Matthew Andler
Biographic Data
| ID | 901780 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Matthew Andler |
| GIVEN NAMES | Matthew |
| FAMILY NAME | Andler |
| SIGNATURE | ANDLER M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Lafayette College |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5991-2800 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 6 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
What is masculinity
Public Health, Political Solidarity, and the Ethics of Orientation Ascriptions
H ow ought we to categorize individuals with respect to sexual orientation? It might be the case, as Esa Daz-Len (2022: 301-305) argues, that we ought to use ordinary categories such as homosexual, heterosexual, and bisexual. Or perhaps, as Robin Dembroff (2016: 22-23) argues, we ought to employ alternative categories such as female-oriented, male-oriented, woman-oriented, and genderqueer-oriented
The Sexual Orientation/Identity Distinction
In this article I explicate the sexual orientation/identity distinction: sexual orientation is “natural,” involving dispositions to sexual behavior, while sexual identity is the “social meaning” of sexual orientation, and argue that the sexual orientation/identity distinction is indispensable to normative explanations regarding LGBTQIA+ oppression and resistance
Categories We Live by
Meeting at our favourite local coffee shop, Local Café, to discuss this critical notice of Ásta’s remarkable contribution to social ontology and feminist philosophy, we place an order with an individual behind the counter. We begin the interaction by assessing the individual, before attributing to them various social properties, including the property of being a barista, the property of being queer, the property of being trans, and the property o…
Sexual Orientation, Ideology, and Philosophical Method
Here, I examine the epistemic relation between beliefs about the nature of sexual orientation (e.g. beliefs concerning whether orientation is dispositional) and beliefs about the taxonomy of orientation categories (e.g. beliefs concerning whether polyamorous is an orientation category). Current philosophical research gives epistemic priority to the former class of beliefs, such that beliefs about the taxonomy of orientation categories tend to be …
Gender Identity and Exclusion
A theory of gender ought to be compatible with trans-inclusive definitions of gender identity terms, such as ‘woman’ and ‘man’. Appealing to this principle of trans-inclusion, Katharine Jenkins argues that we ought to endorse a dual social position and identity theory of gender. Here, I argue that Jenkins’s dual theory of gender fails to be trans-inclusive for the following reasons: (i) it cannot generate a definition of ‘woman’ that extends to i…
Sexual Orientation, Ideology, and Philosophical Method
Here, I examine the epistemic relation between beliefs about the nature of sexual orientation (e.g. beliefs concerning whether orientation is dispositional) and beliefs about the taxonomy of orientation categories (e.g. beliefs concerning whether polyamorous is an orientation category). Current philosophical research gives epistemic priority to the former class of beliefs, such that beliefs about the taxonomy of orientation categories tend to be …
What is masculinity
Gender Identity and Exclusion
A theory of gender ought to be compatible with trans-inclusive definitions of gender identity terms, such as ‘woman’ and ‘man’. Appealing to this principle of trans-inclusion, Katharine Jenkins argues that we ought to endorse a dual social position and identity theory of gender. Here, I argue that Jenkins’s dual theory of gender fails to be trans-inclusive for the following reasons: (i) it cannot generate a definition of ‘woman’ that extends to i…
Sexual Orientation, Ideology, and Philosophical Method
Here, I examine the epistemic relation between beliefs about the nature of sexual orientation (e.g. beliefs concerning whether orientation is dispositional) and beliefs about the taxonomy of orientation categories (e.g. beliefs concerning whether polyamorous is an orientation category). Current philosophical research gives epistemic priority to the former class of beliefs, such that beliefs about the taxonomy of orientation categories tend to be …
Categories We Live by
Meeting at our favourite local coffee shop, Local Café, to discuss this critical notice of Ásta’s remarkable contribution to social ontology and feminist philosophy, we place an order with an individual behind the counter. We begin the interaction by assessing the individual, before attributing to them various social properties, including the property of being a barista, the property of being queer, the property of being trans, and the property o…
The Sexual Orientation/Identity Distinction
In this article I explicate the sexual orientation/identity distinction: sexual orientation is “natural,” involving dispositions to sexual behavior, while sexual identity is the “social meaning” of sexual orientation, and argue that the sexual orientation/identity distinction is indispensable to normative explanations regarding LGBTQIA+ oppression and resistance
Public Health, Political Solidarity, and the Ethics of Orientation Ascriptions
H ow ought we to categorize individuals with respect to sexual orientation? It might be the case, as Esa Daz-Len (2022: 301-305) argues, that we ought to use ordinary categories such as homosexual, heterosexual, and bisexual. Or perhaps, as Robin Dembroff (2016: 22-23) argues, we ought to employ alternative categories such as female-oriented, male-oriented, woman-oriented, and genderqueer-oriented
What is masculinity
Epistemology (5 works) · Law (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Political science (5 works) · Psychology (5 works) · Social Psychology (5 works) · Sociology (5 works) · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies (4 works) · Gender Studies (4 works) · Aesthetics (3 works)