Joy Langston
Biographic Data
| ID | 822896 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Joy Langston |
| GIVEN NAMES | Joy |
| FAMILY NAME | Langston |
| SIGNATURE | LANGSTON J |
| AFFILIATIONS | Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-1828-502X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 17 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 191 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 17 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1996 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 7 |
Democracy and Bad Government in Latin America
This essay reviews the following works:Los últimos años de la reforma agraria mexicana, 1971-1991: Una historia política desde el noroeste. By Luis Aboites Aguilar. Mexico City: El Colegio de Mexico Press, 2022. Pp. 333. Paperback. $280.00. ISBN: 9786075643199.Non-Policy Politics: Richer Voters, Poorer Voters, and the Diversification of Electoral Strategies. By Ernesto Calvo and Maria Victoria Murillo. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019. …
Anti-Democratic Attitudes, the Winner-Loser Gap, and the Rise of the Left in Mexico
Weak support for democratic norms and institutions poses a serious challenge to the survival of democracy. Studies of public opinion often assume that citizens hold politicians accountable for respecting democratic norms. This study examines citizens’ attitudes toward democracy in Mexico. It focuses on the 2018 election as a critical juncture when Andrés Manuel López Obrador (MORENA) won the presidential election on his third attempt. Data from t…
Why Do Clientelist Brokers Go Rogue? Parties, Politicians, and Intermediaries in Mexico
Political scientists working on clientelism have become interested in the relationships between brokers and the politicians and parties for whom they work. In most of this research, brokers are seen as inherently disloyal and normally act against the interests of their patrons, unless monitoring efforts are enacted. In contrast, we argue that territorial brokers have strong incentives to construct long-term, dependent relationships with their pat…
Risky business: Where do presidential campaigns visit
Democratization and Authoritarian Party Survival
Mexico’s Party of the Institutional Revolution (PRI) held executive power continuously from 1929 to 2000, when its candidate suffered a shocking defeat in the presidential elections. This study, which covers the years 1980–2012, uses an institutional focus to understand why the PRI survived its defeat and loss of the resources of the executive bureaucracy to return victoriously after two six-year terms out of office. The book offers a model of th…
Comparing the PRI Experience to Kenya and Taiwan: Mexico's PRI
The final chapter applies the argument based on the Mexican experience to other authoritarian regimes with strong parties that transitioned to democracy: Kenya and Taiwan. Kenya African National Union (KANU) practically disappeared because electoral rules allowed politicians to win elections without strong labels. In Taiwan, the Kuomintang survived and returned to power after two terms out of executive power, in large part because its divisions d…
Gubernatorial Effects on the Voting Behavior of National Legislators
Are subnational political elites, such as governors, capable of affecting the voting behavior of national representatives even in the face of high legislative discipline? We address this question by estimating the exogenous causal effect of gubernatorial influence on the voting behavior of national legislators in Mexico, where constitutional provisions guarantee that the political survival times of governors and legislators are fixed and known ex…
Governors and “Their” Deputies: New Legislative Principals in Mexico
Many studies on legislatures around the world have not detected a regional voting dimension. Yet governors are often important political figures and can exert strong influence on state politicians. From an analysis of the Mexican legislature, I determine that governors hold important resources that ambitious politicians need in a system with no consecutive reelection. Mexican governors use their power over federal deputies to prod their agents, t…
México 2008: El Año en Que Se Vivió en Peligro
El trabajo muestra los obstáculos que tendrá que librar la administración si acaso quiere seguir contando con el apoyo de los votantes, como el combate al narcotráfico y los efectos de la crisis financiera de
Campaigning in an Electoral Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Mexico
The PRI's 2006 Electoral Debacle
This short article outlines why the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which governed Mexico for the final 71 years of the twentieth century, not only lost the 2006 presidential election, but posted a miserable third place finish by taking only 22.7% of the national vote versus 36.7% for the winner, Felipe Calderón of the center-right National Action Party (PAN) and 36.1% for the center-left Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). It also…
Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition
