Daniel J Clarke
Biographic Data
| ID | 8944532 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Daniel J Clarke |
| GIVEN NAMES | Daniel J |
| FAMILY NAME | Clarke |
| SIGNATURE | CLARKE D J |
| AFFILIATIONS | Senior Insurance Specialist, World Bank Group-GFDRR Disaster Risk Financing and Insurance Program |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 12 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 18 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 12 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2012 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2016 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Dealing with Disasters
The world does not turn a blind eye to disasters. In fact, many disasters are followed by an outpouring of generosity. Despite such gestures, disaster responses often seem insufficient, slow, and not well coordinated, and recovery can take years. The main thesis of this book is that the impact of disasters can be dulled if three things are in place beforehand: (1) a coordinated plan for post-disaster action agreed in advance; (2) a fast, evidence…
Bring in the Professionals
Good planning is based on an iterative dialogue among scientists, bureaucrats, implementers, and financiers about what or who is to be protected, how, and how much it will cost. A good plan will include a clear political statement before a disaster about these aspects of the plan. Useful political statements focus on target outcomes and leave the details on the ‘how’ to be worked out by the implementing agencies and financiers. Benefactors who wa…
Defining the Problem
The post-disaster relationships between national and subnational governments, government and farmers, government and homeowners, and government and the international humanitarian system often take the form of a begging bowl, although there are notable exceptions. Begging bowls arise because of benefactors—the people who retain discretion over how to allocate their budgets after a disaster strikes. For beneficiaries, begging-bowl financing of disa…
Planning for Disaster Recovery
Rules can promote decisive, timely action, but a rules-based system is only as good as the data that drive it. Because no rule is perfect, there should be some discretion to deal with situations in which the rules fail. The challenge is to allow discretion without allowing people to game the system. The data need to be resistant to manipulation and strike the right balance between cost, speed, and reliability. Any data that could trigger action w…
Finance as the Glue
Financial and budgetary instruments are the glue that holds credible plans together and makes them strong enough to withstand the whirlwind of highly charged post-disaster politics. When designing and implementing disaster risk financing strategies, details matter. It is important to pay for financial advice and build in-house expertise. Discipline, cost, accuracy, and speed all matter when structuring a disaster risk financing strategy. Speed ma…
Moving forward…
Discretionary begging-bowl financing does not work well for disasters—it is too slow, leads to a fragmented response, and encourages underinvestment in risk reduction and preparedness. To get around this problem, generous people and their political leaders should think like are an insurance company. This means making trade-offs over who or what to protect before disasters. This process is not easy, but it is necessary for a system with good incen…
Dull Disasters? How Planning Ahead Will Make a Difference
Economic losses from disasters are now reaching an average of US$250–$300 billion a year. In the last 20 years, more than 530,000 people died as a direct result of extreme weather events; millions more were seriously injured. Most of the deaths and serious injuries were in developing countries. Meanwhile, highly infectious diseases will continue to emerge or re-emerge, and natural hazards will not disappear. But these extreme events do not need t…
Solving Commitment Problems in Disaster Risk Finance
Those at risk from natural disasters are typically under-protected, possibly because they expect benefactors such as governments and donors to come to their aid. Yet when relief comes, it is often insufficient, delayed or misallocated. Benefactors may wish to commit to provide an efficient amount of fast well-targeted relief, and leave the rest up to recipients, but such commitments are difficult. This article analyses how transferring risk to th…
Microinsurance Decisions
Most index-based insurance products have been developed without giving explicit attention to gender. However, there is ample of evidence that shocks affect men and women differently and that they allocate resources in different ways. In Bangladesh, it is often assumed that women are less involved in agriculture, and, therefore, agricultural insurance might not be of interest to rural women. However, this assumption has not been tested in the fiel…
Dull Disasters
Economic losses from disasters are now reaching an average of US$250-$300 billion a year. In the last 20 years, more than 530,000 people died as a direct result of extreme weather events; millions more were seriously injured. Most of the deaths and serious injuries were in developing countries. Meanwhile, highly infectious diseases will continue to emerge or re-emerge, and natural hazards will not disappear. But these extreme events do not need t…
Learning from Lemons
Microinsurance and natural disasters
Dull Disasters
