Susan C Stokes
Biographic Data
| ID | 8745834 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Susan C Stokes |
| GIVEN NAMES | Susan C |
| FAMILY NAME | Stokes |
| SIGNATURE | STOKES S C |
| AFFILIATIONS | Political Science, Yale University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 26 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 979 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 22 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 4 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1991 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 7 |
The Effect of Electoral Inversions on Democratic Legitimacy: Evidence from the United States
When a party or candidate loses the popular vote but still wins the election, do voters view the winner as legitimate? This scenario, known as an electoral inversion , describes the winners of two of the last six presidential elections in the United States. We report results from two experiments testing the effect of inversions on democratic legitimacy in the US context. Our results indicate that inversions significantly decrease the perceived le…
Why Bother: Rethinking Participation in Elections and Protests
Why Bother: Rethinking Participation in Elections and Protests
Why do vote-suppression efforts sometimes fail? Why does police repression of demonstrators sometimes turn localized protests into massive, national movements? How do politicians and activists manipulate people's emotions to get them involved? The authors of Why Bother? offer a new theory of why people take part in collective action in politics, and test it in the contexts of voting and protesting. They develop the idea that just as there are cos…
Overview of Comparative Politics
This article discusses several crucial questions that comparative political scientists address. These questions also form part of the basis of the current volume. The article first studies the theory and methods used in gathering data and evidence, and then focuses on the concepts of states, state formation, and political consent. Political regimes, political conflict, mass political mobilization, and political instability are other topics examin…
Political Clientelism
This article studies political clientelism. In the first section, the term clientelism can be defined as giving material goods in return for electoral support, where the criterion of distribution that the patron uses is simply: did you/will you support me? This section includes definitions of vote buying and patronage. The two waves of studies of clientelism and the link between clientelism and commitment are discussed in the subsequent sections.…
Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics
"Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism addresses major questions in distributive politics. Why is it acceptable for parties to try to win elections by promising to make certain groups of people better off, but unacceptable, and illegal, to pay people for their votes? Why do parties often lavish benefits on loyal voters, whose support they can count on anyway, rather than on responsive swing voters? Why is vote buying and machine politics common in tod…
Democracy, Accountability, and Representation
This book examines whether the mechanisms of accountability characteristic of democratic systems are sufficient to induce the representatives to act in the best interest of the represented. The first part of the volume focuses on the role of elections, distinguishing different ways in which they may cause representation. The second part is devoted to the role of checks and balances, between the government and the parliament as well as between the…
Political Representation
Political representation lies at the core of modern politics. Democracies, with their vast numbers of citizens, could not operate without representative institutions. Yet relations between the democratic ideal and the everyday practice of political representation have never been well defined and remain the subject of vigorous debate among historians, political theorists, lawyers, and citizens. In this volume, an eminent group of scholars move for…
The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics
The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics offers a critical survey of the field of empirical political science through the collection of a set of articles written by forty-seven scholars in the discipline of comparative politics. Part I includes articles surveying the key research methodologies employed in comparative politics (the comparative method, the use of history, the practice and status of case-study research, and the contributions of f…
Is Vote Buying Undemocratic?
Eleições e representação
O artigo indaga o quanto o mecanismo eleitoral pode, de fato, tornar mais representativas as instituições da democracia. Os autores diagnosticam sérias limitações no voto como mecanismo capaz de alavancar algum controle do representado sobre o representante
Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina
Political machines (or clientelist parties) mobilize electoral support by trading particularistic benefits to voters in exchange for their votes. But if the secret ballot hides voters' actions from the machine, voters are able to renege, accepting benefits and then voting as they choose. To explain how machine politics works, I observe that machines use their deep insertion into voters' social networks to try to circumvent the secret ballot and i…
Endogenous Democratization
The authors show that economic development increases the probability that a country will undergo a transition to democracy. These results contradict the finding of Przeworski and his associates, that development causes democracy to last but not to come into existence in the first place. By dealing adequately with problems of sample selection and model specification, the authors discover that economic growth does cause nondemocracies to democratiz…
Mandates and Democracy: Neoliberalism by Surprise in Latin America
Sometimes politicians run for office promising one set of policies, and if they win, switch to very different ones. Latin American presidents in recent years have frequently run promising to avoid pro-market reforms and harsh economic adjustment, then win and transform immediately into enthusiastic market reformers. Does it matter when politicians ignore the promises they made and the preferences of their constituents? If politicians want to be r…
Economic Reform and Public Opinion in Fujimori's Peru
On August 8, 1990, the finance minister of the newly installed Fujimori government announced price increases. Gasoline would go up more than 3,000%, kerosene almost 7,000%, bread more than 1,500%, and medicines, on average, 1,400%. The inflation rate in August, reflecting these increases, was 400%.