The Changing Party of the Institutional Revolution: Electoral Competition and Decentralized Candidate Selection
We know little about how formerly hegemonic parties react to drastic changes in the external political environment. Under non-competitive electoral conditions, the Party of the Institutional Revolution (PRI) was characterized by centralized legislative recruitment and candidate selection that delivered a large percentage of coveted senate candidacies to national-level party politicians and bureaucrats. This centralized and nationalized recruitmen…
Rising from the Ashes: Reorganizing and Unifying the PRI's State Party Organizations after Electoral Defeat
This article attempts to explain why certain state Party of the Institutional Revolution (PRI) affiliates in Mexico are able to rebuild their organizations and why others are not. The author finds that severe problems of collective action impede the once hegemonic PRI from restructuring its state parties after the defeat of the state executive because the top-down impositions that once forced PRI politicians to cooperate no longer exist. These fi…
Breaking out is Hard to Do: Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Mexico's One-Party Hegemonic Regime
Theoretically based on Albert O. Hirschman's Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, this study examines three cases of rupture or exit by Mexican presidential contenders, in 1940, 1952, and 1988, and one "noncase," in 1999, with a view to how dissidents' strategies shape political institutions. Mexico's PRI-dominated political system depended on its leaders' ability to create an equilibrium based on mutual incentives to remain loyal to the regime
Why Rules Matter: Changes in Candidate Selection in Mexico's PRI, 1988-2000
The traditional literature on Mexico's formerly hegemonic party, the PRI, notes the importance of the 'informal rules of the game' in determining outcomes, such as who will be the PRI's presidential candidate. This article argues that the onset of electoral competition allowed weaker actors within the party to strengthen their position by reforming the statutes in order to give them decision-making power previously denied them. However, this was …
Settlement and Monasticism at Ripon, North Yorkshire, From the 7th to 11th Centuries A.D
Archaeological investigations of a number of small sites, combined with information provided by antiquarian writers, indicate the existence of a number of churches and/or cemeteries in the vicinity of Ripon Cathedral. In two cases these demonstrably originate in the 8th century or earlier, and in the other, less well documented instances an early origin seems likely. It is suggested that these sites are early ecclesiastical nuclei associated with…
Governors and “Their” Deputies: New Legislative Principals in Mexico
Many studies on legislatures around the world have not detected a regional voting dimension. Yet governors are often important political figures and can exert strong influence on state politicians. From an analysis of the Mexican legislature, I determine that governors hold important resources that ambitious politicians need in a system with no consecutive reelection. Mexican governors use their power over federal deputies to prod their agents, t…
Gubernatorial Effects on the Voting Behavior of National Legislators
Are subnational political elites, such as governors, capable of affecting the voting behavior of national representatives even in the face of high legislative discipline? We address this question by estimating the exogenous causal effect of gubernatorial influence on the voting behavior of national legislators in Mexico, where constitutional provisions guarantee that the political survival times of governors and legislators are fixed and known ex…
The Changing Party of the Institutional Revolution: Electoral Competition and Decentralized Candidate Selection
We know little about how formerly hegemonic parties react to drastic changes in the external political environment. Under non-competitive electoral conditions, the Party of the Institutional Revolution (PRI) was characterized by centralized legislative recruitment and candidate selection that delivered a large percentage of coveted senate candidacies to national-level party politicians and bureaucrats. This centralized and nationalized recruitmen…
Rising from the Ashes: Reorganizing and Unifying the PRI's State Party Organizations after Electoral Defeat
This article attempts to explain why certain state Party of the Institutional Revolution (PRI) affiliates in Mexico are able to rebuild their organizations and why others are not. The author finds that severe problems of collective action impede the once hegemonic PRI from restructuring its state parties after the defeat of the state executive because the top-down impositions that once forced PRI politicians to cooperate no longer exist. These fi…
Why Rules Matter: Changes in Candidate Selection in Mexico's PRI, 1988-2000
