Jarrett Leplin
Biographic Data
| ID | 896222 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jarrett Leplin |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jarrett |
| FAMILY NAME | Leplin |
| SIGNATURE | LEPLIN J |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of North Carolina at Greensboro |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 25 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 71 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 24 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1969 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Scientific Realism
A Theory of Epistemic Justification
The Epistemic Status of Auxiliary Hypotheses: A Reply to Douven
Journal Article The Epistemic Status of Auxiliary Hypotheses: A Reply to Douven Get access Jarrett Leplin Jarrett Leplin University of North Carolina at Greensboro Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 50, Issue 200, July 2000, Pages 376–380, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0031-8094.2000.00193.x Published: 07 January 2003
The Epistemic Status of Auxiliary Hypotheses: A Reply to Douven
I have previously argued that anti‐realism cannot use the claim that theories have empirically equivalent rivals (EE) to establish that theories are underdetermined by evidence (UD). Douven objects that the auxiliary hypotheses needed to generate observational equivalence need not as I claimed be themselves underdetermined if (EE) is true, because they may be either compatible with observation or acceptable in the constructive‐empiricist sense. I…
Studies in Scientific Realism
Studies in Scientific Realism
Book Review| January 01 2000 Studies in Scientific Realism STUDIES IN SCIENTIFIC REALISM. By André Kukla. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. Pp. 176. Jarrett Leplin Jarrett Leplin Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (1): 109–112. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-109-1-109 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share F…
A Novel Defense of Scientific Realism
Vigorous and controversial, this book develops a sustained argument for a realist interpretation of science, based on a new analysis of the concept of predictive novelty. Identifying a form of success achieved in science—the successful prediction of novel empirical results—which can be explained only by attributing some measure of truth to the theories that yield it, Jarrett Leplin demonstrates the incapacity of nonrealist accounts to accommodate…
Philip Kitcher's The Advancement of Science: Science Without Legend, Objectivity Without Illusion
Philosophy has an honorable tradition as interpreter and advocate of science. That role is in decline. While other science studies disciplines deconstruct “reality”, “truth”, “rationality”, “knowledge”, and “progress” into the political tools of an interested elite, philosophy finds itself too divided over the scope of these concepts to defend them. The debate over realism in the philosophy of science is at an impasse. Agreeing on the relevant ev…
Mudança científica: Modelos Filosóficos E Pesquisa Histórica
Os autores deste ensaio entendem que é preciso testar de forma mais completa as afirmações empíricas das recentes teorias da mudança científica. Tendo em vista facilitar tal empreendimento, apresentam-se em linguagem não-técnica as afirmações empíricas de Kuhn, Feyerabend, Lakatos e Laudan, que estão organizadas por autor e por assunto. Ao final, inclui-se uma bibliografia de estudos de caso
Empirical Equivalence and Underdetermination
Renormalizing Epistemology
The fact that the goals and methods of science, as well as its empirical conclusions, are subject to change, is shown to allow at once for: (a) the objectivity of warrant for knowledge claims; (b) the absence of a priori standards from epistemology; (c) the normative character of epistemology; and (d) the rationality of axiological innovation. In particular, Laudan's attempt to make axiological constraints undercut epistemic realism is confuted
Is Essentialism Unscientific
This paper defends the Causal Theory of Reference against the recent criticism that it imposes a priori constraints on the aims and practices of science. The metaphysical essentialism of this theory is shown to be compatible with the requirements of naturalistic epistemology. The theory is nevertheless unable to forestall the problem of incommensurability for scientific terms, because it misrepresents the conditions under which their reference is…
Construction and Constraint: The Shaping of Scientific Reality. Ernan McMullin
Varieties of Realism: A Rationale for the Natural Sciences. Rom Harré
Scientific change: Philosophical models and historical research
Methodological Realism and Scientific Rationality
