Gila Sher
Biographic Data
| ID | 833945 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Gila Sher |
| GIVEN NAMES | Gila |
| FAMILY NAME | Sher |
| SIGNATURE | SHER G |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of California San Diego |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-2395-9228 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 15 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 20 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 14 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1994 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
A new defense of Tarski's solution to the liar paradox
Tarski's hierarchical solution to the Liar paradox is widely viewed as ad hoc. In this paper I show that, on the contrary, Tarski's solution is justified by a sound philosophical principle that concerns the inner structure of truth. This principle provides a common philosophical basis to a number of solutions to the Liar paradox, including Tarski's and Kripke's. Tarski himself may not have been aware of this principle, but by providing a philosop…
The metaphysics of truth: Anti-deflationism and substantial pluralism
Two central themes of Douglas Edwards’s The Metaphysics of Truth are anti-deflationism and substantial pluralism. In Part I of this paper I discuss Edwards’s grounds for rejecting deflationism and suggest a few additional grounds. In Part II I discuss Edward's truth-pluralism and respond to his criticism of my correspondence-pluralism. While these pluralisms share significant features, their differences also raise several important questions
Correspondence pluralism
In this paper I present a pluralist view of truth of a special kind: correspondence-pluralism. Correspondence-pluralism is the view that to fulfill its function in knowledge, truth requires correspondence principles rather than mere coherence, pragmatist, or deflationist principles. But these correspondence principles do not need to be the naive principles of traditional correspondence: copy, mirror image, direct isomorphism. Furthermore, these c…
Invariance as a basis for necessity and laws
Many philosophers are baffled by necessity. Humeans, in particular, are deeply disturbed by the idea of necessary laws of nature. In this paper I offer a systematic yet down to earth explanation of necessity and laws in terms of invariance. The type of invariance I employ for this purpose generalizes an invariance used in meta-logic. The main idea is that properties and relations in general have certain degrees of invariance, and some properties/…
Epistemic Friction: An Essay on Knowledge, Truth, and Logic
Gila Sher provides an original view of knowledge from the perspective of our basic human epistemic situation, as limited yet resourceful beings, trying to understand the world in all its complexity. She develops an integrated theory of knowledge, truth, and logic, centred on the idea of epistemic friction: knowledge must be constrained by the world.
Substantivism about truth
Substantivism is a general philosophical methodology advocating a substantive approach to philosophical theorizing. In this article, I present an overview of this methodology with a special emphasis on the field of truth. I begin with a framework for understanding what is at stake in the substantivist-deflationist debate and describe the substantivist critique of deflationism. I then proceed to discuss contemporary substantivism as a positive met…
In memoriam: Jaakko Hintikka
Is logic in the mind or in the world
The paper presents an outline of a unified answer to five questions concerning logic: (1) Is logic in the mind or in the world? (2) Does logic need a foundation? What is the main obstacle to a foundation for logic? Can it be overcome? (3) How does logic work? What does logical form represent? Are logical constants referential? (4) Is there a criterion of logicality? (5) What is the relation between logic and mathematics
In Search of a Substantive Theory of Truth
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY VOLUME CI, NO. 1, JANUARY 2004 IN SEARCH OF A SUBSTANTIVE THEORY OF TRUTH* The layman...expects philosophers to answer deep questions of great import for an understanding of the world.... And the layman is quite right.... Yet he finds most writings by philosophers of the analytical school disconcertingly remote from these concerns.... The complaint...is understandable.... [Alnalytical philosophy passed, comparatively rec…
Truth, Logical Structure, and Compositionality
The Formal-Structural View of Logical Consequence
In a recent paper, 'The Concept of Logical Consequence," W. H. Hanson (1997) criticizes a fml-strmctural characterization of logical consequence in Tarski (1966) and Sher (1991Sher ( ,1996a) ) .'Hanson accepts many principles of the formal-structural view.Relating to Sher 1991 and 1996a, he says: Sher's fundamental principles are sound.She holds that in deciding how the logical consequence relation shall be delineated we must take into account bo…
The Formal-Structural View of Logical Consequence
Between Logic and Intuition: Essays in Honor of Charles Parsons
This collection of essays offers a conspectus of major trends in the philosophy of logic and philosophy of mathematics. A distinguished group of philosophers addresses issues at the centre of contemporary debate: semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes, the set/class distinction, foundations of set theory, mathematical intuition and many others. The volume includes Hilary Putnam's 1995 Alfred Tarski lectures.