Public Support for Market Reforms in New Democracies
Do people in new democracies undergoing market reforms turn against these reforms when the economic adjustment is painful? The conventional wisdom is that they will. According to 'economic voting' models, citizens punish elected governments for bad economic performance. The contributors to this collection, in contrast, begin with the insight that citizens in new democracies have good reasons to depart from the predictions of economic voting. If t…
Elections and Representation
The claim connecting democracy and representation is that under democracy governments are representative because they are elected: if elections are freely contested, if participation is widespread, and if citizens enjoy political liberties, then governments will act in the best interest of the people. In one – the "mandate" – view, elections serve to select good policies or policybearing politicians. Parties or candidates make policy proposals du…
Constituency influence and representation
Democratic Accountability and Policy Change: Economic Policy in Fujimori's Peru
Ask a political theorist what distinguishes democracy from other systems of government and the answer is likely to include terms like and accountability. For Robert Dahl, continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens [is] a key characteristic of democracy. Citizens' ability to vote leaders out of office is the sharpest difference between dictatorship and democracy and enables the citizens to hold the policymakers …
Opinión pública y reformas de mercado: Las limitaciones de la interpretación económica del voto
Economic Reform and Public Opinion in Peru, 1990-1995
Even if they are confident that prosperity lies just over the horizon, politicians who embark on promarket reforms know they are in for some stormy weather. How will they fare in voters' eyes once the pain is felt? Will voters inevitably turn against politicians who impose painful measures without an electoral mandate to do so? The story of economic reform and public opinion in Peru under Alberto Fujimori (1990-1995) poses just these questions. T…
Public Opinion and Market Reforms: The Limits of Economic Voting
The broadly held view that promarket reforms are good for most people is in conflict with the equally broadly held view that, in democracies, reforms will generate widespread resistance. Resistance is expected because reforms typically produce economic downturns, at least over the short term. Under normal circumstances, we expect citizens to withdraw support from governments during periods of economic decline. If citizens withdraw support, then g…
Cultures in Conflict: Social Movements and the State in Peru
Cultures in Conflict: Social Movements and the State in Peru
Politics and Latin America's Urban Poor: Reflections from a Lima Shantytown
In the early 1970s, Wayne Cornelius asked, “Are the migrant masses revolutionary? Definitely not, at least in Latin America and many other parts of the developing world.” These words summarized an emerging revisionist view of the political character of Latin America's new urban poor. Careful empirical research had proved wrong previous scholars and observers who had expected the new migrant populations in Latin America's cities to become sources …
Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina
Political machines (or clientelist parties) mobilize electoral support by trading particularistic benefits to voters in exchange for their votes. But if the secret ballot hides voters' actions from the machine, voters are able to renege, accepting benefits and then voting as they choose. To explain how machine politics works, I observe that machines use their deep insertion into voters' social networks to try to circumvent the secret ballot and i…
Endogenous Democratization
The authors show that economic development increases the probability that a country will undergo a transition to democracy. These results contradict the finding of Przeworski and his associates, that development causes democracy to last but not to come into existence in the first place. By dealing adequately with problems of sample selection and model specification, the authors discover that economic growth does cause nondemocracies to democratiz…
Public Opinion and Market Reforms: The Limits of Economic Voting
The broadly held view that promarket reforms are good for most people is in conflict with the equally broadly held view that, in democracies, reforms will generate widespread resistance. Resistance is expected because reforms typically produce economic downturns, at least over the short term. Under normal circumstances, we expect citizens to withdraw support from governments during periods of economic decline. If citizens withdraw support, then g…
Economic Reform and Public Opinion in Peru, 1990-1995
Even if they are confident that prosperity lies just over the horizon, politicians who embark on promarket reforms know they are in for some stormy weather. How will they fare in voters' eyes once the pain is felt? Will voters inevitably turn against politicians who impose painful measures without an electoral mandate to do so? The story of economic reform and public opinion in Peru under Alberto Fujimori (1990-1995) poses just these questions. T…
