Martin Nell
Biographic Data
| ID | 8941699 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Martin Nell |
| GIVEN NAMES | Martin |
| FAMILY NAME | Nell |
| SIGNATURE | NELL M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Goethe University Frankfurt |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 2 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2000 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2002 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Independent Safety Controls with Moral Hazard
We analyze the role of liability, insurance, and side payments for independent safety controls with unobservable care levels. By independent safety controls we mean that the accident probability depends on the care levels of two parties, and that the effects of the controls on the accident probability are stochastically independent. We show that efficiency can be reached for these kinds of double moral hazard through side payments if one agent de…
Auditor liability rules under imperfect information and costly litigation
This paper examines auditor liability rules under imperfect information, costly litigation and risk-averse auditors. A negligence rule fails in such a setting, because in equilibrium auditors will deviate with positive probability from any given standard. It is shown that strict liability outperforms negligence with respect to risk allocation and the probability that a desired level of care is met by the auditor if competitive liability insurance…
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Auditor liability rules under imperfect information and costly litigation
This paper examines auditor liability rules under imperfect information, costly litigation and risk-averse auditors. A negligence rule fails in such a setting, because in equilibrium auditors will deviate with positive probability from any given standard. It is shown that strict liability outperforms negligence with respect to risk allocation and the probability that a desired level of care is met by the auditor if competitive liability insurance…
Independent Safety Controls with Moral Hazard
We analyze the role of liability, insurance, and side payments for independent safety controls with unobservable care levels. By independent safety controls we mean that the accident probability depends on the care levels of two parties, and that the effects of the controls on the accident probability are stochastically independent. We show that efficiency can be reached for these kinds of double moral hazard through side payments if one agent de…
Actuarial science (2 works) · Business (2 works) · Economics (2 works) · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems (2 works) · Liability insurance (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works) · Accounting (1 work) · Audit (1 work) · Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance (1 work) · Auto insurance risk selection (1 work)