The traditional literature on Mexico's formerly hegemonic party, the PRI, notes the importance of the 'informal rules of the game' in determining outcomes, such as who will be the PRI's presidential candidate. This article argues that the onset of electoral competition allowed weaker actors within the party to strengthen their position by reforming the statutes in order to give them decision-making power previously denied them. However, this was …
Campaigning in an Electoral Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Mexico
The PRI's 2006 Electoral Debacle
This short article outlines why the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which governed Mexico for the final 71 years of the twentieth century, not only lost the 2006 presidential election, but posted a miserable third place finish by taking only 22.7% of the national vote versus 36.7% for the winner, Felipe Calderón of the center-right National Action Party (PAN) and 36.1% for the center-left Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). It also…
Breaking out is Hard to Do: Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Mexico's One-Party Hegemonic Regime
Theoretically based on Albert O. Hirschman's Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, this study examines three cases of rupture or exit by Mexican presidential contenders, in 1940, 1952, and 1988, and one "noncase," in 1999, with a view to how dissidents' strategies shape political institutions. Mexico's PRI-dominated political system depended on its leaders' ability to create an equilibrium based on mutual incentives to remain loyal to the regime
Settlement and Monasticism at Ripon, North Yorkshire, From the 7th to 11th Centuries A.D
Archaeological investigations of a number of small sites, combined with information provided by antiquarian writers, indicate the existence of a number of churches and/or cemeteries in the vicinity of Ripon Cathedral. In two cases these demonstrably originate in the 8th century or earlier, and in the other, less well documented instances an early origin seems likely. It is suggested that these sites are early ecclesiastical nuclei associated with…
Why Do Clientelist Brokers Go Rogue? Parties, Politicians, and Intermediaries in Mexico
Political scientists working on clientelism have become interested in the relationships between brokers and the politicians and parties for whom they work. In most of this research, brokers are seen as inherently disloyal and normally act against the interests of their patrons, unless monitoring efforts are enacted. In contrast, we argue that territorial brokers have strong incentives to construct long-term, dependent relationships with their pat…
Risky business: Where do presidential campaigns visit
Settlement and Monasticism at Ripon, North Yorkshire, From the 7th to 11th Centuries A.D
Archaeological investigations of a number of small sites, combined with information provided by antiquarian writers, indicate the existence of a number of churches and/or cemeteries in the vicinity of Ripon Cathedral. In two cases these demonstrably originate in the 8th century or earlier, and in the other, less well documented instances an early origin seems likely. It is suggested that these sites are early ecclesiastical nuclei associated with…
Why Rules Matter: Changes in Candidate Selection in Mexico's PRI, 1988-2000
The traditional literature on Mexico's formerly hegemonic party, the PRI, notes the importance of the 'informal rules of the game' in determining outcomes, such as who will be the PRI's presidential candidate. This article argues that the onset of electoral competition allowed weaker actors within the party to strengthen their position by reforming the statutes in order to give them decision-making power previously denied them. However, this was …
Breaking out is Hard to Do: Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Mexico's One-Party Hegemonic Regime
Theoretically based on Albert O. Hirschman's Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, this study examines three cases of rupture or exit by Mexican presidential contenders, in 1940, 1952, and 1988, and one "noncase," in 1999, with a view to how dissidents' strategies shape political institutions. Mexico's PRI-dominated political system depended on its leaders' ability to create an equilibrium based on mutual incentives to remain loyal to the regime
Rising from the Ashes: Reorganizing and Unifying the PRI's State Party Organizations after Electoral Defeat
This article attempts to explain why certain state Party of the Institutional Revolution (PRI) affiliates in Mexico are able to rebuild their organizations and why others are not. The author finds that severe problems of collective action impede the once hegemonic PRI from restructuring its state parties after the defeat of the state executive because the top-down impositions that once forced PRI politicians to cooperate no longer exist. These fi…
Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition
The Changing Party of the Institutional Revolution: Electoral Competition and Decentralized Candidate Selection
