Maxim D Gorbachev
Biographic Data
| ID | 8884626 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Maxim D Gorbachev |
| GIVEN NAMES | Maxim D |
| FAMILY NAME | Gorbachev |
| SIGNATURE | GORBACHEV M D |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 3 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Hard Problem of Illusion
The hard problem of consciousness, which consists in the need for a non-functional explanation of subjective experience as a possibility to have subjective experience at all, while focusing on attempts to give this explanation, often loses sight of consciousness itself and its phenomenality, the real way of existence of which is assumed as a given. Illusionism replaces the hard problem of consciousness with the problem of illusion, which impli…
Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness. Part II
This is the second part of the article devoted to the approach to the problem of consciousness, which is called illusionism. Illusionism claims that phenomenal consciousness is illusory, because conscious experience is misrepresented as having phenomenal properties. Illusionism replaces the hard problem of consciousness with the problem of illusion. In this part, special attention is paid to the justification of illusionism and pointing out its …
Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness Part I
This is the first part of the article, which presents arguments in favour of an approach to consciousness, which is called illusionism. This is the view that phenomenal consciousness is illusory. According to illusionists, our sense that our conscious experiences are like something is a result of the fact that we systematically misrepresent them or their objects as having phenomenal properties. The hard problem is replaced by the problem of il…
No prominent works on this page.
Hard Problem of Illusion
The hard problem of consciousness, which consists in the need for a non-functional explanation of subjective experience as a possibility to have subjective experience at all, while focusing on attempts to give this explanation, often loses sight of consciousness itself and its phenomenality, the real way of existence of which is assumed as a given. Illusionism replaces the hard problem of consciousness with the problem of illusion, which impli…
Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness. Part II
This is the second part of the article devoted to the approach to the problem of consciousness, which is called illusionism. Illusionism claims that phenomenal consciousness is illusory, because conscious experience is misrepresented as having phenomenal properties. Illusionism replaces the hard problem of consciousness with the problem of illusion. In this part, special attention is paid to the justification of illusionism and pointing out its …
Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness Part I
This is the first part of the article, which presents arguments in favour of an approach to consciousness, which is called illusionism. This is the view that phenomenal consciousness is illusory. According to illusionists, our sense that our conscious experiences are like something is a result of the fact that we systematically misrepresent them or their objects as having phenomenal properties. The hard problem is replaced by the problem of il…
Cognitive psychology (3 works) · Consciousness (3 works) · Epistemology (3 works) · Illusion (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (2 works) · False accusation (2 works) · Qualia (2 works) · Social Psychology (2 works)