Léo Fitouchi
Biographic Data
| ID | 8580974 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Léo Fitouchi |
| GIVEN NAMES | Léo |
| FAMILY NAME | Fitouchi |
| SIGNATURE | FITOUCHI L |
| AFFILIATIONS | Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-1724-0129 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 15 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 15 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Harmless bodily pleasures are moralized because they are perceived as reducing self-control and cooperativeness
The Cognitive Foundations of Fictional Stories
Why is there so much diversity in fictional plots? Why are some fictional stories more popular in certain countries or during specific historical periods? In this paper, we propose an evolutionary psychological framework to address these questions. Fictional stories trigger a range of evolved psychological mechanisms—such as finding mates (romance fiction), exploring the world (adventure fiction), or avoiding threats (horror fiction). While these…
Reciprocal contracts—not competitive acquisition—explain the moral psychology of ownership
We applaud Boyer's attempt to ground the psychology of ownership partly in a cooperative logic. In this commentary, we propose to go further and ground the psychology of ownership solely in a cooperative logic. The predictions of bargaining theory, we argue, completely contradict the actual features of ownership intuitions. Ownership is only about the calculation of mutually beneficial, reciprocal contracts
The puritanical moral contract: Purity, cooperation, and the architecture of the moral mind
Commentators raise fundamental questions about the notion of purity (sect. R1), the architecture of moral cognition (sect. R2), the functional relationship between morality and cooperation (sect. R3), the role of folk-theories of self-control in moral judgement (sect. R4), and the cultural variation of morality (sect. R5). In our response, we address all these issues by clarifying our theory of puritanism, responding to counter-arguments, and inc…
Prosocial religions as folk-technologies of mutual policing
Why do humans believe in moralizing gods? Leading accounts argue that these beliefs evolved because they help societies grow and promote group cooperation. Yet recent evidence suggests that beliefs in moralizing gods are not limited to large societies and might not have strong effects on cooperation. Here, we propose that prosocial religions, including beliefs in moralizing gods, develop because individuals shape supernatural beliefs to achieve t…
The gene’s-eye view of culture: Vehicles, not replicators
Punitive justice serves to restore reciprocal cooperation in three small-scale societies
The social leverage effect: Institutions transform weak reputation effects into strong incentives for cooperation
Institutions allow cooperation to persist when reciprocity and reputation provide insufficient incentives. Yet how they do so remains unclear, especially given that institutions are themselves a form of cooperation. To solve this puzzle, we develop a mathematical model of reputation-based cooperation in which two social dilemmas are nested within one another. The first dilemma, characterized by high individual costs or insufficient monitoring, ca…
From supernatural punishment to big gods to puritanical religions: Clarifying explanatory targets in the rise of moralizing religions
International audience
Harmless bodily pleasures are moralized because they are perceived as reducing self-control and cooperativeness
Why do many people moralize harmless bodily pleasures, such as gluttony, masturbation, and drinking alcohol? In three pre-registered experiments (N > 1,600), we investigated whether this is because they perceive bodily pleasures as indirectly facilitating antisocial behaviors by altering self-control. In Study 1 and 2, participants judged that targets who increased (vs. decreased) their indulgence harmless sex, food, alcohol, and laziness had bec…
An evolutionary contractualist theory of morality
Our goal in this paper is to use an evolutionary approach to explain the existence and design features of human moral cognition. Our premise is that humans are under selection to be good cooperative investments. Hence, they face a trade-off between maximizing the immediate gains of each social interaction and maximizing its long-term reputational effects. In a 2-player game, we show, under simplifying assumptions, that this trade- off leads indiv…
The intertwined cultural evolution of ascetic spiritualities and puritanical religions as technologies of self-discipline
Why do, across ascetic spiritual traditions (e.g. Ancient Greek spiritualities, Stoicism, Christianity, Buddhism, Jainism, Hinduism, Confucianism), a moralizing side restricting bodily pleasures, and a joyful side celebrating self-control derived well-being develop in concert? Why are these two intertwined cultural traits a recent development in human history, characteristic of economically developed, socially complex societies of the "Axial" tra…
Moral disciplining: The cognitive and evolutionary foundations of puritanical morality
Why do many societies moralize apparently harmless pleasures, such as lust, gluttony, alcohol, drugs, and even music and dance? Why do they erect temperance, asceticism, sobriety, modesty, and piety as cardinal moral virtues? According to existing theories, this puritanical morality cannot be reduced to concerns for harm and fairness: it must emerge from cognitive systems that did not evolve for cooperation (e.g., disgust-based “Purity” concerns)…
Are there really so many moral emotions? Carving morality at its functional joints
In recent decades, a large body of work has highlighted the importance of emotional processes in moral cognition. Since then, a heterogeneous bundle of emotions as varied as anger, guilt, shame, contempt, empathy, gratitude, and disgust have been proposed to play an essential role in moral psychology. However, the inclusion of these emotions in the moral domain often lacks a clear functional rationale, generating conflations between merely social…
The intertwined cultural evolution of ascetic spiritualities and puritanical religions as technologies of self-discipline
International audience
