Juan Pablo Micozzi
Biographic Data
| ID | 801793 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Juan Pablo Micozzi |
| GIVEN NAMES | Juan Pablo |
| FAMILY NAME | Micozzi |
| SIGNATURE | MICOZZI J P |
| AFFILIATIONS | Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-3865-4870 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 23 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 311 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 23 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2005 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 10 |
Working Class Inclusion: Evaluations of Democratic Institutions in Latin America by Tiffany D. Barnes, Yann P. Kerevel and Gregory W. Saxton
Gender, Institutions, and Legislative Speech
Speechmaking is a vital resource for legislators and holds particular importance for women lawmakers, who frequently constitute a numerical minority and face constraints on their political influence. We argue that formal and informal institutions, district characteristics, and issue priorities shape women's speech participation. Analyzing twenty-eight years of speeches from Chile's Chamber of Deputies, we first show that women's speeches constitu…
Congressional Committees, Electoral Connections, and Legislative Speech
This article examines the effects of committee specialization and district characteristics on speech participation by topic and congressional forum. It argues that committee specialization should increase speech participation during legislative debates, while district characteristics should affect the likelihood of speech participation in non-lawmaking forums. To examine these expectations, we analyze over 100,000 speeches delivered in the Chilea…
Does the early bird always get the worm? First round advantages and second round victories in Latin America
Magnitud de distrito y representación femenina: Evidencia de Argentina y América Latina
En este trabajo argumentamos que el efecto global de la magnitud de distrito sobre la representación femenina es ambiguo, dado que la magnitud de distrito puede aumentar tanto (a) la magnitud partidaria-lo que promueve la elección de mujeres-como (b) el número de listas que obtienen escaños-que la dificulta, ya que las listas marginales suelen estar encabezadas por hombres. Para identificar el efecto de interés, explotamos el hecho de que la Cáma…
Resignation as Promotion? Executive Turnover and Early Departures in the Argentine Congress, 1983–2017
When (and why) do legislators quit their jobs? Previous answers to this question have focused on retirements. Looking at voluntary resignations instead, in this article we argue that leaving Congress to assume an elected (executive) office or a position in the (sub)national bureaucracy may be a career‐advancing move motivated by progressive ambition. We document this claim with data from Argentina, where roughly 12% of elected deputies leave volu…
Parliamentary rules, party norms, and legislative speech
This article examines speech participation under different parliamentary rules: open forums dedicated to bill debates, and closed forums reserved for non-lawmaking speeches. It discusses how electoral incentives influence speechmaking by promoting divergent party norms within those forums. Our empirical analysis focuses on the Chilean Chamber of Deputies. The findings lend support to the view that, in forums dedicated to non-lawmaking speeches, p…
District Magnitude and Female Representation: Evidence from Argentina and Latin America
We claim that the overall effect of district magnitude on female representation is ambiguous because district magnitude increases both (a) party magnitude—which promotes the election of women, and (b) the number of lists getting seats—which hampers it, as marginal lists are usually headed by men. For identification, we exploit the fact that the Argentine Chamber of Deputies and the Buenos Aires legislature elect half of their members every two ye…
How valuable is a legislative seat? Incumbency effects in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies
In many developing countries, national legislative seats are considered less valuable than (subnational) executive positions. Even then, ambitious politicians may seek a legislative seat either (a) as a window of opportunity for jumping to an executive office; or (b) as a consolation prize when no better option is available. Using a regression discontinuity design adapted to a pr setting, we examine these possibilities in the Argentine Chamber of…
Constituency Effects and Legislative Dissent Under Closed-List Proportional Representation
According to conventional wisdom, closed-list proportional representation (CLPR) electoral systems create incentives for legislators to favor the party line over their voters' positions. However, electoral incentives may induce party leaders to tolerate "shirking" by some legislators, even under CLPR. This study argues that in considering whose deviations from the party line should be tolerated, party leaders exploit differences in voters' relati…
Disentangling the Role of Ideology and Partisanship in Legislative Voting: Evidence from Argentina
We present a novel approach to disentangle the effects of ideology, partisanship, and constituency pressures on roll‐call voting. First, we place voters and legislators on a common ideological space. Next, we use roll‐call data to identify the partisan influence on legislators' behavior. Finally, we use a structural equation model to account for these separate effects on legislative voting. We rely on public opinion data and a survey of Argentine…
