Valeria Palanza
Biographic Data
| ID | 791473 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Valeria Palanza |
| GIVEN NAMES | Valeria |
| FAMILY NAME | Palanza |
| SIGNATURE | PALANZA V |
| AFFILIATIONS | Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-1383-4675 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 70 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 9 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2012 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 5 |
Line‐item vetoes as a coordination mechanism
Although presidential vetoes are central to the legislative process, the role of total versus line item vetoes (LIV) is largely unclear. While total vetoes are a sign of conflict between the branches, as the literature has emphasized, we argue that LIV function as a negative agenda setting mechanism that enables presidents to coordinate within their coalition. To test our argument, we use an original dataset on all statutes and executive decrees …
Lawmaking and Presidential Attributes in the Chilean Constitution
In 2019, Chile was struck by an uprising that shook its political structure to the core. Mobilization was so overwhelming that political elites decided—against what they had defended vigorously during past decades—to allow for a comprehensive reform of the Constitution enacted in 1980. Because constitutions allocate decision rights and define their political system as they do so, the process reopened the debate regarding the country’s imbalanced …
Chile’s failed constitutional intent
This article suggests that the conditions under which the Chilean constitutional process of 2021–22 undertook its task held the seeds of its doom. Constitutional conventions are always tasked with reaching agreements on the controversial allocation of decision rights, and doing so is no simple feat. The Chilean process combined (1) very dispersed preferences regarding the problems the new constitution should solve and the institutions to best ena…
Do Transitional Justice Museums Persuade Visitors? Evidence from a Field Experiment
Do transitional justice museums persuade visitors? We implement a novel field experiment at the Museum of Memory and Human Rights in Santiago, Chile to understand the effects of governments' attempts to shape citizens' attitudes through symbolic transitional justice policies such as museums and memorials. Our findings suggest that though perceptions of the museum vary along ideological lines, Chilean university students display greater support fo…
Presidents on the Fast Track
Among presidents' lesser known legislative powers is urgency authority. Seven Latin American presidents wield it: the constitutional power to impose on lawmakers a short deadline to discuss and vote selected bills. This power is similar to the fast-track authority that Congress grants periodically to the US president. We claim that the key consequence of urgency authority is procedural: urgency prevents amendments during floor consideration. By u…
Congressional Institutionalization
This article explains variations in levels of institutionalization across legislatures of the world. It construes institutionalization as an equilibrium outcome that emerges from beliefs and investments made by political actors. Drawing insights from work on US congressional institutionalization and congressional organization, and on comparative party system institutionalization, it provides an index to measure congressional institutionalization.…
Veto Bargaining and the Legislative Process in Multiparty Presidential Systems
This article analyzes the use of vetoes in multiparty presidential systems. It suggests that the nature of executive-legislative bargaining is fundamentally altered when multiple parties compose the legislature and when presidential veto prerogatives are extended to incorporate partial (line-item) vetoes. Using a data set that includes all bills passed by the Argentine Congress in the past 25 years, we estimate veto occurrence under different sce…
Item Vetoes and Attempts to Override Them in Multiparty Legislatures
This paper analyzes the dynamics of vetoes and veto overrides in the context of a multiparty legislature using an original dataset from the period 1983–2007 in Argentina. We argue that the President can use an “item” or “partial” veto to selectively delete articles, while keeping enough distributive goods in the bill to break up the coalition responsible for its passage, thereby eliminating support for an override. Our research reveals that total…
Argentina
Los años 2010 y 2011 marcaron un ciclo político en Argentina. Tras la muerte del ex presidente Néstor Kirchner sobrevino la consolidación de Cristina Fernández de Kirchner como líder de cuño propio, desembocando en una victoria electoral abrumadora a fines del 2011. Algunos cambios, operados a nivel institucional, podrían transformar el panorama político de largo plazo. Este trabajo repasa la coyuntura política, económica y social de Argentina du…
Do Transitional Justice Museums Persuade Visitors? Evidence from a Field Experiment
Do transitional justice museums persuade visitors? We implement a novel field experiment at the Museum of Memory and Human Rights in Santiago, Chile to understand the effects of governments' attempts to shape citizens' attitudes through symbolic transitional justice policies such as museums and memorials. Our findings suggest that though perceptions of the museum vary along ideological lines, Chilean university students display greater support fo…
Congressional Institutionalization
This article explains variations in levels of institutionalization across legislatures of the world. It construes institutionalization as an equilibrium outcome that emerges from beliefs and investments made by political actors. Drawing insights from work on US congressional institutionalization and congressional organization, and on comparative party system institutionalization, it provides an index to measure congressional institutionalization.…
Veto Bargaining and the Legislative Process in Multiparty Presidential Systems
This article analyzes the use of vetoes in multiparty presidential systems. It suggests that the nature of executive-legislative bargaining is fundamentally altered when multiple parties compose the legislature and when presidential veto prerogatives are extended to incorporate partial (line-item) vetoes. Using a data set that includes all bills passed by the Argentine Congress in the past 25 years, we estimate veto occurrence under different sce…
Argentina
Los años 2010 y 2011 marcaron un ciclo político en Argentina. Tras la muerte del ex presidente Néstor Kirchner sobrevino la consolidación de Cristina Fernández de Kirchner como líder de cuño propio, desembocando en una victoria electoral abrumadora a fines del 2011. Algunos cambios, operados a nivel institucional, podrían transformar el panorama político de largo plazo. Este trabajo repasa la coyuntura política, económica y social de Argentina du…
