Ragnar Francén
Biographic Data
| ID | 8995620 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Ragnar Francén |
| GIVEN NAMES | Ragnar |
| FAMILY NAME | Francén |
| SIGNATURE | FRANCÉN R |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Gothenburg |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-7963-676X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 6 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Disagreement for pluralists
Internalists and externalists about moral motivation debate whether moral opinions can come without motivation to act. But it has also been suggested that no such theory is uniquely correct: Moral Motivation Pluralism is the view that different people have different concepts of moral opinions, such that an internalist theory can be correct in relation to some such concept, while externalism can be correct in relation to other people’s concept. Th…
The limits of the just‐too‐different argument
According to moral non‐naturalism, the kind of genuine or robust normativity that is characteristic of moral requirements cannot be accounted for within a wholly naturalistic worldview, but requires us to posit a domain of non‐natural properties and facts. The main argument for this core non‐naturalist claim appeals to what David Enoch calls the ‘just‐too‐different intuition’. According to Enoch, robust normativity cannot be natural, since it is …
A Failed Proof of Moral Realism
Mananas, flusses and jartles: Belief ascriptions in light of peripheral concept variation
On a simple and neat view, sometimes called the Relational Analysis of Attitude Ascriptions, a belief ascription on the form ‘S believes that x is F’ is correct if, and only if, S stands in the belief-relation to the proposition designated by ‘that x is F’, i.e., the proposition that x is F. It follows from this view that, for a person to believe, say, that x is a boat, there is one unique proposition that she has to believe. This paper argues ag…
Moral Disagreement and Practical Direction
Whenever A judges that x-ing is morally wrong and B judges that x-ing is not morally wrong, we think that they disagree. The two standard types of accounts of such moral disagreements both presuppose that the class of moral wrong-judgments is uniform, though in different ways. According to the belief account, the disagreement is doxastic: A and B have beliefs with conflicting cognitive contents. This presupposes “belief-uniformity”: that the cont…
Reconsidering the Meta‐ethical Implications of Motivational Internalism and Externalism
Motivational internalism and externalism – that is, theories about moral motivation – have played central roles in meta‐ethical debate mainly because they have been thought to have implications for the constitutive nature of moral judgements. Thus, internalism and externalism have been adduced in favour of and against various versions of cognitivism and non‐cognitivism. This article aims to question a fundamental presupposition behind such argume…
No prominent works on this page.
Reconsidering the Meta‐ethical Implications of Motivational Internalism and Externalism
Motivational internalism and externalism – that is, theories about moral motivation – have played central roles in meta‐ethical debate mainly because they have been thought to have implications for the constitutive nature of moral judgements. Thus, internalism and externalism have been adduced in favour of and against various versions of cognitivism and non‐cognitivism. This article aims to question a fundamental presupposition behind such argume…
Mananas, flusses and jartles: Belief ascriptions in light of peripheral concept variation
On a simple and neat view, sometimes called the Relational Analysis of Attitude Ascriptions, a belief ascription on the form ‘S believes that x is F’ is correct if, and only if, S stands in the belief-relation to the proposition designated by ‘that x is F’, i.e., the proposition that x is F. It follows from this view that, for a person to believe, say, that x is a boat, there is one unique proposition that she has to believe. This paper argues ag…
Moral Disagreement and Practical Direction
Whenever A judges that x-ing is morally wrong and B judges that x-ing is not morally wrong, we think that they disagree. The two standard types of accounts of such moral disagreements both presuppose that the class of moral wrong-judgments is uniform, though in different ways. According to the belief account, the disagreement is doxastic: A and B have beliefs with conflicting cognitive contents. This presupposes “belief-uniformity”: that the cont…
The limits of the just‐too‐different argument
According to moral non‐naturalism, the kind of genuine or robust normativity that is characteristic of moral requirements cannot be accounted for within a wholly naturalistic worldview, but requires us to posit a domain of non‐natural properties and facts. The main argument for this core non‐naturalist claim appeals to what David Enoch calls the ‘just‐too‐different intuition’. According to Enoch, robust normativity cannot be natural, since it is …
A Failed Proof of Moral Realism
Disagreement for pluralists
Internalists and externalists about moral motivation debate whether moral opinions can come without motivation to act. But it has also been suggested that no such theory is uniquely correct: Moral Motivation Pluralism is the view that different people have different concepts of moral opinions, such that an internalist theory can be correct in relation to some such concept, while externalism can be correct in relation to other people’s concept. Th…
Epistemology (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Argument (complex analysis) (3 works) · Free Will and Agency (3 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (3 works) · War, Ethics, and Justification (3 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works) · Social Psychology (2 works)