The hidden electoral connection: Analysing parliamentary questions in the Chilean Congress
Legislators in presidential countries use a variety of mechanisms to advance their electoral careers and connect with relevant constituents. The most frequently studied activities are bill initiation, co-sponsoring, and legislative speeches. In this paper, the authors examine legislators' information requests (i.e. parliamentary questions) to the government, which have been studied in some parliamentary countries but remain largely unscrutinised …
Division or Union of Labor? Analyzing Workers' Representation in the Argentine Congress
Does social background affect legislators' behavior in office? Do individuals with specific social ties tend to be mainly concerned with representing their group of reference, beyond partisanship? This article deals with these questions by analyzing bill-drafting patterns by representatives in the Argentine Congress who belong to an understudied group: workers. The wide presence of a broad, populist party (Peronism) that historically incorporated…
The Effect of the Electoral Calendar on Politicians' Selection into Legislative Cohorts and Legislative Behavior in Argentina, 1983–2007
How do electoral opportunities affect politicians' career strategies? Do politicians behave strategically in response to the opportunities provided by the electoral calendar? We argue that in a legislature that combines nonstatic ambition with a staggered electoral calendar, different kinds of politicians will have dissimilar preferences towards running in concurrent or midterm elections. More specifically, politicians with no previous executive …
An empirical stochastic model of Argentina’s Impossible Game (1955–1966)
Argentine politics from 1955 to 1966 was characterized by the conflict between the Peronists and the anti-Peronists. While each camp could veto the other’s project, neither could advance their own agenda. In his canonical interpretation, O’Donnell ( Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism. Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973) concluded that party democracy during this era was tantamount to an ‘…
The Subnational Connection in Unitary Regimes: Progressive Ambition and Legislative Behavior inUruguay
How do legislators develop reputations to further their individual goals in environments with limited space for personalization? In this article, we evaluate congressional behavior by legislators with gubernatorial expectations in a unitary environment where parties control political activities and institutions hinder individualization. By analyzing the process of drafting bills inUruguay, we demonstrate that deputies with subnational executive a…
From House to Home: Strategic Bill Drafting in Multilevel Systems with Non-static Ambition
How do legislators behave in systems where pursuit of re-election is not the rule, and ambition is channelled through multiple levels of government? Is their legislative behaviour biased towards their immediate career goals? In this paper, the Argentine case is analysed in order to explore the link between political ambition and legislative performance in a multilevel setting where politicians have subnational executive positions as priorities, r…
Alliance for Progress? Multilevel Ambition and Patterns of Cosponsorship in the Argentine House
How does political ambition affect strategies of cooperation in Congress? What activities do legislators develop with their peers to maximize their career goals? One of the main collaborative activities in a legislature, cosponsorship, has been widely analyzed in the literature as a position taking device. However, most findings have been restricted to environments where ambition is static (i.e., legislators pursuing permanent reelection), which …
Does Electoral Accountability Make a Difference? Direct Elections, Career Ambition, and Legislative Performance in the Argentine Senate
Studies analyzing the American Congress demonstrate that senators’ attention towards voters substantially increased after the 17th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which replaced their indirect appointment with direct election. Even though this finding seems useful for theoretical generalizations, expectations become unclear as concerns about career perspectives differ. Should politicians with nonstatic ambition shift their attention towards v…
Does Women's Presence Change Legislative Behavior? Evidence from Argentina, 1983–2007
In scores of countries, the adoption of gender quotas has boosted the numbers of women elected to national legislatures. How does the growing presence of women affect legislative behavior regarding women's rights? Using an original dataset of all the bills submitted to the Argentine Congress between 1983 and 2007, we analyze the relationship between women's presence in Congress and the introduction and approval of bills related to women's rights.…
The Quality of Democracy in Latin America
Government and Opposition in the Argentine Congress, 1989-2007: Understanding Inter-Party Dynamics through Roll Call Vote Analysis
This article employs roll call vote data and Bayesian ideal point estimation to examine inter-party dynamics in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies between 1989 and 2007. It highlights the presence in the Argentine Congress of a strong government vs. opposition dimension as well as identifies the relative position on this dimension, vis-à-vis the governing party, of the most prominent non-governing parties. Special attention is paid to the evolutio…
