P-C Hautcoeur
Biographic Data
| ID | 8763290 |
|---|---|
| NAME | P-C Hautcoeur |
| GIVEN NAMES | P-C |
| FAMILY NAME | Hautcoeur |
| SIGNATURE | HAUTCŒUR P |
| AFFILIATIONS | École Normale Supérieure - PSL |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 2 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1999 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2007 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Why didn't France follow the British stabilisation after World War I
We show that, because the cost of the war had been so high in France, the size of the French public debt, the budget deficit and the monetary overhang made it impossible to stabilise immediately after World War I, even on the anti-Keynesian assumption that a stabilisation would have had no negative effects on income. The reason for the immediate postwar inflation was then not mismanaged policy but a wise choice in the French context; nevertheless…
Threat of a capital levy, expected devaluation and interest rates in France during the interwar period
In this paper we try to isolate and measure the respective importance of political and economic aspects in two critical episodes of France interwar. We do this by separating expectations of taxation and of devaluation that are implicitly included in the prices of various categories of French and foreign bonds. Concerning the 1924–26 crisis, we show first that there was no expectation of a government default; second that the rise of interest rates…
No prominent works on this page.
Threat of a capital levy, expected devaluation and interest rates in France during the interwar period
In this paper we try to isolate and measure the respective importance of political and economic aspects in two critical episodes of France interwar. We do this by separating expectations of taxation and of devaluation that are implicitly included in the prices of various categories of French and foreign bonds. Concerning the 1924–26 crisis, we show first that there was no expectation of a government default; second that the rise of interest rates…
Why didn't France follow the British stabilisation after World War I
We show that, because the cost of the war had been so high in France, the size of the French public debt, the budget deficit and the monetary overhang made it impossible to stabilise immediately after World War I, even on the anti-Keynesian assumption that a stabilisation would have had no negative effects on income. The reason for the immediate postwar inflation was then not mismanaged policy but a wise choice in the French context; nevertheless…
Capital (architecture) (1 works) · Classics (1 works) · Devaluation (1 works) · Economic history (1 works) · Economics (1 works) · European Socioeconomic and Political Studies (1 works) · Exchange rate (1 works) · French Historical and Cultural Studies (1 works) · Global Financial Crisis and Policies (1 works) · Historical Economic and Social Studies (1 works)