize purely how conscious experiences are structured—are objective phenomenal facts. I begin by precisifying the idea of objective phenomenology and diagn…
The Gradability of ‘Conscious’
Are some creatures “more conscious” than others? A number of consciousness researchers have aimed to answer this question. Yet some have claimed that this question does not even make sense. They claim that “conscious” (in the phenomenal sense) never occurs as a gradable adjective , meaning an adjective that permits degree expressions (“more f than,” “slightly f ,” etc.) and that is associated with a degreed property. Both sides face an explanator…
Epistemology (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Psychology (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (4 works) · Cognitive science (3 works) · Consciousness (3 works) · Artificial Intelligence (2 works) · Artificial Intelligence (2 works) · Creatures (2 works)