Chiara Superti
Biographic Data
| ID | 821176 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Chiara Superti |
| GIVEN NAMES | Chiara |
| FAMILY NAME | Superti |
| SIGNATURE | SUPERTI C |
| AFFILIATIONS | Columbia University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-1832-2396 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 50 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 7 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2014 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
A foot in both countries
How does emigrant enfranchisement affect immigrants’ political interest and partisanship? The ballot access granted by the origin country has both a symbolic and informational value for individuals. It returns political dignity to emigrants and transforms them from passive subjects to political actors, targeted by political campaigns and get-out-the-vote efforts. For the majority of the enfranchised, this empowerment spills over onto their attitu…
Too Old to Forget
Scholars have argued that immigrants’ trust in institutions is the result of the exposure to host-country institutions but also shaped by past experiences in the country of origin. These experiences create a “home-country point of reference,” a political/institutional memory that becomes the relevant comparison for any political/institutional interaction in the host country. We develop further this concept and unpack its key determinants—the age …
Protest at the ballot box
Populist parties foment discontent with the establishment. Previous studies explored whether sentiments of discontent and protest can predict populist voting. In this paper, we argue that past electoral protest in a community, rather than merely a sense of discontent, is a good predictor of new populist lists and their electoral support. We explore this connection using blank voting, a measure that allows a systematic and unbiased evaluation of p…
Protesting with the ballot
Who wins the most when everybody wins? Predicting candidate performance in an authoritarian election
What explains the variation in vote shares received by candidates in single-party authoritarian elections where everybody wins? The scholarly literature has often ignored institutional variations, treated all authoritarian elections as similar, and explained the variation of vote shares as a consequence of clientelism, coercion or electoral fraud. We employ a unique data set for Cuba’s 2013 National Assembly election to show an alternative answer…
Authoritarian Regimes and Their Permitted Oppositions
Electoral opposition to long-established authoritarian regimes may be loyal or rejectionist. Loyal oppositionists vote to send a selective signal to rulers; rejectionist oppositionists vote blank or void the ballot in full disapproval. In Cuba, the number of candidates equals the number of seats, yet voters may vote blank, void, or selectively (choosing some but not all candidates on the ballot), although the Communist Party has campaigned for al…
Italian politics
Italian politics: technocrats in office. 2012." Contemporary Italian Politics, 6(3), pp. 300–301
Too Old to Forget
Scholars have argued that immigrants’ trust in institutions is the result of the exposure to host-country institutions but also shaped by past experiences in the country of origin. These experiences create a “home-country point of reference,” a political/institutional memory that becomes the relevant comparison for any political/institutional interaction in the host country. We develop further this concept and unpack its key determinants—the age …
Protest at the ballot box
Populist parties foment discontent with the establishment. Previous studies explored whether sentiments of discontent and protest can predict populist voting. In this paper, we argue that past electoral protest in a community, rather than merely a sense of discontent, is a good predictor of new populist lists and their electoral support. We explore this connection using blank voting, a measure that allows a systematic and unbiased evaluation of p…
A foot in both countries
How does emigrant enfranchisement affect immigrants’ political interest and partisanship? The ballot access granted by the origin country has both a symbolic and informational value for individuals. It returns political dignity to emigrants and transforms them from passive subjects to political actors, targeted by political campaigns and get-out-the-vote efforts. For the majority of the enfranchised, this empowerment spills over onto their attitu…
Protesting with the ballot
Authoritarian Regimes and Their Permitted Oppositions
Electoral opposition to long-established authoritarian regimes may be loyal or rejectionist. Loyal oppositionists vote to send a selective signal to rulers; rejectionist oppositionists vote blank or void the ballot in full disapproval. In Cuba, the number of candidates equals the number of seats, yet voters may vote blank, void, or selectively (choosing some but not all candidates on the ballot), although the Communist Party has campaigned for al…
Who wins the most when everybody wins? Predicting candidate performance in an authoritarian election
What explains the variation in vote shares received by candidates in single-party authoritarian elections where everybody wins? The scholarly literature has often ignored institutional variations, treated all authoritarian elections as similar, and explained the variation of vote shares as a consequence of clientelism, coercion or electoral fraud. We employ a unique data set for Cuba’s 2013 National Assembly election to show an alternative answer…
Italian politics
Italian politics: technocrats in office. 2012." Contemporary Italian Politics, 6(3), pp. 300–301
Authoritarian Regimes and Their Permitted Oppositions
Electoral opposition to long-established authoritarian regimes may be loyal or rejectionist. Loyal oppositionists vote to send a selective signal to rulers; rejectionist oppositionists vote blank or void the ballot in full disapproval. In Cuba, the number of candidates equals the number of seats, yet voters may vote blank, void, or selectively (choosing some but not all candidates on the ballot), although the Communist Party has campaigned for al…
Who wins the most when everybody wins? Predicting candidate performance in an authoritarian election
What explains the variation in vote shares received by candidates in single-party authoritarian elections where everybody wins? The scholarly literature has often ignored institutional variations, treated all authoritarian elections as similar, and explained the variation of vote shares as a consequence of clientelism, coercion or electoral fraud. We employ a unique data set for Cuba’s 2013 National Assembly election to show an alternative answer…
Protesting with the ballot
Too Old to Forget
Scholars have argued that immigrants’ trust in institutions is the result of the exposure to host-country institutions but also shaped by past experiences in the country of origin. These experiences create a “home-country point of reference,” a political/institutional memory that becomes the relevant comparison for any political/institutional interaction in the host country. We develop further this concept and unpack its key determinants—the age …
Protest at the ballot box
Populist parties foment discontent with the establishment. Previous studies explored whether sentiments of discontent and protest can predict populist voting. In this paper, we argue that past electoral protest in a community, rather than merely a sense of discontent, is a good predictor of new populist lists and their electoral support. We explore this connection using blank voting, a measure that allows a systematic and unbiased evaluation of p…
A foot in both countries
How does emigrant enfranchisement affect immigrants’ political interest and partisanship? The ballot access granted by the origin country has both a symbolic and informational value for individuals. It returns political dignity to emigrants and transforms them from passive subjects to political actors, targeted by political campaigns and get-out-the-vote efforts. For the majority of the enfranchised, this empowerment spills over onto their attitu…
Law (7 works) · Political science (7 works) · Politics (7 works) · Political economy (6 works) · Sociology (6 works) · Law (5 works) · Ballot (4 works) · Voting (4 works) · Democracy (3 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (3 works)