Matti Sarkia
Biographic Data
| ID | 884813 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Matti Sarkia |
| GIVEN NAMES | Matti |
| FAMILY NAME | Sarkia |
| SIGNATURE | SARKIA M |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Helsinki |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-6523-9993 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 19 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 8 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
What are consumer sentiment indicators a measure of
This paper discusses the status of consumer sentiment indicators in macroeconomic forecasting, and argues that economists have been ambivalent between several different interpretations of the cognitive ontology of consumer sentiment: deflationism (motivated by an emphasis on economic fundamentals or rational expectations), doxastic realism (motivated by the ideas of privileged epistemic access and wisdom of the masses), and affective realism (mot…
Modeling the Normativity of Joint Commitments
This paper discusses current debates about the normativity of joint commitments in analytical social ontology from a methodological point of view. I argue that collective-acceptance-based, critical-emancipatory, and experimental-philosophy-based approaches to social ontology all face challenges in accommodating the dynamic and strategic aspects of joint commitment. To make up for their shortcomings, I draw on evolutionary game theory and mindshap…
Mechanistic Explanation, Interdisciplinary Integration and Interpersonal Social Coordination
Prominent research programs dealing with the nature and mechanisms of interpersonal social coordination have emerged in cognitive science, developmental psychology and evolutionary anthropology. I argue that the mechanistic approach to explanation in contemporary philosophy of science can facilitate interdisciplinary integration and division of labor between these different disciplinary research programs. By distinguishing phenomenal models from …
Two approaches to naturalistic social ontology
Social ontological inquiry has been pursued in analytic philosophy as well as in the social scientific tradition of critical realism. These traditions have remained largely separate despite partly overlapping concerns and similar underlying strategies of argumentation. They have also both been the subject of similar criticisms based on naturalistic approaches to the philosophy of science, which have addressed their apparent reliance on a transcen…
A model-based approach to social ontology
This paper argues for theoretical modeling and model-construction as central (but not necessarily the only) types of activities that philosophers of social ontology (in the analytic tradition) engage in. This claim is defended through a detailed case study and revisionary interpretation of Raimo Tuomela’s account of the we-perspective. My interpretation is grounded in Ronald Giere’s account of scientific models, and argued to be compatible with, …
Modeling intentional agency
This paper analyzes three contrasting strategies for modeling intentional agency in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind and action, and draws parallels between them and similar strategies of scientific model-construction. Gricean modeling involves identifying primitive building blocks of intentional agency, and building up from such building blocks to prototypically agential behaviors. Analogical modeling is based on picking out an exemplary…
Mechanistic explanations in the cognitive social sciences
Discussions of the relations between the social sciences and the cognitive sciences have proliferated in recent years. Our article contributes to the philosophical and methodological foundations of the cognitive social sciences by proposing a framework based on contemporary mechanistic approaches to the philosophy of science to analyze the epistemological, ontological and methodological aspects of research programs at the intersection of the soci…
Arguments for the cognitive social sciences
This article analyses the arguments for the integration between the cognitive and social sciences. We understand interdisciplinary integration as an umbrella term that includes different ways of bringing scientific disciplines together. Our focus is on four arguments based on different ideas about how the cognitive sciences should be integrated with the social sciences: explanatory grounding, theoretical unification, constraint and complementarit…
Mechanistic explanations in the cognitive social sciences
Discussions of the relations between the social sciences and the cognitive sciences have proliferated in recent years. Our article contributes to the philosophical and methodological foundations of the cognitive social sciences by proposing a framework based on contemporary mechanistic approaches to the philosophy of science to analyze the epistemological, ontological and methodological aspects of research programs at the intersection of the soci…
Arguments for the cognitive social sciences
This article analyses the arguments for the integration between the cognitive and social sciences. We understand interdisciplinary integration as an umbrella term that includes different ways of bringing scientific disciplines together. Our focus is on four arguments based on different ideas about how the cognitive sciences should be integrated with the social sciences: explanatory grounding, theoretical unification, constraint and complementarit…
Two approaches to naturalistic social ontology
