Nada Ben Elhadj
Biographic Data
| ID | 8776586 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Nada Ben Elhadj |
| GIVEN NAMES | Nada Ben |
| FAMILY NAME | Elhadj |
| SIGNATURE | BEN ELHADJ N |
| AFFILIATIONS | Institut Supérieur de Gestion de Tunis, University of Tunis, Tunis, Tunisia |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 2 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2014 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Low prices cum selective distribution versus high prices
We investigate the best signalling strategy for a monopoly introducing a new product with unobservable quality when second-period sales are linked to first-period ones and the firm may tailor its distribution network to exclude some consumers. When producing a high quality product rather than a low quality one is relatively costly with respect to the increase in quality, optimal signalling is by price alone. But when the cost differential is lowe…
Advertising Spillovers and Market Structure
Dans ce papier, nous caractérisons l’équilibre d’un marché duopolistique en présence d’externalités publicitaires. Nous montrons que la distinction pertinente n’est pas entre des externalités publicitaires purement positives et des externalités purement négatives mais entre des externalités fortement positives et des externalités faiblement positives ou négatives. En outre, nous montrons que, selon l’intensité des externalités publicitaires et le…
No prominent works on this page.
Advertising Spillovers and Market Structure
Dans ce papier, nous caractérisons l’équilibre d’un marché duopolistique en présence d’externalités publicitaires. Nous montrons que la distinction pertinente n’est pas entre des externalités publicitaires purement positives et des externalités purement négatives mais entre des externalités fortement positives et des externalités faiblement positives ou négatives. En outre, nous montrons que, selon l’intensité des externalités publicitaires et le…
Low prices cum selective distribution versus high prices
We investigate the best signalling strategy for a monopoly introducing a new product with unobservable quality when second-period sales are linked to first-period ones and the firm may tailor its distribution network to exclude some consumers. When producing a high quality product rather than a low quality one is relatively costly with respect to the increase in quality, optimal signalling is by price alone. But when the cost differential is lowe…
Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing (2 works) · Digital Platforms and Economics (2 works) · Merger and Competition Analysis (2 works) · Business (1 work) · Econometrics (1 work) · Economics (1 work) · Engineering (1 work) · Game Theory and Applications (1 work) · Humanities (1 work) · Industrial organization (1 work)