Ludwig Kersten
Biographic Data
| ID | 807994 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Ludwig Kersten |
| GIVEN NAMES | Ludwig |
| FAMILY NAME | Kersten |
| SIGNATURE | KERSTEN L |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Alberta |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-7054-8942 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1970 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Artificial minds and AI duplication: The very idea
The AI duplication thesis claims that AI systems which are identical to humans on an abstract functional level of description relevant to psychology and behaviour (‘AI duplicates’) are nomologically possible. First, we argue that the AI duplication thesis should be understood in terms of the identity of medium-independent computational properties, and that medium-independence should not be understood as a special case of multiple realisability. S…
Implementing artificial consciousness
Implementationalism maintains that conventional, silicon‐based artificial systems are not conscious because they fail to satisfy certain substantive constraints on computational implementation. In this article, we argue that several recently proposed substantive constraints are implausible, or at least are not well‐supported, insofar as they conflate intuitions about computational implementation generally and consciousness specifically. We argue …
Wide computationalism revisited: Distributed mechanisms, parsimony and testability
Recent years have seen a surge of interest in applying mechanistic thinking to computational accounts of implementation and individuation. One recent extension of this work involves so-called ‘wide’ approaches to computation, the view that computational processes spread out beyond the boundaries of the individual. These ‘mechanistic accounts of wide computation’ maintain that computational processes are wide in virtue of being part of mechanisms …
An idealised account of mechanistic computation
A New Mark of the Cognitive? Predictive Processing and Extended Cognition
There is a longstanding debate between those who think that cognition extends into the external environment (extend cognition) and those who think it is located squarely within the individual (internalism). Recently, a new actor has emerged on the scene, one that looks to play kingmaker. Predictive processing (PP) says that the mind/brain is fundamentally engaged in a process of minimising the difference between what is predicted about the world …
How to be concrete: Mechanistic computation and the abstraction problem
This paper takes up a recent challenge to mechanistic approaches to computational implementation (MAC), the view that computational implementation is best explicated within a mechanistic framework. The challenge, what has been labelled “the abstraction problem”, claims that one of MAC’s central pillars – medium independence – is deeply confused when applied to the question of computational implementation. The concern is that while it makes sense …
Las tribus indígenas del gran chaco hasta fines del siglo XVIII. Una contribución a la etnografía histórica de Sudamérica
A New Mark of the Cognitive? Predictive Processing and Extended Cognition
There is a longstanding debate between those who think that cognition extends into the external environment (extend cognition) and those who think it is located squarely within the individual (internalism). Recently, a new actor has emerged on the scene, one that looks to play kingmaker. Predictive processing (PP) says that the mind/brain is fundamentally engaged in a process of minimising the difference between what is predicted about the world …
Las tribus indígenas del gran chaco hasta fines del siglo XVIII. Una contribución a la etnografía histórica de Sudamérica
How to be concrete: Mechanistic computation and the abstraction problem
This paper takes up a recent challenge to mechanistic approaches to computational implementation (MAC), the view that computational implementation is best explicated within a mechanistic framework. The challenge, what has been labelled “the abstraction problem”, claims that one of MAC’s central pillars – medium independence – is deeply confused when applied to the question of computational implementation. The concern is that while it makes sense …
A New Mark of the Cognitive? Predictive Processing and Extended Cognition
There is a longstanding debate between those who think that cognition extends into the external environment (extend cognition) and those who think it is located squarely within the individual (internalism). Recently, a new actor has emerged on the scene, one that looks to play kingmaker. Predictive processing (PP) says that the mind/brain is fundamentally engaged in a process of minimising the difference between what is predicted about the world …
Wide computationalism revisited: Distributed mechanisms, parsimony and testability
Recent years have seen a surge of interest in applying mechanistic thinking to computational accounts of implementation and individuation. One recent extension of this work involves so-called ‘wide’ approaches to computation, the view that computational processes spread out beyond the boundaries of the individual. These ‘mechanistic accounts of wide computation’ maintain that computational processes are wide in virtue of being part of mechanisms …
An idealised account of mechanistic computation
Implementing artificial consciousness
Implementationalism maintains that conventional, silicon‐based artificial systems are not conscious because they fail to satisfy certain substantive constraints on computational implementation. In this article, we argue that several recently proposed substantive constraints are implausible, or at least are not well‐supported, insofar as they conflate intuitions about computational implementation generally and consciousness specifically. We argue …
Artificial minds and AI duplication: The very idea
The AI duplication thesis claims that AI systems which are identical to humans on an abstract functional level of description relevant to psychology and behaviour (‘AI duplicates’) are nomologically possible. First, we argue that the AI duplication thesis should be understood in terms of the identity of medium-independent computational properties, and that medium-independence should not be understood as a special case of multiple realisability. S…
Computability, Logic, AI Algorithms (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Epistemology (4 works) · Psychology (4 works) · Cognitive science (3 works) · Embodied and Extended Cognition (3 works) · Metaphysics (3 works) · Computation (2 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (2 works)