We know little about how formerly hegemonic parties react to drastic changes in the external political environment. Under non-competitive electoral conditions, the Party of the Institutional Revolution (PRI) was characterized by centralized legislative recruitment and candidate selection that delivered a large percentage of coveted senate candidacies to national-level party politicians and bureaucrats. This centralized and nationalized recruitmen…
The PRI's 2006 Electoral Debacle
This short article outlines why the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which governed Mexico for the final 71 years of the twentieth century, not only lost the 2006 presidential election, but posted a miserable third place finish by taking only 22.7% of the national vote versus 36.7% for the winner, Felipe Calderón of the center-right National Action Party (PAN) and 36.1% for the center-left Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). It also…
México 2008: El Año en Que Se Vivió en Peligro
El trabajo muestra los obstáculos que tendrá que librar la administración si acaso quiere seguir contando con el apoyo de los votantes, como el combate al narcotráfico y los efectos de la crisis financiera de
Campaigning in an Electoral Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Mexico
Governors and “Their” Deputies: New Legislative Principals in Mexico
Many studies on legislatures around the world have not detected a regional voting dimension. Yet governors are often important political figures and can exert strong influence on state politicians. From an analysis of the Mexican legislature, I determine that governors hold important resources that ambitious politicians need in a system with no consecutive reelection. Mexican governors use their power over federal deputies to prod their agents, t…
Gubernatorial Effects on the Voting Behavior of National Legislators
Are subnational political elites, such as governors, capable of affecting the voting behavior of national representatives even in the face of high legislative discipline? We address this question by estimating the exogenous causal effect of gubernatorial influence on the voting behavior of national legislators in Mexico, where constitutional provisions guarantee that the political survival times of governors and legislators are fixed and known ex…
Democratization and Authoritarian Party Survival
Mexico’s Party of the Institutional Revolution (PRI) held executive power continuously from 1929 to 2000, when its candidate suffered a shocking defeat in the presidential elections. This study, which covers the years 1980–2012, uses an institutional focus to understand why the PRI survived its defeat and loss of the resources of the executive bureaucracy to return victoriously after two six-year terms out of office. The book offers a model of th…
Comparing the PRI Experience to Kenya and Taiwan: Mexico's PRI
The final chapter applies the argument based on the Mexican experience to other authoritarian regimes with strong parties that transitioned to democracy: Kenya and Taiwan. Kenya African National Union (KANU) practically disappeared because electoral rules allowed politicians to win elections without strong labels. In Taiwan, the Kuomintang survived and returned to power after two terms out of executive power, in large part because its divisions d…
Risky business: Where do presidential campaigns visit
Anti-Democratic Attitudes, the Winner-Loser Gap, and the Rise of the Left in Mexico
Weak support for democratic norms and institutions poses a serious challenge to the survival of democracy. Studies of public opinion often assume that citizens hold politicians accountable for respecting democratic norms. This study examines citizens’ attitudes toward democracy in Mexico. It focuses on the 2018 election as a critical juncture when Andrés Manuel López Obrador (MORENA) won the presidential election on his third attempt. Data from t…
Why Do Clientelist Brokers Go Rogue? Parties, Politicians, and Intermediaries in Mexico
Political scientists working on clientelism have become interested in the relationships between brokers and the politicians and parties for whom they work. In most of this research, brokers are seen as inherently disloyal and normally act against the interests of their patrons, unless monitoring efforts are enacted. In contrast, we argue that territorial brokers have strong incentives to construct long-term, dependent relationships with their pat…
Democracy and Bad Government in Latin America
This essay reviews the following works:Los últimos años de la reforma agraria mexicana, 1971-1991: Una historia política desde el noroeste. By Luis Aboites Aguilar. Mexico City: El Colegio de Mexico Press, 2022. Pp. 333. Paperback. $280.00. ISBN: 9786075643199.Non-Policy Politics: Richer Voters, Poorer Voters, and the Diversification of Electoral Strategies. By Ernesto Calvo and Maria Victoria Murillo. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019. …
Political science (15 works) · Law (14 works) · Politics (14 works) · Political economy (12 works) · Politics and Society in Latin America (11 works) · Economics (8 works) · Democracy (7 works) · Law (7 works) · Public Administration (7 works) · Sociology (6 works)