On the Possibility of a Substantive Theory of Truth
Foundations without Foundationalism: A Case for Second-Order Logic
PART I: ORIENTATION Terms and questions Foundationalism and foundations of mathematics PART II: LOGIC AND MATHEMATICS Theory Metatheory Second-order logic and mathematics Advanced metatheory PART III: HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY The historical triumph of first-order languages Second-order logic and rule-following The competition Index
On the Possibility of a Substantive Theory of Truth
Is logic in the mind or in the world
The paper presents an outline of a unified answer to five questions concerning logic: (1) Is logic in the mind or in the world? (2) Does logic need a foundation? What is the main obstacle to a foundation for logic? Can it be overcome? (3) How does logic work? What does logical form represent? Are logical constants referential? (4) Is there a criterion of logicality? (5) What is the relation between logic and mathematics
The Formal-Structural View of Logical Consequence
In a recent paper, 'The Concept of Logical Consequence," W. H. Hanson (1997) criticizes a fml-strmctural characterization of logical consequence in Tarski (1966) and Sher (1991Sher ( ,1996a) ) .'Hanson accepts many principles of the formal-structural view.Relating to Sher 1991 and 1996a, he says: Sher's fundamental principles are sound.She holds that in deciding how the logical consequence relation shall be delineated we must take into account bo…
The Formal-Structural View of Logical Consequence
Foundations without Foundationalism: A Case for Second-Order Logic
PART I: ORIENTATION Terms and questions Foundationalism and foundations of mathematics PART II: LOGIC AND MATHEMATICS Theory Metatheory Second-order logic and mathematics Advanced metatheory PART III: HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY The historical triumph of first-order languages Second-order logic and rule-following The competition Index
On the Possibility of a Substantive Theory of Truth
Between Logic and Intuition: Essays in Honor of Charles Parsons
This collection of essays offers a conspectus of major trends in the philosophy of logic and philosophy of mathematics. A distinguished group of philosophers addresses issues at the centre of contemporary debate: semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes, the set/class distinction, foundations of set theory, mathematical intuition and many others. The volume includes Hilary Putnam's 1995 Alfred Tarski lectures.
Truth, Logical Structure, and Compositionality
The Formal-Structural View of Logical Consequence
In a recent paper, 'The Concept of Logical Consequence," W. H. Hanson (1997) criticizes a fml-strmctural characterization of logical consequence in Tarski (1966) and Sher (1991Sher ( ,1996a) ) .'Hanson accepts many principles of the formal-structural view.Relating to Sher 1991 and 1996a, he says: Sher's fundamental principles are sound.She holds that in deciding how the logical consequence relation shall be delineated we must take into account bo…
The Formal-Structural View of Logical Consequence
In Search of a Substantive Theory of Truth
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY VOLUME CI, NO. 1, JANUARY 2004 IN SEARCH OF A SUBSTANTIVE THEORY OF TRUTH* The layman...expects philosophers to answer deep questions of great import for an understanding of the world.... And the layman is quite right.... Yet he finds most writings by philosophers of the analytical school disconcertingly remote from these concerns.... The complaint...is understandable.... [Alnalytical philosophy passed, comparatively rec…
Is logic in the mind or in the world
The paper presents an outline of a unified answer to five questions concerning logic: (1) Is logic in the mind or in the world? (2) Does logic need a foundation? What is the main obstacle to a foundation for logic? Can it be overcome? (3) How does logic work? What does logical form represent? Are logical constants referential? (4) Is there a criterion of logicality? (5) What is the relation between logic and mathematics
In memoriam: Jaakko Hintikka
Epistemic Friction: An Essay on Knowledge, Truth, and Logic
Gila Sher provides an original view of knowledge from the perspective of our basic human epistemic situation, as limited yet resourceful beings, trying to understand the world in all its complexity. She develops an integrated theory of knowledge, truth, and logic, centred on the idea of epistemic friction: knowledge must be constrained by the world.
Substantivism about truth
Substantivism is a general philosophical methodology advocating a substantive approach to philosophical theorizing. In this article, I present an overview of this methodology with a special emphasis on the field of truth. I begin with a framework for understanding what is at stake in the substantivist-deflationist debate and describe the substantivist critique of deflationism. I then proceed to discuss contemporary substantivism as a positive met…
Invariance as a basis for necessity and laws
Many philosophers are baffled by necessity. Humeans, in particular, are deeply disturbed by the idea of necessary laws of nature. In this paper I offer a systematic yet down to earth explanation of necessity and laws in terms of invariance. The type of invariance I employ for this purpose generalizes an invariance used in meta-logic. The main idea is that properties and relations in general have certain degrees of invariance, and some properties/…
A new defense of Tarski's solution to the liar paradox
Tarski's hierarchical solution to the Liar paradox is widely viewed as ad hoc. In this paper I show that, on the contrary, Tarski's solution is justified by a sound philosophical principle that concerns the inner structure of truth. This principle provides a common philosophical basis to a number of solutions to the Liar paradox, including Tarski's and Kripke's. Tarski himself may not have been aware of this principle, but by providing a philosop…
The metaphysics of truth: Anti-deflationism and substantial pluralism
Two central themes of Douglas Edwards’s The Metaphysics of Truth are anti-deflationism and substantial pluralism. In Part I of this paper I discuss Edwards’s grounds for rejecting deflationism and suggest a few additional grounds. In Part II I discuss Edward's truth-pluralism and respond to his criticism of my correspondence-pluralism. While these pluralisms share significant features, their differences also raise several important questions
Correspondence pluralism
In this paper I present a pluralist view of truth of a special kind: correspondence-pluralism. Correspondence-pluralism is the view that to fulfill its function in knowledge, truth requires correspondence principles rather than mere coherence, pragmatist, or deflationist principles. But these correspondence principles do not need to be the naive principles of traditional correspondence: copy, mirror image, direct isomorphism. Furthermore, these c…
Epistemology (14 works) · Philosophy (14 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (10 works) · Metaphysics (8 works) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (7 works) · Philosophy of language (7 works) · Computer Science (6 works) · Mathematics (6 works) · Philosophy of science (5 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (4 works)