In response to recent recognition of the complexities of scientific change, discussion of the objectivity and the rationality of science has focused on criteria of theory choice. This paper addresses instead the rationality of scientific decisions at the level of ongoing research. It argues that whether or not a realist view of theories is compatible with the historical discontinuities of scientific change, certain realist assumptions are crucial…
Introduction
Testing Scientific Theories. John Earman
The Assessment of Auxiliary Hypotheses
Truth and scientific progress
Reference and scientific realism
Synchronisation Rules and Transitivity
The concept of an ad hoc hypothesis
Contextual Falsification and Scientific Methodology
Recent discussion of the problem of the conclusive falsification of scientific hypotheses has generally regarded the Duhemian Thesis (D-Thesis) as both true and interesting [10] but has dismissed the claim that disconfirmed hypotheses can be retained in explanations of the disconfirming evidence as either trivial [3] or unargued [12]. This paper rejects these positions. First, the status, in the argument for the D-Thesis, of the claim that auxili…
Meaning Variance and the Comparability of Theories
Scientific change: Philosophical models and historical research
The concept of an ad hoc hypothesis
Mudança científica: Modelos Filosóficos E Pesquisa Histórica
Os autores deste ensaio entendem que é preciso testar de forma mais completa as afirmações empíricas das recentes teorias da mudança científica. Tendo em vista facilitar tal empreendimento, apresentam-se em linguagem não-técnica as afirmações empíricas de Kuhn, Feyerabend, Lakatos e Laudan, que estão organizadas por autor e por assunto. Ao final, inclui-se uma bibliografia de estudos de caso
Methodological Realism and Scientific Rationality
In response to recent recognition of the complexities of scientific change, discussion of the objectivity and the rationality of science has focused on criteria of theory choice. This paper addresses instead the rationality of scientific decisions at the level of ongoing research. It argues that whether or not a realist view of theories is compatible with the historical discontinuities of scientific change, certain realist assumptions are crucial…
Renormalizing Epistemology
The fact that the goals and methods of science, as well as its empirical conclusions, are subject to change, is shown to allow at once for: (a) the objectivity of warrant for knowledge claims; (b) the absence of a priori standards from epistemology; (c) the normative character of epistemology; and (d) the rationality of axiological innovation. In particular, Laudan's attempt to make axiological constraints undercut epistemic realism is confuted
Reference and scientific realism
Is Essentialism Unscientific
This paper defends the Causal Theory of Reference against the recent criticism that it imposes a priori constraints on the aims and practices of science. The metaphysical essentialism of this theory is shown to be compatible with the requirements of naturalistic epistemology. The theory is nevertheless unable to forestall the problem of incommensurability for scientific terms, because it misrepresents the conditions under which their reference is…
The Assessment of Auxiliary Hypotheses
Contextual Falsification and Scientific Methodology
Recent discussion of the problem of the conclusive falsification of scientific hypotheses has generally regarded the Duhemian Thesis (D-Thesis) as both true and interesting [10] but has dismissed the claim that disconfirmed hypotheses can be retained in explanations of the disconfirming evidence as either trivial [3] or unargued [12]. This paper rejects these positions. First, the status, in the argument for the D-Thesis, of the claim that auxili…
Truth and scientific progress
Construction and Constraint: The Shaping of Scientific Reality. Ernan McMullin
Synchronisation Rules and Transitivity
Meaning Variance and the Comparability of Theories
Meaning Variance and the Comparability of Theories
Contextual Falsification and Scientific Methodology
Recent discussion of the problem of the conclusive falsification of scientific hypotheses has generally regarded the Duhemian Thesis (D-Thesis) as both true and interesting [10] but has dismissed the claim that disconfirmed hypotheses can be retained in explanations of the disconfirming evidence as either trivial [3] or unargued [12]. This paper rejects these positions. First, the status, in the argument for the D-Thesis, of the claim that auxili…
The concept of an ad hoc hypothesis
Synchronisation Rules and Transitivity
Reference and scientific realism
Truth and scientific progress
The Assessment of Auxiliary Hypotheses
Introduction
Testing Scientific Theories. John Earman
Scientific change: Philosophical models and historical research
Methodological Realism and Scientific Rationality