Social ontological inquiry has been pursued in analytic philosophy as well as in the social scientific tradition of critical realism. These traditions have remained largely separate despite partly overlapping concerns and similar underlying strategies of argumentation. They have also both been the subject of similar criticisms based on naturalistic approaches to the philosophy of science, which have addressed their apparent reliance on a transcen…
Modeling intentional agency
This paper analyzes three contrasting strategies for modeling intentional agency in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind and action, and draws parallels between them and similar strategies of scientific model-construction. Gricean modeling involves identifying primitive building blocks of intentional agency, and building up from such building blocks to prototypically agential behaviors. Analogical modeling is based on picking out an exemplary…
A model-based approach to social ontology
This paper argues for theoretical modeling and model-construction as central (but not necessarily the only) types of activities that philosophers of social ontology (in the analytic tradition) engage in. This claim is defended through a detailed case study and revisionary interpretation of Raimo Tuomela’s account of the we-perspective. My interpretation is grounded in Ronald Giere’s account of scientific models, and argued to be compatible with, …
Arguments for the cognitive social sciences
This article analyses the arguments for the integration between the cognitive and social sciences. We understand interdisciplinary integration as an umbrella term that includes different ways of bringing scientific disciplines together. Our focus is on four arguments based on different ideas about how the cognitive sciences should be integrated with the social sciences: explanatory grounding, theoretical unification, constraint and complementarit…
Mechanistic explanations in the cognitive social sciences
Discussions of the relations between the social sciences and the cognitive sciences have proliferated in recent years. Our article contributes to the philosophical and methodological foundations of the cognitive social sciences by proposing a framework based on contemporary mechanistic approaches to the philosophy of science to analyze the epistemological, ontological and methodological aspects of research programs at the intersection of the soci…
Modeling intentional agency
This paper analyzes three contrasting strategies for modeling intentional agency in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind and action, and draws parallels between them and similar strategies of scientific model-construction. Gricean modeling involves identifying primitive building blocks of intentional agency, and building up from such building blocks to prototypically agential behaviors. Analogical modeling is based on picking out an exemplary…
A model-based approach to social ontology
This paper argues for theoretical modeling and model-construction as central (but not necessarily the only) types of activities that philosophers of social ontology (in the analytic tradition) engage in. This claim is defended through a detailed case study and revisionary interpretation of Raimo Tuomela’s account of the we-perspective. My interpretation is grounded in Ronald Giere’s account of scientific models, and argued to be compatible with, …
Two approaches to naturalistic social ontology
Social ontological inquiry has been pursued in analytic philosophy as well as in the social scientific tradition of critical realism. These traditions have remained largely separate despite partly overlapping concerns and similar underlying strategies of argumentation. They have also both been the subject of similar criticisms based on naturalistic approaches to the philosophy of science, which have addressed their apparent reliance on a transcen…
Mechanistic Explanation, Interdisciplinary Integration and Interpersonal Social Coordination
Prominent research programs dealing with the nature and mechanisms of interpersonal social coordination have emerged in cognitive science, developmental psychology and evolutionary anthropology. I argue that the mechanistic approach to explanation in contemporary philosophy of science can facilitate interdisciplinary integration and division of labor between these different disciplinary research programs. By distinguishing phenomenal models from …
What are consumer sentiment indicators a measure of
This paper discusses the status of consumer sentiment indicators in macroeconomic forecasting, and argues that economists have been ambivalent between several different interpretations of the cognitive ontology of consumer sentiment: deflationism (motivated by an emphasis on economic fundamentals or rational expectations), doxastic realism (motivated by the ideas of privileged epistemic access and wisdom of the masses), and affective realism (mot…
Modeling the Normativity of Joint Commitments
This paper discusses current debates about the normativity of joint commitments in analytical social ontology from a methodological point of view. I argue that collective-acceptance-based, critical-emancipatory, and experimental-philosophy-based approaches to social ontology all face challenges in accommodating the dynamic and strategic aspects of joint commitment. To make up for their shortcomings, I draw on evolutionary game theory and mindshap…
Epistemology (7 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (7 works) · Sociology (7 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Cognitive science (4 works) · Philosophy of science (4 works) · Psychology (4 works) · Social science (4 works) · Cognition (3 works)