The Governor' Backyard: A Seat-Vote Model of Electoral Reform for Subnational Multiparty Races
Evaluating the fairness of electoral reforms is a critical requirement for electoral accountability in any democracy. There is, however, no research measuring the expected seat benefit for incumbent reformers in newly democratized countries. Much of this delay is due to the technical difficulties of generalizing previous seat-vote models to multiparty races, a problem that has limited both subnational and cross-national comparisons of electoral r…
Does Women's Presence Change Legislative Behavior? Evidence from Argentina, 1983–2007
In scores of countries, the adoption of gender quotas has boosted the numbers of women elected to national legislatures. How does the growing presence of women affect legislative behavior regarding women's rights? Using an original dataset of all the bills submitted to the Argentine Congress between 1983 and 2007, we analyze the relationship between women's presence in Congress and the introduction and approval of bills related to women's rights.…
The Governor' Backyard: A Seat-Vote Model of Electoral Reform for Subnational Multiparty Races
Evaluating the fairness of electoral reforms is a critical requirement for electoral accountability in any democracy. There is, however, no research measuring the expected seat benefit for incumbent reformers in newly democratized countries. Much of this delay is due to the technical difficulties of generalizing previous seat-vote models to multiparty races, a problem that has limited both subnational and cross-national comparisons of electoral r…
The Subnational Connection in Unitary Regimes: Progressive Ambition and Legislative Behavior inUruguay
How do legislators develop reputations to further their individual goals in environments with limited space for personalization? In this article, we evaluate congressional behavior by legislators with gubernatorial expectations in a unitary environment where parties control political activities and institutions hinder individualization. By analyzing the process of drafting bills inUruguay, we demonstrate that deputies with subnational executive a…
From House to Home: Strategic Bill Drafting in Multilevel Systems with Non-static Ambition
How do legislators behave in systems where pursuit of re-election is not the rule, and ambition is channelled through multiple levels of government? Is their legislative behaviour biased towards their immediate career goals? In this paper, the Argentine case is analysed in order to explore the link between political ambition and legislative performance in a multilevel setting where politicians have subnational executive positions as priorities, r…
Alliance for Progress? Multilevel Ambition and Patterns of Cosponsorship in the Argentine House
How does political ambition affect strategies of cooperation in Congress? What activities do legislators develop with their peers to maximize their career goals? One of the main collaborative activities in a legislature, cosponsorship, has been widely analyzed in the literature as a position taking device. However, most findings have been restricted to environments where ambition is static (i.e., legislators pursuing permanent reelection), which …
Government and Opposition in the Argentine Congress, 1989-2007: Understanding Inter-Party Dynamics through Roll Call Vote Analysis
This article employs roll call vote data and Bayesian ideal point estimation to examine inter-party dynamics in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies between 1989 and 2007. It highlights the presence in the Argentine Congress of a strong government vs. opposition dimension as well as identifies the relative position on this dimension, vis-à-vis the governing party, of the most prominent non-governing parties. Special attention is paid to the evolutio…
The hidden electoral connection: Analysing parliamentary questions in the Chilean Congress
Legislators in presidential countries use a variety of mechanisms to advance their electoral careers and connect with relevant constituents. The most frequently studied activities are bill initiation, co-sponsoring, and legislative speeches. In this paper, the authors examine legislators' information requests (i.e. parliamentary questions) to the government, which have been studied in some parliamentary countries but remain largely unscrutinised …
Does Electoral Accountability Make a Difference? Direct Elections, Career Ambition, and Legislative Performance in the Argentine Senate
Studies analyzing the American Congress demonstrate that senators’ attention towards voters substantially increased after the 17th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which replaced their indirect appointment with direct election. Even though this finding seems useful for theoretical generalizations, expectations become unclear as concerns about career perspectives differ. Should politicians with nonstatic ambition shift their attention towards v…
Disentangling the Role of Ideology and Partisanship in Legislative Voting: Evidence from Argentina
We present a novel approach to disentangle the effects of ideology, partisanship, and constituency pressures on roll‐call voting. First, we place voters and legislators on a common ideological space. Next, we use roll‐call data to identify the partisan influence on legislators' behavior. Finally, we use a structural equation model to account for these separate effects on legislative voting. We rely on public opinion data and a survey of Argentine…
The Effect of the Electoral Calendar on Politicians' Selection into Legislative Cohorts and Legislative Behavior in Argentina, 1983–2007
