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Daisuke Oyama

Biographic Data

ID8763936
NAMEDaisuke Oyama
GIVEN NAMESDaisuke
FAMILY NAMEOyama
SIGNATUREOYAMA D
AFFILIATIONSFaculty of Economics; University of Tokyo
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS3
TOTAL CITATIONS0
WORKS AS AUTHOR3
WORKS AS EDITOR0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2009
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2015
H-INDEX0
  • Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection

    Open Access•Daisuke Oyama, William H Sandholm et al.•ARTICLE•Theoretical Economics•2015

    We consider a model of evolution in games in which a revising agent observes the actions of a random number of randomly sampled opponents and then chooses a best response to the distribution of actions in the sample. We provide a condition on the distribution of sample sizes under which an iterated p-dominant equilibrium is almost globally asymptotically stable under these dynamics. We show under an additional condition on the sample size distrib…

  • Robust Equilibria under Non-Common Priors

    Open Access•Daisuke Oyama, Olivier Tercieux•ARTICLE•Journal of Economic Theory•2009

  • Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria

    Open Access•Daisuke Oyama, Olivier Tercieux•ARTICLE•Journal of Economic Theory•2009

No prominent works on this page.

  • Robust Equilibria under Non-Common Priors

    Open Access•Daisuke Oyama, Olivier Tercieux•ARTICLE•Journal of Economic Theory•2009

  • Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria

    Open Access•Daisuke Oyama, Olivier Tercieux•ARTICLE•Journal of Economic Theory•2009

  • Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection

    Open Access•Daisuke Oyama, William H Sandholm et al.•ARTICLE•Theoretical Economics•2015

    We consider a model of evolution in games in which a revising agent observes the actions of a random number of randomly sampled opponents and then chooses a best response to the distribution of actions in the sample. We provide a condition on the distribution of sample sizes under which an iterated p-dominant equilibrium is almost globally asymptotically stable under these dynamics. We show under an additional condition on the sample size distrib…

Economic theories and models (3 works) · Game Theory and Applications (3 works) · Mathematical economics (3 works) · Mathematical optimization (3 works) · Mathematics (3 works) · Applied Mathematics (2 works) · Complete information (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Equilibrium selection (2 works) · Game theory (2 works)

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