Andrea Castagnola
Biographic Data
| ID | 835328 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Andrea Castagnola |
| GIVEN NAMES | Andrea |
| FAMILY NAME | Castagnola |
| SIGNATURE | CASTAGNOLA A |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Pittsburgh |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9038-6522 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 120 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 9 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2009 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
The paradox of judicial reforms in Latin America
Conventional wisdom indicates that certain institutional reforms strengthen the judiciary, while others curb its authority. However, even court-empowering reforms can undermine judicial independence. Reforms often create new vacancies by prompting the resignation of sitting judges or expanding the size of the court. Judicial turnover thus creates opportunities for the reforming parties to appoint loyal judges. We document that court-empowering re…
Manipulating Courts in New Democracies
Judicial Instability and Endogenous Constitutional Change
Legal scholars frequently advocate institutional reforms to modernize the judiciary and promote judicial independence. However, constitutional reforms also offer an opportunity for politicians to reshuffle the high courts. The negative consequences of constitutional change for judicial stability are explored using an original database of Supreme Court and Constitutional Tribunal members in eighteen Latin American countries between 1904 and 2010. …
Bibliographie / Bibliography
Bibliographie / Bibliography
Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulssig
I Want It All, and I Want It Now
Provincial supreme courts are important players in local politics because justices can affect the interest of the ruling governors; however, no research has addressed the factors that affect judicial turnover in provincial high courts in new democracies. This research attempts to fill this gap by using original data on the 525 departures of all provincial high court justices in Argentina from 1983 to 2009. My guiding hypothesis is that the stabil…
Judicial Power and Strategic Communication in Mexico - by Staton, Jeffrey K
Party Nationalization and Institutions
Party nationalization has two distinct components: the first is based on the degree of homogeneity in the geographic distribution of a party's vote, and the other is defined by the degree to which national events are reflected in the change in a party's electoral support in all regions of the country. In spite of literature tying the static/distributional and the dynamic components together, we show theoretically and empirically that there is a n…
Presidential Control of High Courts in Latin America
In many Latin American countries the executive branch manipulates the composition of the Supreme Court, and judicial independence has remained elusive. Because high courts can exercise judicial review and influence lower courts, incoming presidents often force the resignation of adversarial justices or “pack” the courts with friends. One indicator of this problem has been the high turnover among members of the high courts. In this paper we offer …
Party Nationalization and Institutions
Party nationalization has two distinct components: the first is based on the degree of homogeneity in the geographic distribution of a party's vote, and the other is defined by the degree to which national events are reflected in the change in a party's electoral support in all regions of the country. In spite of literature tying the static/distributional and the dynamic components together, we show theoretically and empirically that there is a n…
Presidential Control of High Courts in Latin America
In many Latin American countries the executive branch manipulates the composition of the Supreme Court, and judicial independence has remained elusive. Because high courts can exercise judicial review and influence lower courts, incoming presidents often force the resignation of adversarial justices or “pack” the courts with friends. One indicator of this problem has been the high turnover among members of the high courts. In this paper we offer …
Judicial Instability and Endogenous Constitutional Change
Legal scholars frequently advocate institutional reforms to modernize the judiciary and promote judicial independence. However, constitutional reforms also offer an opportunity for politicians to reshuffle the high courts. The negative consequences of constitutional change for judicial stability are explored using an original database of Supreme Court and Constitutional Tribunal members in eighteen Latin American countries between 1904 and 2010. …
I Want It All, and I Want It Now
Provincial supreme courts are important players in local politics because justices can affect the interest of the ruling governors; however, no research has addressed the factors that affect judicial turnover in provincial high courts in new democracies. This research attempts to fill this gap by using original data on the 525 departures of all provincial high court justices in Argentina from 1983 to 2009. My guiding hypothesis is that the stabil…
The paradox of judicial reforms in Latin America
Conventional wisdom indicates that certain institutional reforms strengthen the judiciary, while others curb its authority. However, even court-empowering reforms can undermine judicial independence. Reforms often create new vacancies by prompting the resignation of sitting judges or expanding the size of the court. Judicial turnover thus creates opportunities for the reforming parties to appoint loyal judges. We document that court-empowering re…
Party Nationalization and Institutions
Party nationalization has two distinct components: the first is based on the degree of homogeneity in the geographic distribution of a party's vote, and the other is defined by the degree to which national events are reflected in the change in a party's electoral support in all regions of the country. In spite of literature tying the static/distributional and the dynamic components together, we show theoretically and empirically that there is a n…
Presidential Control of High Courts in Latin America
In many Latin American countries the executive branch manipulates the composition of the Supreme Court, and judicial independence has remained elusive. Because high courts can exercise judicial review and influence lower courts, incoming presidents often force the resignation of adversarial justices or “pack” the courts with friends. One indicator of this problem has been the high turnover among members of the high courts. In this paper we offer …
I Want It All, and I Want It Now
Provincial supreme courts are important players in local politics because justices can affect the interest of the ruling governors; however, no research has addressed the factors that affect judicial turnover in provincial high courts in new democracies. This research attempts to fill this gap by using original data on the 525 departures of all provincial high court justices in Argentina from 1983 to 2009. My guiding hypothesis is that the stabil…
Judicial Power and Strategic Communication in Mexico - by Staton, Jeffrey K
Bibliographie / Bibliography
Bibliographie / Bibliography
Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulssig
Judicial Instability and Endogenous Constitutional Change
Legal scholars frequently advocate institutional reforms to modernize the judiciary and promote judicial independence. However, constitutional reforms also offer an opportunity for politicians to reshuffle the high courts. The negative consequences of constitutional change for judicial stability are explored using an original database of Supreme Court and Constitutional Tribunal members in eighteen Latin American countries between 1904 and 2010. …
Manipulating Courts in New Democracies
The paradox of judicial reforms in Latin America
Conventional wisdom indicates that certain institutional reforms strengthen the judiciary, while others curb its authority. However, even court-empowering reforms can undermine judicial independence. Reforms often create new vacancies by prompting the resignation of sitting judges or expanding the size of the court. Judicial turnover thus creates opportunities for the reforming parties to appoint loyal judges. We document that court-empowering re…
Judicial and Constitutional Studies (5 works) · Law (5 works) · Law (5 works) · Political science (5 works) · Latin Americans (4 works) · Politics (4 works) · Supreme court (4 works) · Economics (3 works) · Judicial Independence (3 works) · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems (3 works)