Reza Hadisi
Biographic Data
| ID | 9197207 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Reza Hadisi |
| GIVEN NAMES | Reza |
| FAMILY NAME | Hadisi |
| SIGNATURE | HADISI R |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Toronto |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-9577-1283 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 4 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Tusian Perfectionism
Autonomy as Practical Understanding
I offer a theory of autonomous agency that relies on the resources of a strongly cognitivist theory of intention and intentional action. On the proposed account, intentional action is a graded notion that is explained via the agent’s degree of practical knowledge. In turn, autonomous agency is also a graded notion that is explained via the agent’s degree of practical understanding. The resulting theory can synthesize insights from both the hierar…
Kant’s Account of Epistemic Normativity
According to a common interpretation, most explicitly defended by Onora O’Neill and Patricia Kitcher, Kant held that epistemic obligations normatively depend on moral obligations. That is, were a rational agent not bound by any moral obligation, then she would not be bound by any epistemic obligation either. By contrast, in this paper, I argue that, according to Kant, some epistemic obligations are normatively independent from moral obligations, …
Ghazālī's Transformative Answer to Scepticism
In this paper, I offer a reconstruction of Ghazālī's encounter with scepticism in the Deliverance from Error . For Ghazālī, I argue, radical scepticism about the possibility of knowledge ensues from intellectualist assumptions about the nature of justification. On the reading that I will propose, Ghazālī holds that foundational knowledge can only be justified via actions that lead to transformative experiences
No prominent works on this page.
Ghazālī's Transformative Answer to Scepticism
In this paper, I offer a reconstruction of Ghazālī's encounter with scepticism in the Deliverance from Error . For Ghazālī, I argue, radical scepticism about the possibility of knowledge ensues from intellectualist assumptions about the nature of justification. On the reading that I will propose, Ghazālī holds that foundational knowledge can only be justified via actions that lead to transformative experiences
Autonomy as Practical Understanding
I offer a theory of autonomous agency that relies on the resources of a strongly cognitivist theory of intention and intentional action. On the proposed account, intentional action is a graded notion that is explained via the agent’s degree of practical knowledge. In turn, autonomous agency is also a graded notion that is explained via the agent’s degree of practical understanding. The resulting theory can synthesize insights from both the hierar…
Kant’s Account of Epistemic Normativity
According to a common interpretation, most explicitly defended by Onora O’Neill and Patricia Kitcher, Kant held that epistemic obligations normatively depend on moral obligations. That is, were a rational agent not bound by any moral obligation, then she would not be bound by any epistemic obligation either. By contrast, in this paper, I argue that, according to Kant, some epistemic obligations are normatively independent from moral obligations, …
Tusian Perfectionism
Philosophy (4 works) · Epistemology (3 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (3 works) · Sociology (3 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Psychology (2 works) · Argument (complex analysis) (1 work) · Autonomy (1 work) · Child and Animal Learning Development (1 work)