Economic losses from disasters are now reaching an average of US$250-$300 billion a year. In the last 20 years, more than 530,000 people died as a direct result of extreme weather events; millions more were seriously injured. Most of the deaths and serious injuries were in developing countries. Meanwhile, highly infectious diseases will continue to emerge or re-emerge, and natural hazards will not disappear. But these extreme events do not need t…
Microinsurance and natural disasters
Microinsurance and natural disasters
Learning from Lemons
Dealing with Disasters
The world does not turn a blind eye to disasters. In fact, many disasters are followed by an outpouring of generosity. Despite such gestures, disaster responses often seem insufficient, slow, and not well coordinated, and recovery can take years. The main thesis of this book is that the impact of disasters can be dulled if three things are in place beforehand: (1) a coordinated plan for post-disaster action agreed in advance; (2) a fast, evidence…
Bring in the Professionals
Good planning is based on an iterative dialogue among scientists, bureaucrats, implementers, and financiers about what or who is to be protected, how, and how much it will cost. A good plan will include a clear political statement before a disaster about these aspects of the plan. Useful political statements focus on target outcomes and leave the details on the ‘how’ to be worked out by the implementing agencies and financiers. Benefactors who wa…
Defining the Problem
The post-disaster relationships between national and subnational governments, government and farmers, government and homeowners, and government and the international humanitarian system often take the form of a begging bowl, although there are notable exceptions. Begging bowls arise because of benefactors—the people who retain discretion over how to allocate their budgets after a disaster strikes. For beneficiaries, begging-bowl financing of disa…
Planning for Disaster Recovery
Rules can promote decisive, timely action, but a rules-based system is only as good as the data that drive it. Because no rule is perfect, there should be some discretion to deal with situations in which the rules fail. The challenge is to allow discretion without allowing people to game the system. The data need to be resistant to manipulation and strike the right balance between cost, speed, and reliability. Any data that could trigger action w…
Finance as the Glue
Financial and budgetary instruments are the glue that holds credible plans together and makes them strong enough to withstand the whirlwind of highly charged post-disaster politics. When designing and implementing disaster risk financing strategies, details matter. It is important to pay for financial advice and build in-house expertise. Discipline, cost, accuracy, and speed all matter when structuring a disaster risk financing strategy. Speed ma…
Moving forward…
Discretionary begging-bowl financing does not work well for disasters—it is too slow, leads to a fragmented response, and encourages underinvestment in risk reduction and preparedness. To get around this problem, generous people and their political leaders should think like are an insurance company. This means making trade-offs over who or what to protect before disasters. This process is not easy, but it is necessary for a system with good incen…
Dull Disasters? How Planning Ahead Will Make a Difference
Economic losses from disasters are now reaching an average of US$250–$300 billion a year. In the last 20 years, more than 530,000 people died as a direct result of extreme weather events; millions more were seriously injured. Most of the deaths and serious injuries were in developing countries. Meanwhile, highly infectious diseases will continue to emerge or re-emerge, and natural hazards will not disappear. But these extreme events do not need t…
Solving Commitment Problems in Disaster Risk Finance
Those at risk from natural disasters are typically under-protected, possibly because they expect benefactors such as governments and donors to come to their aid. Yet when relief comes, it is often insufficient, delayed or misallocated. Benefactors may wish to commit to provide an efficient amount of fast well-targeted relief, and leave the rest up to recipients, but such commitments are difficult. This article analyses how transferring risk to th…
Microinsurance Decisions
Most index-based insurance products have been developed without giving explicit attention to gender. However, there is ample of evidence that shocks affect men and women differently and that they allocate resources in different ways. In Bangladesh, it is often assumed that women are less involved in agriculture, and, therefore, agricultural insurance might not be of interest to rural women. However, this assumption has not been tested in the fiel…
Dull Disasters
Economic losses from disasters are now reaching an average of US$250-$300 billion a year. In the last 20 years, more than 530,000 people died as a direct result of extreme weather events; millions more were seriously injured. Most of the deaths and serious injuries were in developing countries. Meanwhile, highly infectious diseases will continue to emerge or re-emerge, and natural hazards will not disappear. But these extreme events do not need t…
Business (11 works) · Agricultural risk and resilience (10 works) · Disaster Management and Resilience (8 works) · Economics (8 works) · Insurance and Financial Risk Management (5 works) · Natural disaster (5 works) · Political science (5 works) · Politics (5 works) · Geography (4 works) · Incentive (4 works)