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Bruno Pantaleão

Biographic Data

ID818294
NAMEBruno Pantaleão
GIVEN NAMESBruno
FAMILY NAMEPantaleão
SIGNATUREPANTALEÃO B
AFFILIATIONSFundação Getulio Vargas
ORCID0000-0002-9605-2483
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS6
TOTAL CITATIONS4
AUTHOR COUNT6
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2025
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2026
H-INDEX1
  • Improving police management boosts economic development: Evidence from Brazil

    Open Access•Bruno Pantaleão•ARTICLE•World Development•2026•References: 67

  • The Cross-Border Spillover Effects of Cannabis Regulation in South America

    Open Access•Bruno de Assis, Giovanni di Pietra et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Quantitative Criminology•2025

  • Police autonomy, data-driven strategies, and violence: Evidence from Brazil’s policing reform

    Open Access•Rafael Parfitt, Bruno Pantaleão et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•2025•Cited by: 1•References: 9

  • Peace Dividends: Criminal Governance, Rational Violence, and Economic Development

    Open Access•Bruno Pantaleão•ARTICLE•American Political Science Review•2025•Cited by: 1•References: 35

    In this article, I show that in contexts where the state fails to deliver order and security, criminal organizations can paradoxically facilitate economic development. I consider the case of the Primeiro Comando da Capital [“First Capital Command”] (PCC)—a Brazilian prison gang that has achieved hegemony over the criminal market of a large region and become the de facto regulator of violence and organized crime in São Paulo. Employing a robust di…

  • Enxugando Gelo: Apresentando Os Microdados Das Apreensões De Drogas No Sul Do Brasil

    Open Access•Bruno Pantaleão•ARTICLE•Revista Brasileira de Segurança…•2025•References: 16

    A chamada Guerra às Drogas é uma das principais políticas e estratégias de segurança pública em vigor no Brasil. Embora o atual modelo repressivo onere recursos escassos em áreas essenciais como educação e saúde, sua avaliação sistemática é dificultada pela falta de indicadores tangíveis de sucesso. Aumentos nas apreensões são frequentemente interpretados como triunfos da estratégia governamental, mas podem, na realidade, refletir o fracasso da e…

  • When Elections Empower Crime: Political Protection and Milícia Expansion in Rio de Janeiro

    Open Access•Bruno Pantaleão, Isabella C Montini•ARTICLE•Latin American Politics and Society•2025•Cited by: 2•References: 45

    Milícias are mafia-style organizations, often composed of current and former state agents, that have rapidly expanded in areas with limited state presence and weak legal oversight. In Rio de Janeiro, their territorial control is not maintained by coercion alone, but also through strategic political alliances. This article theorizes and tests a mechanism linking milícia expansion to electoral politics: milícias deliver concentrated electoral suppo…

  • When Elections Empower Crime: Political Protection and Milícia Expansion in Rio de Janeiro

    Open Access•Bruno Pantaleão, Isabella C Montini•ARTICLE•Latin American Politics and Society•2025•Cited by: 2•References: 45

    Milícias are mafia-style organizations, often composed of current and former state agents, that have rapidly expanded in areas with limited state presence and weak legal oversight. In Rio de Janeiro, their territorial control is not maintained by coercion alone, but also through strategic political alliances. This article theorizes and tests a mechanism linking milícia expansion to electoral politics: milícias deliver concentrated electoral suppo…

  • Police autonomy, data-driven strategies, and violence: Evidence from Brazil’s policing reform

    Open Access•Rafael Parfitt, Bruno Pantaleão et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•2025•Cited by: 1•References: 9

  • Peace Dividends: Criminal Governance, Rational Violence, and Economic Development

    Open Access•Bruno Pantaleão•ARTICLE•American Political Science Review•2025•Cited by: 1•References: 35

    In this article, I show that in contexts where the state fails to deliver order and security, criminal organizations can paradoxically facilitate economic development. I consider the case of the Primeiro Comando da Capital [“First Capital Command”] (PCC)—a Brazilian prison gang that has achieved hegemony over the criminal market of a large region and become the de facto regulator of violence and organized crime in São Paulo. Employing a robust di…

  • The Cross-Border Spillover Effects of Cannabis Regulation in South America

    Open Access•Bruno de Assis, Giovanni di Pietra et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Quantitative Criminology•2025

  • Police autonomy, data-driven strategies, and violence: Evidence from Brazil’s policing reform

    Open Access•Rafael Parfitt, Bruno Pantaleão et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•2025•Cited by: 1•References: 9

  • Peace Dividends: Criminal Governance, Rational Violence, and Economic Development

    Open Access•Bruno Pantaleão•ARTICLE•American Political Science Review•2025•Cited by: 1•References: 35

    In this article, I show that in contexts where the state fails to deliver order and security, criminal organizations can paradoxically facilitate economic development. I consider the case of the Primeiro Comando da Capital [“First Capital Command”] (PCC)—a Brazilian prison gang that has achieved hegemony over the criminal market of a large region and become the de facto regulator of violence and organized crime in São Paulo. Employing a robust di…

  • Enxugando Gelo: Apresentando Os Microdados Das Apreensões De Drogas No Sul Do Brasil

    Open Access•Bruno Pantaleão•ARTICLE•Revista Brasileira de Segurança…•2025•References: 16

    A chamada Guerra às Drogas é uma das principais políticas e estratégias de segurança pública em vigor no Brasil. Embora o atual modelo repressivo onere recursos escassos em áreas essenciais como educação e saúde, sua avaliação sistemática é dificultada pela falta de indicadores tangíveis de sucesso. Aumentos nas apreensões são frequentemente interpretados como triunfos da estratégia governamental, mas podem, na realidade, refletir o fracasso da e…

  • When Elections Empower Crime: Political Protection and Milícia Expansion in Rio de Janeiro

    Open Access•Bruno Pantaleão, Isabella C Montini•ARTICLE•Latin American Politics and Society•2025•Cited by: 2•References: 45

    Milícias are mafia-style organizations, often composed of current and former state agents, that have rapidly expanded in areas with limited state presence and weak legal oversight. In Rio de Janeiro, their territorial control is not maintained by coercion alone, but also through strategic political alliances. This article theorizes and tests a mechanism linking milícia expansion to electoral politics: milícias deliver concentrated electoral suppo…

  • Improving police management boosts economic development: Evidence from Brazil

    Open Access•Bruno Pantaleão•ARTICLE•World Development•2026•References: 67

Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance (6 works) · Crime Patterns and Interventions (4 works) · Corporate governance (2 works) · Corruption and Economic Development (2 works) · Geography (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · Psychology (2 works) · Autonomy (1 works) · Baseline (sea (1 works) · Bureaucracy (1 works)

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