In response to recent recognition of the complexities of scientific change, discussion of the objectivity and the rationality of science has focused on criteria of theory choice. This paper addresses instead the rationality of scientific decisions at the level of ongoing research. It argues that whether or not a realist view of theories is compatible with the historical discontinuities of scientific change, certain realist assumptions are crucial…
Is Essentialism Unscientific
This paper defends the Causal Theory of Reference against the recent criticism that it imposes a priori constraints on the aims and practices of science. The metaphysical essentialism of this theory is shown to be compatible with the requirements of naturalistic epistemology. The theory is nevertheless unable to forestall the problem of incommensurability for scientific terms, because it misrepresents the conditions under which their reference is…
Construction and Constraint: The Shaping of Scientific Reality. Ernan McMullin
Varieties of Realism: A Rationale for the Natural Sciences. Rom Harré
Renormalizing Epistemology
The fact that the goals and methods of science, as well as its empirical conclusions, are subject to change, is shown to allow at once for: (a) the objectivity of warrant for knowledge claims; (b) the absence of a priori standards from epistemology; (c) the normative character of epistemology; and (d) the rationality of axiological innovation. In particular, Laudan's attempt to make axiological constraints undercut epistemic realism is confuted
Empirical Equivalence and Underdetermination
Mudança científica: Modelos Filosóficos E Pesquisa Histórica
Os autores deste ensaio entendem que é preciso testar de forma mais completa as afirmações empíricas das recentes teorias da mudança científica. Tendo em vista facilitar tal empreendimento, apresentam-se em linguagem não-técnica as afirmações empíricas de Kuhn, Feyerabend, Lakatos e Laudan, que estão organizadas por autor e por assunto. Ao final, inclui-se uma bibliografia de estudos de caso
Philip Kitcher's The Advancement of Science: Science Without Legend, Objectivity Without Illusion
Philosophy has an honorable tradition as interpreter and advocate of science. That role is in decline. While other science studies disciplines deconstruct “reality”, “truth”, “rationality”, “knowledge”, and “progress” into the political tools of an interested elite, philosophy finds itself too divided over the scope of these concepts to defend them. The debate over realism in the philosophy of science is at an impasse. Agreeing on the relevant ev…
A Novel Defense of Scientific Realism
Vigorous and controversial, this book develops a sustained argument for a realist interpretation of science, based on a new analysis of the concept of predictive novelty. Identifying a form of success achieved in science—the successful prediction of novel empirical results—which can be explained only by attributing some measure of truth to the theories that yield it, Jarrett Leplin demonstrates the incapacity of nonrealist accounts to accommodate…
The Epistemic Status of Auxiliary Hypotheses: A Reply to Douven
Journal Article The Epistemic Status of Auxiliary Hypotheses: A Reply to Douven Get access Jarrett Leplin Jarrett Leplin University of North Carolina at Greensboro Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 50, Issue 200, July 2000, Pages 376–380, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0031-8094.2000.00193.x Published: 07 January 2003
The Epistemic Status of Auxiliary Hypotheses: A Reply to Douven
I have previously argued that anti‐realism cannot use the claim that theories have empirically equivalent rivals (EE) to establish that theories are underdetermined by evidence (UD). Douven objects that the auxiliary hypotheses needed to generate observational equivalence need not as I claimed be themselves underdetermined if (EE) is true, because they may be either compatible with observation or acceptable in the constructive‐empiricist sense. I…
Studies in Scientific Realism
Studies in Scientific Realism
Book Review| January 01 2000 Studies in Scientific Realism STUDIES IN SCIENTIFIC REALISM. By André Kukla. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. Pp. 176. Jarrett Leplin Jarrett Leplin Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (1): 109–112. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-109-1-109 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share F…
A Theory of Epistemic Justification
Scientific Realism
Epistemology (21 works) · Philosophy (21 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (21 works) · Computer Science (9 works) · Philosophy of science (9 works) · Realism (9 works) · Psychology (6 works) · Sociology (6 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (5 works) · Mathematics (5 works)