Reuven Brandt
Biographic Data
| ID | 8676131 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Reuven Brandt |
| GIVEN NAMES | Reuven |
| FAMILY NAME | Brandt |
| SIGNATURE | BRANDT R |
| AFFILIATIONS | Department of Philosophy UC San Diego 9500 Gilman Drive # 0119 La Jolla California 92093‐0119 USA |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-3808-1072 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 4 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Procreative Obligations and the Directed Duty of Care
There is much dispute about what we owe the children we are responsible for creating. Some argue that so long as we provide offspring with lives worth living we do no wrong. Others argue that our procreative obligations are weightier and oblige us to provide (or attempt to provide) our offspring with a reasonable opportunity to thrive, or meet some other standard beyond merely providing a life worth living. Our practices and intuitions on this ma…
Significant Interests and the Right to Know
The ethical gene
In this paper I argue that current law and policy governing germline genetic modification are overly broad and in fact prohibit medical interventions normally considered unobjectionable. The root of the problem lies in the fact law and policy tend to espouse a near categorical ban on medical interventions that alter germline DNA. However, if we pay close attention to the biological mechanisms at play we see that many standard medical intervention…
Gamete Donation, the Responsibility Objection, and Procreative Responsibilities
Sophisticated arguments advanced by Harry Silverstein, David Boonin, and Jeff McMahan attempt to show that being responsible for an individual's existence need not result in an obligation to ensure that the needs of that individual are satisfied. While these arguments take place within the abortion debate, by extension they threaten causal accounts of procreative responsibility more generally. In this article, I defend causal accounts of procreat…
No prominent works on this page.
Gamete Donation, the Responsibility Objection, and Procreative Responsibilities
Sophisticated arguments advanced by Harry Silverstein, David Boonin, and Jeff McMahan attempt to show that being responsible for an individual's existence need not result in an obligation to ensure that the needs of that individual are satisfied. While these arguments take place within the abortion debate, by extension they threaten causal accounts of procreative responsibility more generally. In this article, I defend causal accounts of procreat…
The ethical gene
In this paper I argue that current law and policy governing germline genetic modification are overly broad and in fact prohibit medical interventions normally considered unobjectionable. The root of the problem lies in the fact law and policy tend to espouse a near categorical ban on medical interventions that alter germline DNA. However, if we pay close attention to the biological mechanisms at play we see that many standard medical intervention…
Significant Interests and the Right to Know
Procreative Obligations and the Directed Duty of Care
There is much dispute about what we owe the children we are responsible for creating. Some argue that so long as we provide offspring with lives worth living we do no wrong. Others argue that our procreative obligations are weightier and oblige us to provide (or attempt to provide) our offspring with a reasonable opportunity to thrive, or meet some other standard beyond merely providing a life worth living. Our practices and intuitions on this ma…
Law (4 works) · Political science (4 works) · Law and economics (3 works) · Sociology (3 works) · Environmental ethics (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Psychology (2 works) · Abortion (1 work) · Biology (1 work) · Biomedical Ethics and Regulation (1 work)