J David Pérez-Castrillo
Biographic Data
| ID | 9192078 |
|---|---|
| NAME | J David Pérez-Castrillo |
| GIVEN NAMES | J David |
| FAMILY NAME | Pérez-Castrillo |
| SIGNATURE | PÉREZ-CASTRILLO J D |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 4 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1991 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2001 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
A general analysis of rent-seeking games
An Introduction to the Economics of Information
In this revised second edition, An Introduction to the Economics of Information covers the consequences for the character and efficiency of the interaction between individuals and organizations when one party has more or better information on some aspect of the relationship. This is the condition of asymmetric information, under which the information gap will be exploited if, by doing so, the better-informed party can achieve some advantage. The …
Moral hazard and cooperation
La structure industrielle dans une course au brevet avec coûts fixes et coûts variables
Verdier Thierry, Pérez-Castrillo J. David. La structure industrielle dans une course au brevet avec coûts fixes et coûts variables. In: Revue économique, volume 42, n°6, 1991. pp. 1111-1140
No prominent works on this page.
Moral hazard and cooperation
La structure industrielle dans une course au brevet avec coûts fixes et coûts variables
Verdier Thierry, Pérez-Castrillo J. David. La structure industrielle dans une course au brevet avec coûts fixes et coûts variables. In: Revue économique, volume 42, n°6, 1991. pp. 1111-1140
A general analysis of rent-seeking games
An Introduction to the Economics of Information
In this revised second edition, An Introduction to the Economics of Information covers the consequences for the character and efficiency of the interaction between individuals and organizations when one party has more or better information on some aspect of the relationship. This is the condition of asymmetric information, under which the information gap will be exploited if, by doing so, the better-informed party can achieve some advantage. The …
Computer Science (3 works) · Economics (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Actuarial science (2 works) · Economic theories and models (2 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (2 works) · Incentive (2 works) · Moral hazard (2 works) · 330 (1 work) · Adverse selection (1 work)