Eleições e representação
O artigo indaga o quanto o mecanismo eleitoral pode, de fato, tornar mais representativas as instituições da democracia. Os autores diagnosticam sérias limitações no voto como mecanismo capaz de alavancar algum controle do representado sobre o representante
Democratic Accountability and Policy Change: Economic Policy in Fujimori's Peru
Ask a political theorist what distinguishes democracy from other systems of government and the answer is likely to include terms like and accountability. For Robert Dahl, continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens [is] a key characteristic of democracy. Citizens' ability to vote leaders out of office is the sharpest difference between dictatorship and democracy and enables the citizens to hold the policymakers …
Hegemony, Consciousness, and Political Change in Peru
Constituency influence and representation
The Effect of Electoral Inversions on Democratic Legitimacy: Evidence from the United States
When a party or candidate loses the popular vote but still wins the election, do voters view the winner as legitimate? This scenario, known as an electoral inversion , describes the winners of two of the last six presidential elections in the United States. We report results from two experiments testing the effect of inversions on democratic legitimacy in the US context. Our results indicate that inversions significantly decrease the perceived le…
Politics and Latin America's Urban Poor: Reflections from a Lima Shantytown
In the early 1970s, Wayne Cornelius asked, “Are the migrant masses revolutionary? Definitely not, at least in Latin America and many other parts of the developing world.” These words summarized an emerging revisionist view of the political character of Latin America's new urban poor. Careful empirical research had proved wrong previous scholars and observers who had expected the new migrant populations in Latin America's cities to become sources …
Hegemony, Consciousness, and Political Change in Peru
Cultures in Conflict: Social Movements and the State in Peru
Cultures in Conflict: Social Movements and the State in Peru
Economic Reform and Public Opinion in Peru, 1990-1995
Even if they are confident that prosperity lies just over the horizon, politicians who embark on promarket reforms know they are in for some stormy weather. How will they fare in voters' eyes once the pain is felt? Will voters inevitably turn against politicians who impose painful measures without an electoral mandate to do so? The story of economic reform and public opinion in Peru under Alberto Fujimori (1990-1995) poses just these questions. T…
Public Opinion and Market Reforms: The Limits of Economic Voting
The broadly held view that promarket reforms are good for most people is in conflict with the equally broadly held view that, in democracies, reforms will generate widespread resistance. Resistance is expected because reforms typically produce economic downturns, at least over the short term. Under normal circumstances, we expect citizens to withdraw support from governments during periods of economic decline. If citizens withdraw support, then g…
Democratic Accountability and Policy Change: Economic Policy in Fujimori's Peru
Ask a political theorist what distinguishes democracy from other systems of government and the answer is likely to include terms like and accountability. For Robert Dahl, continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens [is] a key characteristic of democracy. Citizens' ability to vote leaders out of office is the sharpest difference between dictatorship and democracy and enables the citizens to hold the policymakers …
Opinión pública y reformas de mercado: Las limitaciones de la interpretación económica del voto
Constituency influence and representation
Elections and Representation
The claim connecting democracy and representation is that under democracy governments are representative because they are elected: if elections are freely contested, if participation is widespread, and if citizens enjoy political liberties, then governments will act in the best interest of the people. In one – the "mandate" – view, elections serve to select good policies or policybearing politicians. Parties or candidates make policy proposals du…
Mandates and Democracy: Neoliberalism by Surprise in Latin America
Sometimes politicians run for office promising one set of policies, and if they win, switch to very different ones. Latin American presidents in recent years have frequently run promising to avoid pro-market reforms and harsh economic adjustment, then win and transform immediately into enthusiastic market reformers. Does it matter when politicians ignore the promises they made and the preferences of their constituents? If politicians want to be r…
Economic Reform and Public Opinion in Fujimori's Peru
On August 8, 1990, the finance minister of the newly installed Fujimori government announced price increases. Gasoline would go up more than 3,000%, kerosene almost 7,000%, bread more than 1,500%, and medicines, on average, 1,400%. The inflation rate in August, reflecting these increases, was 400%.