How do electoral opportunities affect politicians' career strategies? Do politicians behave strategically in response to the opportunities provided by the electoral calendar? We argue that in a legislature that combines nonstatic ambition with a staggered electoral calendar, different kinds of politicians will have dissimilar preferences towards running in concurrent or midterm elections. More specifically, politicians with no previous executive …
Parliamentary rules, party norms, and legislative speech
This article examines speech participation under different parliamentary rules: open forums dedicated to bill debates, and closed forums reserved for non-lawmaking speeches. It discusses how electoral incentives influence speechmaking by promoting divergent party norms within those forums. Our empirical analysis focuses on the Chilean Chamber of Deputies. The findings lend support to the view that, in forums dedicated to non-lawmaking speeches, p…
Division or Union of Labor? Analyzing Workers' Representation in the Argentine Congress
Does social background affect legislators' behavior in office? Do individuals with specific social ties tend to be mainly concerned with representing their group of reference, beyond partisanship? This article deals with these questions by analyzing bill-drafting patterns by representatives in the Argentine Congress who belong to an understudied group: workers. The wide presence of a broad, populist party (Peronism) that historically incorporated…
How valuable is a legislative seat? Incumbency effects in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies
In many developing countries, national legislative seats are considered less valuable than (subnational) executive positions. Even then, ambitious politicians may seek a legislative seat either (a) as a window of opportunity for jumping to an executive office; or (b) as a consolation prize when no better option is available. Using a regression discontinuity design adapted to a pr setting, we examine these possibilities in the Argentine Chamber of…
District Magnitude and Female Representation: Evidence from Argentina and Latin America
We claim that the overall effect of district magnitude on female representation is ambiguous because district magnitude increases both (a) party magnitude—which promotes the election of women, and (b) the number of lists getting seats—which hampers it, as marginal lists are usually headed by men. For identification, we exploit the fact that the Argentine Chamber of Deputies and the Buenos Aires legislature elect half of their members every two ye…
An empirical stochastic model of Argentina’s Impossible Game (1955–1966)
Argentine politics from 1955 to 1966 was characterized by the conflict between the Peronists and the anti-Peronists. While each camp could veto the other’s project, neither could advance their own agenda. In his canonical interpretation, O’Donnell ( Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism. Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973) concluded that party democracy during this era was tantamount to an ‘…
Congressional Committees, Electoral Connections, and Legislative Speech
This article examines the effects of committee specialization and district characteristics on speech participation by topic and congressional forum. It argues that committee specialization should increase speech participation during legislative debates, while district characteristics should affect the likelihood of speech participation in non-lawmaking forums. To examine these expectations, we analyze over 100,000 speeches delivered in the Chilea…
Gender, Institutions, and Legislative Speech
Speechmaking is a vital resource for legislators and holds particular importance for women lawmakers, who frequently constitute a numerical minority and face constraints on their political influence. We argue that formal and informal institutions, district characteristics, and issue priorities shape women's speech participation. Analyzing twenty-eight years of speeches from Chile's Chamber of Deputies, we first show that women's speeches constitu…
Does the early bird always get the worm? First round advantages and second round victories in Latin America
Resignation as Promotion? Executive Turnover and Early Departures in the Argentine Congress, 1983–2017
When (and why) do legislators quit their jobs? Previous answers to this question have focused on retirements. Looking at voluntary resignations instead, in this article we argue that leaving Congress to assume an elected (executive) office or a position in the (sub)national bureaucracy may be a career‐advancing move motivated by progressive ambition. We document this claim with data from Argentina, where roughly 12% of elected deputies leave volu…
Constituency Effects and Legislative Dissent Under Closed-List Proportional Representation
According to conventional wisdom, closed-list proportional representation (CLPR) electoral systems create incentives for legislators to favor the party line over their voters' positions. However, electoral incentives may induce party leaders to tolerate "shirking" by some legislators, even under CLPR. This study argues that in considering whose deviations from the party line should be tolerated, party leaders exploit differences in voters' relati…
The Governor' Backyard: A Seat-Vote Model of Electoral Reform for Subnational Multiparty Races