Item Vetoes and Attempts to Override Them in Multiparty Legislatures
This paper analyzes the dynamics of vetoes and veto overrides in the context of a multiparty legislature using an original dataset from the period 1983–2007 in Argentina. We argue that the President can use an “item” or “partial” veto to selectively delete articles, while keeping enough distributive goods in the bill to break up the coalition responsible for its passage, thereby eliminating support for an override. Our research reveals that total…
Chile’s failed constitutional intent
This article suggests that the conditions under which the Chilean constitutional process of 2021–22 undertook its task held the seeds of its doom. Constitutional conventions are always tasked with reaching agreements on the controversial allocation of decision rights, and doing so is no simple feat. The Chilean process combined (1) very dispersed preferences regarding the problems the new constitution should solve and the institutions to best ena…
Presidents on the Fast Track
Among presidents' lesser known legislative powers is urgency authority. Seven Latin American presidents wield it: the constitutional power to impose on lawmakers a short deadline to discuss and vote selected bills. This power is similar to the fast-track authority that Congress grants periodically to the US president. We claim that the key consequence of urgency authority is procedural: urgency prevents amendments during floor consideration. By u…
Lawmaking and Presidential Attributes in the Chilean Constitution
In 2019, Chile was struck by an uprising that shook its political structure to the core. Mobilization was so overwhelming that political elites decided—against what they had defended vigorously during past decades—to allow for a comprehensive reform of the Constitution enacted in 1980. Because constitutions allocate decision rights and define their political system as they do so, the process reopened the debate regarding the country’s imbalanced …
Argentina
Los años 2010 y 2011 marcaron un ciclo político en Argentina. Tras la muerte del ex presidente Néstor Kirchner sobrevino la consolidación de Cristina Fernández de Kirchner como líder de cuño propio, desembocando en una victoria electoral abrumadora a fines del 2011. Algunos cambios, operados a nivel institucional, podrían transformar el panorama político de largo plazo. Este trabajo repasa la coyuntura política, económica y social de Argentina du…
Item Vetoes and Attempts to Override Them in Multiparty Legislatures
This paper analyzes the dynamics of vetoes and veto overrides in the context of a multiparty legislature using an original dataset from the period 1983–2007 in Argentina. We argue that the President can use an “item” or “partial” veto to selectively delete articles, while keeping enough distributive goods in the bill to break up the coalition responsible for its passage, thereby eliminating support for an override. Our research reveals that total…
Veto Bargaining and the Legislative Process in Multiparty Presidential Systems
This article analyzes the use of vetoes in multiparty presidential systems. It suggests that the nature of executive-legislative bargaining is fundamentally altered when multiple parties compose the legislature and when presidential veto prerogatives are extended to incorporate partial (line-item) vetoes. Using a data set that includes all bills passed by the Argentine Congress in the past 25 years, we estimate veto occurrence under different sce…
Congressional Institutionalization
This article explains variations in levels of institutionalization across legislatures of the world. It construes institutionalization as an equilibrium outcome that emerges from beliefs and investments made by political actors. Drawing insights from work on US congressional institutionalization and congressional organization, and on comparative party system institutionalization, it provides an index to measure congressional institutionalization.…
Presidents on the Fast Track
Among presidents' lesser known legislative powers is urgency authority. Seven Latin American presidents wield it: the constitutional power to impose on lawmakers a short deadline to discuss and vote selected bills. This power is similar to the fast-track authority that Congress grants periodically to the US president. We claim that the key consequence of urgency authority is procedural: urgency prevents amendments during floor consideration. By u…
Do Transitional Justice Museums Persuade Visitors? Evidence from a Field Experiment
Do transitional justice museums persuade visitors? We implement a novel field experiment at the Museum of Memory and Human Rights in Santiago, Chile to understand the effects of governments' attempts to shape citizens' attitudes through symbolic transitional justice policies such as museums and memorials. Our findings suggest that though perceptions of the museum vary along ideological lines, Chilean university students display greater support fo…
Chile’s failed constitutional intent
This article suggests that the conditions under which the Chilean constitutional process of 2021–22 undertook its task held the seeds of its doom. Constitutional conventions are always tasked with reaching agreements on the controversial allocation of decision rights, and doing so is no simple feat. The Chilean process combined (1) very dispersed preferences regarding the problems the new constitution should solve and the institutions to best ena…
Line‐item vetoes as a coordination mechanism
Although presidential vetoes are central to the legislative process, the role of total versus line item vetoes (LIV) is largely unclear. While total vetoes are a sign of conflict between the branches, as the literature has emphasized, we argue that LIV function as a negative agenda setting mechanism that enables presidents to coordinate within their coalition. To test our argument, we use an original dataset on all statutes and executive decrees …
Lawmaking and Presidential Attributes in the Chilean Constitution
In 2019, Chile was struck by an uprising that shook its political structure to the core. Mobilization was so overwhelming that political elites decided—against what they had defended vigorously during past decades—to allow for a comprehensive reform of the Constitution enacted in 1980. Because constitutions allocate decision rights and define their political system as they do so, the process reopened the debate regarding the country’s imbalanced …
Political science (9 works) · Law (7 works) · Judicial and Constitutional Studies (6 works) · Law (6 works) · Legislature (6 works) · Politics (6 works) · Law and economics (5 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (4 works) · Sociology (4 works) · Economics (3 works)