Public Support for Market Reforms in New Democracies
Do people in new democracies undergoing market reforms turn against these reforms when the economic adjustment is painful? The conventional wisdom is that they will. According to 'economic voting' models, citizens punish elected governments for bad economic performance. The contributors to this collection, in contrast, begin with the insight that citizens in new democracies have good reasons to depart from the predictions of economic voting. If t…
Endogenous Democratization
The authors show that economic development increases the probability that a country will undergo a transition to democracy. These results contradict the finding of Przeworski and his associates, that development causes democracy to last but not to come into existence in the first place. By dealing adequately with problems of sample selection and model specification, the authors discover that economic growth does cause nondemocracies to democratiz…
Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina
Political machines (or clientelist parties) mobilize electoral support by trading particularistic benefits to voters in exchange for their votes. But if the secret ballot hides voters' actions from the machine, voters are able to renege, accepting benefits and then voting as they choose. To explain how machine politics works, I observe that machines use their deep insertion into voters' social networks to try to circumvent the secret ballot and i…
Eleições e representação
O artigo indaga o quanto o mecanismo eleitoral pode, de fato, tornar mais representativas as instituições da democracia. Os autores diagnosticam sérias limitações no voto como mecanismo capaz de alavancar algum controle do representado sobre o representante
Is Vote Buying Undemocratic?
The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics
The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics offers a critical survey of the field of empirical political science through the collection of a set of articles written by forty-seven scholars in the discipline of comparative politics. Part I includes articles surveying the key research methodologies employed in comparative politics (the comparative method, the use of history, the practice and status of case-study research, and the contributions of f…
Political Representation
Political representation lies at the core of modern politics. Democracies, with their vast numbers of citizens, could not operate without representative institutions. Yet relations between the democratic ideal and the everyday practice of political representation have never been well defined and remain the subject of vigorous debate among historians, political theorists, lawyers, and citizens. In this volume, an eminent group of scholars move for…
Democracy, Accountability, and Representation
This book examines whether the mechanisms of accountability characteristic of democratic systems are sufficient to induce the representatives to act in the best interest of the represented. The first part of the volume focuses on the role of elections, distinguishing different ways in which they may cause representation. The second part is devoted to the role of checks and balances, between the government and the parliament as well as between the…
Overview of Comparative Politics
This article discusses several crucial questions that comparative political scientists address. These questions also form part of the basis of the current volume. The article first studies the theory and methods used in gathering data and evidence, and then focuses on the concepts of states, state formation, and political consent. Political regimes, political conflict, mass political mobilization, and political instability are other topics examin…
Political Clientelism
This article studies political clientelism. In the first section, the term clientelism can be defined as giving material goods in return for electoral support, where the criterion of distribution that the patron uses is simply: did you/will you support me? This section includes definitions of vote buying and patronage. The two waves of studies of clientelism and the link between clientelism and commitment are discussed in the subsequent sections.…
Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics
"Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism addresses major questions in distributive politics. Why is it acceptable for parties to try to win elections by promising to make certain groups of people better off, but unacceptable, and illegal, to pay people for their votes? Why do parties often lavish benefits on loyal voters, whose support they can count on anyway, rather than on responsive swing voters? Why is vote buying and machine politics common in tod…
Why Bother: Rethinking Participation in Elections and Protests
Why do vote-suppression efforts sometimes fail? Why does police repression of demonstrators sometimes turn localized protests into massive, national movements? How do politicians and activists manipulate people's emotions to get them involved? The authors of Why Bother? offer a new theory of why people take part in collective action in politics, and test it in the contexts of voting and protesting. They develop the idea that just as there are cos…
Why Bother: Rethinking Participation in Elections and Protests
Political science (23 works) · Politics (21 works) · Law (20 works) · Political economy (16 works) · Democracy (13 works) · Economics (13 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (9 works) · Law (9 works) · Public Administration (9 works) · Politics and Society in Latin America (8 works)