Evaluating the fairness of electoral reforms is a critical requirement for electoral accountability in any democracy. There is, however, no research measuring the expected seat benefit for incumbent reformers in newly democratized countries. Much of this delay is due to the technical difficulties of generalizing previous seat-vote models to multiparty races, a problem that has limited both subnational and cross-national comparisons of electoral r…
Government and Opposition in the Argentine Congress, 1989-2007: Understanding Inter-Party Dynamics through Roll Call Vote Analysis
This article employs roll call vote data and Bayesian ideal point estimation to examine inter-party dynamics in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies between 1989 and 2007. It highlights the presence in the Argentine Congress of a strong government vs. opposition dimension as well as identifies the relative position on this dimension, vis-à-vis the governing party, of the most prominent non-governing parties. Special attention is paid to the evolutio…
The Quality of Democracy in Latin America
Does Electoral Accountability Make a Difference? Direct Elections, Career Ambition, and Legislative Performance in the Argentine Senate
Studies analyzing the American Congress demonstrate that senators’ attention towards voters substantially increased after the 17th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which replaced their indirect appointment with direct election. Even though this finding seems useful for theoretical generalizations, expectations become unclear as concerns about career perspectives differ. Should politicians with nonstatic ambition shift their attention towards v…
Does Women's Presence Change Legislative Behavior? Evidence from Argentina, 1983–2007
In scores of countries, the adoption of gender quotas has boosted the numbers of women elected to national legislatures. How does the growing presence of women affect legislative behavior regarding women's rights? Using an original dataset of all the bills submitted to the Argentine Congress between 1983 and 2007, we analyze the relationship between women's presence in Congress and the introduction and approval of bills related to women's rights.…
The Subnational Connection in Unitary Regimes: Progressive Ambition and Legislative Behavior inUruguay
How do legislators develop reputations to further their individual goals in environments with limited space for personalization? In this article, we evaluate congressional behavior by legislators with gubernatorial expectations in a unitary environment where parties control political activities and institutions hinder individualization. By analyzing the process of drafting bills inUruguay, we demonstrate that deputies with subnational executive a…
From House to Home: Strategic Bill Drafting in Multilevel Systems with Non-static Ambition
How do legislators behave in systems where pursuit of re-election is not the rule, and ambition is channelled through multiple levels of government? Is their legislative behaviour biased towards their immediate career goals? In this paper, the Argentine case is analysed in order to explore the link between political ambition and legislative performance in a multilevel setting where politicians have subnational executive positions as priorities, r…
Alliance for Progress? Multilevel Ambition and Patterns of Cosponsorship in the Argentine House
How does political ambition affect strategies of cooperation in Congress? What activities do legislators develop with their peers to maximize their career goals? One of the main collaborative activities in a legislature, cosponsorship, has been widely analyzed in the literature as a position taking device. However, most findings have been restricted to environments where ambition is static (i.e., legislators pursuing permanent reelection), which …
The Effect of the Electoral Calendar on Politicians' Selection into Legislative Cohorts and Legislative Behavior in Argentina, 1983–2007
How do electoral opportunities affect politicians' career strategies? Do politicians behave strategically in response to the opportunities provided by the electoral calendar? We argue that in a legislature that combines nonstatic ambition with a staggered electoral calendar, different kinds of politicians will have dissimilar preferences towards running in concurrent or midterm elections. More specifically, politicians with no previous executive …
An empirical stochastic model of Argentina’s Impossible Game (1955–1966)
Argentine politics from 1955 to 1966 was characterized by the conflict between the Peronists and the anti-Peronists. While each camp could veto the other’s project, neither could advance their own agenda. In his canonical interpretation, O’Donnell ( Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism. Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973) concluded that party democracy during this era was tantamount to an ‘…
Disentangling the Role of Ideology and Partisanship in Legislative Voting: Evidence from Argentina
We present a novel approach to disentangle the effects of ideology, partisanship, and constituency pressures on roll‐call voting. First, we place voters and legislators on a common ideological space. Next, we use roll‐call data to identify the partisan influence on legislators' behavior. Finally, we use a structural equation model to account for these separate effects on legislative voting. We rely on public opinion data and a survey of Argentine…
The hidden electoral connection: Analysing parliamentary questions in the Chilean Congress