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The intertwined cultural evolution of ascetic spiritualities and puritanical religions as technologies of self-discipline
Why do, across ascetic spiritual traditions (e.g. Ancient Greek spiritualities, Stoicism, Christianity, Buddhism, Jainism, Hinduism, Confucianism), a moralizing side restricting bodily pleasures, and a joyful side celebrating self-control derived well-being develop in concert? Why are these two intertwined cultural traits a recent development in human history, characteristic of economically developed, socially complex societies of the "Axial" tra…
Moral disciplining: The cognitive and evolutionary foundations of puritanical morality
Why do many societies moralize apparently harmless pleasures, such as lust, gluttony, alcohol, drugs, and even music and dance? Why do they erect temperance, asceticism, sobriety, modesty, and piety as cardinal moral virtues? According to existing theories, this puritanical morality cannot be reduced to concerns for harm and fairness: it must emerge from cognitive systems that did not evolve for cooperation (e.g., disgust-based “Purity” concerns)…
Are there really so many moral emotions? Carving morality at its functional joints
In recent decades, a large body of work has highlighted the importance of emotional processes in moral cognition. Since then, a heterogeneous bundle of emotions as varied as anger, guilt, shame, contempt, empathy, gratitude, and disgust have been proposed to play an essential role in moral psychology. However, the inclusion of these emotions in the moral domain often lacks a clear functional rationale, generating conflations between merely social…
The intertwined cultural evolution of ascetic spiritualities and puritanical religions as technologies of self-discipline
International audience
Harmless bodily pleasures are moralized because they are perceived as reducing self-control and cooperativeness
Why do many people moralize harmless bodily pleasures, such as gluttony, masturbation, and drinking alcohol? In three pre-registered experiments (N > 1,600), we investigated whether this is because they perceive bodily pleasures as indirectly facilitating antisocial behaviors by altering self-control. In Study 1 and 2, participants judged that targets who increased (vs. decreased) their indulgence harmless sex, food, alcohol, and laziness had bec…
An evolutionary contractualist theory of morality
Our goal in this paper is to use an evolutionary approach to explain the existence and design features of human moral cognition. Our premise is that humans are under selection to be good cooperative investments. Hence, they face a trade-off between maximizing the immediate gains of each social interaction and maximizing its long-term reputational effects. In a 2-player game, we show, under simplifying assumptions, that this trade- off leads indiv…
Reciprocal contracts—not competitive acquisition—explain the moral psychology of ownership
We applaud Boyer's attempt to ground the psychology of ownership partly in a cooperative logic. In this commentary, we propose to go further and ground the psychology of ownership solely in a cooperative logic. The predictions of bargaining theory, we argue, completely contradict the actual features of ownership intuitions. Ownership is only about the calculation of mutually beneficial, reciprocal contracts
The puritanical moral contract: Purity, cooperation, and the architecture of the moral mind
Commentators raise fundamental questions about the notion of purity (sect. R1), the architecture of moral cognition (sect. R2), the functional relationship between morality and cooperation (sect. R3), the role of folk-theories of self-control in moral judgement (sect. R4), and the cultural variation of morality (sect. R5). In our response, we address all these issues by clarifying our theory of puritanism, responding to counter-arguments, and inc…
Prosocial religions as folk-technologies of mutual policing
Why do humans believe in moralizing gods? Leading accounts argue that these beliefs evolved because they help societies grow and promote group cooperation. Yet recent evidence suggests that beliefs in moralizing gods are not limited to large societies and might not have strong effects on cooperation. Here, we propose that prosocial religions, including beliefs in moralizing gods, develop because individuals shape supernatural beliefs to achieve t…
The gene’s-eye view of culture: Vehicles, not replicators
Punitive justice serves to restore reciprocal cooperation in three small-scale societies
The social leverage effect: Institutions transform weak reputation effects into strong incentives for cooperation
Institutions allow cooperation to persist when reciprocity and reputation provide insufficient incentives. Yet how they do so remains unclear, especially given that institutions are themselves a form of cooperation. To solve this puzzle, we develop a mathematical model of reputation-based cooperation in which two social dilemmas are nested within one another. The first dilemma, characterized by high individual costs or insufficient monitoring, ca…
From supernatural punishment to big gods to puritanical religions: Clarifying explanatory targets in the rise of moralizing religions
International audience
The Cognitive Foundations of Fictional Stories
Why is there so much diversity in fictional plots? Why are some fictional stories more popular in certain countries or during specific historical periods? In this paper, we propose an evolutionary psychological framework to address these questions. Fictional stories trigger a range of evolved psychological mechanisms—such as finding mates (romance fiction), exploring the world (adventure fiction), or avoiding threats (horror fiction). While these…
Harmless bodily pleasures are moralized because they are perceived as reducing self-control and cooperativeness
Psychology (12 works) · Social Psychology (11 works) · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation (8 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (7 works) · Epistemology (6 works) · Philosophy (6 works) · Economics (5 works) · Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior (4 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (4 works) · Law (4 works)