Artem T Iunusov
Biographic Data
| ID | 8885193 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Artem T Iunusov |
| GIVEN NAMES | Artem T |
| FAMILY NAME | Iunusov |
| SIGNATURE | IUNUSOV A T |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0570-6347 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2016 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Why Blame? On Justification of Practices of Holding Morally Responsible
The normative question that is discussed in modern studies of moral responsibility rather often is the question of reasons that would make holding someone responsible inappropriate. But what is discussed far less frequently is the logically prior question of what what reasons, if any, do we have in favor of the practice of holding each other morally responsible at all — that is, what reasons can we offer to justify blaming or praising someone, es…
Principles and Causes in Aristotle’s Metaphysics Δ.1
This paper deals with a new interpretation of the passage 1013a16–17 in Aristotle’s Metaphysics Δ.1, proposed by Richard Bodéüs and Annick Stevens in their recent edition of a French translation and commentary of Δ. In section 1 I describe the problems with the traditional reading of this passage that implies that all principles are causes: given it, first, Aristotle makes a serious logical error in his reasoning and, second, it is impossible t…
T.M. Scanlon’s account of responsibility and the problem of moral luck
Thomas M. Scanlon is one of the most prominent modern moral philosophers, and his theory of moral responsibility is one of the most influential theories of this kind in modern ethics. In the present article we set out the main features of this theory and then deal in detail with one of the problems this theory faces, the moral luck cases. Despite several plausible approaches to this problem being available within the framework of theories of bro…
The Concept of Universality in Jurgen Habermas’ Moral Theory
This paper deals with the conception of universality in Jurgen Habermas’ moral theory. My basic presupposition here is that the concept of universality (which is often supposed to have to be one of the necessary features of any moral judgement or norm) is highly problematic not only due to a variety of possible problems arising from how it functions in specific moral theories, but also – and chiefly – due to the fact that it is far from easy to…
First philosophy as a science
.
No prominent works on this page.
First philosophy as a science
.
The Concept of Universality in Jurgen Habermas’ Moral Theory
This paper deals with the conception of universality in Jurgen Habermas’ moral theory. My basic presupposition here is that the concept of universality (which is often supposed to have to be one of the necessary features of any moral judgement or norm) is highly problematic not only due to a variety of possible problems arising from how it functions in specific moral theories, but also – and chiefly – due to the fact that it is far from easy to…
T.M. Scanlon’s account of responsibility and the problem of moral luck
Thomas M. Scanlon is one of the most prominent modern moral philosophers, and his theory of moral responsibility is one of the most influential theories of this kind in modern ethics. In the present article we set out the main features of this theory and then deal in detail with one of the problems this theory faces, the moral luck cases. Despite several plausible approaches to this problem being available within the framework of theories of bro…
Principles and Causes in Aristotle’s Metaphysics Δ.1
This paper deals with a new interpretation of the passage 1013a16–17 in Aristotle’s Metaphysics Δ.1, proposed by Richard Bodéüs and Annick Stevens in their recent edition of a French translation and commentary of Δ. In section 1 I describe the problems with the traditional reading of this passage that implies that all principles are causes: given it, first, Aristotle makes a serious logical error in his reasoning and, second, it is impossible t…
Why Blame? On Justification of Practices of Holding Morally Responsible
The normative question that is discussed in modern studies of moral responsibility rather often is the question of reasons that would make holding someone responsible inappropriate. But what is discussed far less frequently is the logically prior question of what what reasons, if any, do we have in favor of the practice of holding each other morally responsible at all — that is, what reasons can we offer to justify blaming or praising someone, es…
Epistemology (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Ethics in medical practice (2 works) · Free Will and Agency (2 works) · Metaphysics (2 works) · Moral responsibility (2 works) · Sociology (2 works) · Analytics (1 work)