Yavuz Recep Başoğlu
Biographic Data
| ID | 9197340 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Yavuz Recep Başoğlu |
| GIVEN NAMES | Yavuz Recep |
| FAMILY NAME | Başoğlu |
| SIGNATURE | BAŞOĞLU Y R |
| AFFILIATIONS | Central European University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-4966-1144 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 4 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Against Perceiving Meanings: Empedocles Leaped or Loves
Aftereffects, High-Levelism and Gestalt Properties
According to high-levelism, one can perceptually be aware of high-level properties such as natural kind properties. Against high-levelism, the Gestalt proposal suggests that instead of high-level properties, one can have a perceptual experience as of Gestalt properties, i.e., determinables of determinate low-level properties. When one looks at a bird, the high-levelist argues that one can perceive the property of being a bird, and the proponent o…
Perceiving meaning and the argument from evidence-insensitivity
Various illusions of meaning appear to be insensitive to counter-evidence. That is, in a similar fashion to the well-known Müller-Lyer illusion in vision, certain illusions of meaning seem not to fade away even after one endorses beliefs that rebut the illusion one is having. Such apparently evidence-insensitive illusions have been employed to support the view that we can perceive meanings because evidence-insensitivity is typically taken to be a…
Naïve Realism and (Some) High‐Level Illusions
So‐called high‐levelists about perceptual experience claim that we can perceive not only low‐level properties such as colour and shape but also high‐level properties such as natural kind properties. Although various proponents of opposing theories of perception agree on this high‐levelist view, it is seldom asked which theories of perception have resources to account for high‐level perception. In this paper, I raise this question for naïve realis…
No prominent works on this page.
Aftereffects, High-Levelism and Gestalt Properties
According to high-levelism, one can perceptually be aware of high-level properties such as natural kind properties. Against high-levelism, the Gestalt proposal suggests that instead of high-level properties, one can have a perceptual experience as of Gestalt properties, i.e., determinables of determinate low-level properties. When one looks at a bird, the high-levelist argues that one can perceive the property of being a bird, and the proponent o…
Perceiving meaning and the argument from evidence-insensitivity
Various illusions of meaning appear to be insensitive to counter-evidence. That is, in a similar fashion to the well-known Müller-Lyer illusion in vision, certain illusions of meaning seem not to fade away even after one endorses beliefs that rebut the illusion one is having. Such apparently evidence-insensitive illusions have been employed to support the view that we can perceive meanings because evidence-insensitivity is typically taken to be a…
Naïve Realism and (Some) High‐Level Illusions
So‐called high‐levelists about perceptual experience claim that we can perceive not only low‐level properties such as colour and shape but also high‐level properties such as natural kind properties. Although various proponents of opposing theories of perception agree on this high‐levelist view, it is seldom asked which theories of perception have resources to account for high‐level perception. In this paper, I raise this question for naïve realis…
Against Perceiving Meanings: Empedocles Leaped or Loves
Epistemology (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Cognitive psychology (2 works) · Perception (2 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (2 works) · Philosophy of mind (2 works) · Philosophy of science (2 works) · Academic and Historical Perspectives in Psychology (1 works) · Action Observation and Synchronization (1 works)