Legislators in presidential countries use a variety of mechanisms to advance their electoral careers and connect with relevant constituents. The most frequently studied activities are bill initiation, co-sponsoring, and legislative speeches. In this paper, the authors examine legislators' information requests (i.e. parliamentary questions) to the government, which have been studied in some parliamentary countries but remain largely unscrutinised …
Division or Union of Labor? Analyzing Workers' Representation in the Argentine Congress
Does social background affect legislators' behavior in office? Do individuals with specific social ties tend to be mainly concerned with representing their group of reference, beyond partisanship? This article deals with these questions by analyzing bill-drafting patterns by representatives in the Argentine Congress who belong to an understudied group: workers. The wide presence of a broad, populist party (Peronism) that historically incorporated…
How valuable is a legislative seat? Incumbency effects in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies
In many developing countries, national legislative seats are considered less valuable than (subnational) executive positions. Even then, ambitious politicians may seek a legislative seat either (a) as a window of opportunity for jumping to an executive office; or (b) as a consolation prize when no better option is available. Using a regression discontinuity design adapted to a pr setting, we examine these possibilities in the Argentine Chamber of…
Constituency Effects and Legislative Dissent Under Closed-List Proportional Representation
According to conventional wisdom, closed-list proportional representation (CLPR) electoral systems create incentives for legislators to favor the party line over their voters' positions. However, electoral incentives may induce party leaders to tolerate "shirking" by some legislators, even under CLPR. This study argues that in considering whose deviations from the party line should be tolerated, party leaders exploit differences in voters' relati…
Resignation as Promotion? Executive Turnover and Early Departures in the Argentine Congress, 1983–2017
When (and why) do legislators quit their jobs? Previous answers to this question have focused on retirements. Looking at voluntary resignations instead, in this article we argue that leaving Congress to assume an elected (executive) office or a position in the (sub)national bureaucracy may be a career‐advancing move motivated by progressive ambition. We document this claim with data from Argentina, where roughly 12% of elected deputies leave volu…
Parliamentary rules, party norms, and legislative speech
This article examines speech participation under different parliamentary rules: open forums dedicated to bill debates, and closed forums reserved for non-lawmaking speeches. It discusses how electoral incentives influence speechmaking by promoting divergent party norms within those forums. Our empirical analysis focuses on the Chilean Chamber of Deputies. The findings lend support to the view that, in forums dedicated to non-lawmaking speeches, p…
District Magnitude and Female Representation: Evidence from Argentina and Latin America
We claim that the overall effect of district magnitude on female representation is ambiguous because district magnitude increases both (a) party magnitude—which promotes the election of women, and (b) the number of lists getting seats—which hampers it, as marginal lists are usually headed by men. For identification, we exploit the fact that the Argentine Chamber of Deputies and the Buenos Aires legislature elect half of their members every two ye…
Congressional Committees, Electoral Connections, and Legislative Speech
This article examines the effects of committee specialization and district characteristics on speech participation by topic and congressional forum. It argues that committee specialization should increase speech participation during legislative debates, while district characteristics should affect the likelihood of speech participation in non-lawmaking forums. To examine these expectations, we analyze over 100,000 speeches delivered in the Chilea…
Does the early bird always get the worm? First round advantages and second round victories in Latin America
Magnitud de distrito y representación femenina: Evidencia de Argentina y América Latina
En este trabajo argumentamos que el efecto global de la magnitud de distrito sobre la representación femenina es ambiguo, dado que la magnitud de distrito puede aumentar tanto (a) la magnitud partidaria-lo que promueve la elección de mujeres-como (b) el número de listas que obtienen escaños-que la dificulta, ya que las listas marginales suelen estar encabezadas por hombres. Para identificar el efecto de interés, explotamos el hecho de que la Cáma…
Working Class Inclusion: Evaluations of Democratic Institutions in Latin America by Tiffany D. Barnes, Yann P. Kerevel and Gregory W. Saxton
Gender, Institutions, and Legislative Speech
Speechmaking is a vital resource for legislators and holds particular importance for women lawmakers, who frequently constitute a numerical minority and face constraints on their political influence. We argue that formal and informal institutions, district characteristics, and issue priorities shape women's speech participation. Analyzing twenty-eight years of speeches from Chile's Chamber of Deputies, we first show that women's speeches constitu…
Political science (22 works) · Law (21 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (19 works) · Law (18 works) · Politics (18 works) · Legislature (17 works) · Economics (16 works) · Public Administration (15 works) · Political economy (13 works) · Politics and Society in Latin America (13 works)