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Jodi Finkel

Biographic Data

ID823097
NAMEJodi Finkel
GIVEN NAMESJodi
FAMILY NAMEFinkel
SIGNATUREFINKEL J
AFFILIATIONSLoyola Marymount University
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS5
TOTAL CITATIONS23
AUTHOR COUNT5
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2003
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2014
H-INDEX3
  • Empowering Sex Workers in Guatemala: Establishing a Sustainable Nonprofit (with Students) in a Developing Country

    Open Access•Jodi Finkel•ARTICLE•PS Political Science & Politics•2014

    In 2005, with two of my students, I started a literacy program in a red-light district in Guatemala City. In 2007, we became a nonprofit organization dedicated to the promotion of the rights of sex workers in Guatemala (i.e., Women for Justice, Education, and Awareness, known in Spanish as MuJER). Today, MuJER provides literacy classes and accelerated elementary school, vocational training, antiviolence programs, and grassroots organizing. We hav…

  • Explaining the Failure of Mexico’s National Commission of Human Rights (Ombudsman’s Office) after Democratization: Elections, Incentives, and Unaccountability in the Mexican Senate

    Open Access•Jodi Finkel•ARTICLE•Human Rights Review•2012•Cited by: 4•References: 5

  • Judicial Reform as Insurance Policy: Mexico in the 1990s

    Open Access•Jodi Finkel•ARTICLE•Latin American Politics and Society•2005•Cited by: 11•References: 4

    After seven decades of Mexican judicial subordination, President Ernesto Zedillo in 1994 introduced judicial reforms that increased the independence and judicial review powers of the judicial branch. The willful creation of a judiciary capable of checking the power of the president and the ruling PRI appears to counter political logic; but it makes sense as a political "insurance policy" to protect the ruling party from its rivals. PRI politician…

  • Judicial Reform in Argentina in the 1990s: How Electoral Incentives Shape Institutional Change

    Open Access•Jodi Finkel•ARTICLE•Latin American Research Review•2004

    Judicial reform presents a paradox: why would a ruling party agree to judicial reforms that limit its own political power? In the Argentine case, I argue that although the ruling Peronist party could be induced in 1994 to initiate reforms (introduce constitutional revisions to strengthen the judiciary), the party then proved unwilling to accept the costs of an independent judiciary and failed to implement these changes (via enactment of congressi…

  • Supreme Court Decisions on Electoral Rules after Mexico's 1994 Judicial Reform: An Empowered Court

    Open Access•Jodi Finkel•ARTICLE•Journal of Latin American Studies•2003•Cited by: 8

    In 1994 Mexico's ruling party granted new powers of judicial review and increased independence to the Mexican Supreme Court. Would these reforms enable the Court to overcome decades of judicial subordination? I examine all Mexican Supreme Court decisions addressing the constitutionality of electoral rules - rules that are inherently contentious because they determine the chances for obtaining power - during Zedillo's sexenio. These cases, culmina…

  • Judicial Reform as Insurance Policy: Mexico in the 1990s

    Open Access•Jodi Finkel•ARTICLE•Latin American Politics and Society•2005•Cited by: 11•References: 4

    After seven decades of Mexican judicial subordination, President Ernesto Zedillo in 1994 introduced judicial reforms that increased the independence and judicial review powers of the judicial branch. The willful creation of a judiciary capable of checking the power of the president and the ruling PRI appears to counter political logic; but it makes sense as a political "insurance policy" to protect the ruling party from its rivals. PRI politician…

  • Supreme Court Decisions on Electoral Rules after Mexico's 1994 Judicial Reform: An Empowered Court

    Open Access•Jodi Finkel•ARTICLE•Journal of Latin American Studies•2003•Cited by: 8

    In 1994 Mexico's ruling party granted new powers of judicial review and increased independence to the Mexican Supreme Court. Would these reforms enable the Court to overcome decades of judicial subordination? I examine all Mexican Supreme Court decisions addressing the constitutionality of electoral rules - rules that are inherently contentious because they determine the chances for obtaining power - during Zedillo's sexenio. These cases, culmina…

  • Explaining the Failure of Mexico’s National Commission of Human Rights (Ombudsman’s Office) after Democratization: Elections, Incentives, and Unaccountability in the Mexican Senate

    Open Access•Jodi Finkel•ARTICLE•Human Rights Review•2012•Cited by: 4•References: 5

  • Supreme Court Decisions on Electoral Rules after Mexico's 1994 Judicial Reform: An Empowered Court

    Open Access•Jodi Finkel•ARTICLE•Journal of Latin American Studies•2003•Cited by: 8

    In 1994 Mexico's ruling party granted new powers of judicial review and increased independence to the Mexican Supreme Court. Would these reforms enable the Court to overcome decades of judicial subordination? I examine all Mexican Supreme Court decisions addressing the constitutionality of electoral rules - rules that are inherently contentious because they determine the chances for obtaining power - during Zedillo's sexenio. These cases, culmina…

  • Judicial Reform in Argentina in the 1990s: How Electoral Incentives Shape Institutional Change

    Open Access•Jodi Finkel•ARTICLE•Latin American Research Review•2004

    Judicial reform presents a paradox: why would a ruling party agree to judicial reforms that limit its own political power? In the Argentine case, I argue that although the ruling Peronist party could be induced in 1994 to initiate reforms (introduce constitutional revisions to strengthen the judiciary), the party then proved unwilling to accept the costs of an independent judiciary and failed to implement these changes (via enactment of congressi…

  • Judicial Reform as Insurance Policy: Mexico in the 1990s

    Open Access•Jodi Finkel•ARTICLE•Latin American Politics and Society•2005•Cited by: 11•References: 4

    After seven decades of Mexican judicial subordination, President Ernesto Zedillo in 1994 introduced judicial reforms that increased the independence and judicial review powers of the judicial branch. The willful creation of a judiciary capable of checking the power of the president and the ruling PRI appears to counter political logic; but it makes sense as a political "insurance policy" to protect the ruling party from its rivals. PRI politician…

  • Explaining the Failure of Mexico’s National Commission of Human Rights (Ombudsman’s Office) after Democratization: Elections, Incentives, and Unaccountability in the Mexican Senate

    Open Access•Jodi Finkel•ARTICLE•Human Rights Review•2012•Cited by: 4•References: 5

  • Empowering Sex Workers in Guatemala: Establishing a Sustainable Nonprofit (with Students) in a Developing Country

    Open Access•Jodi Finkel•ARTICLE•PS Political Science & Politics•2014

    In 2005, with two of my students, I started a literacy program in a red-light district in Guatemala City. In 2007, we became a nonprofit organization dedicated to the promotion of the rights of sex workers in Guatemala (i.e., Women for Justice, Education, and Awareness, known in Spanish as MuJER). Today, MuJER provides literacy classes and accelerated elementary school, vocational training, antiviolence programs, and grassroots organizing. We hav…

Political science (5 works) · Judicial and Constitutional Studies (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Politics (4 works) · Economics (3 works) · Judicial reform (3 works) · Legal and Constitutional Studies (3 works) · Incentive (2 works) · Judicial activism (2 works) · Judicial Independence (2 works)

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