ANDERS ENGSTRØM
Biographic Data
| ID | 9197366 |
|---|---|
| NAME | ANDERS ENGSTRØM |
| GIVEN NAMES | ANDERS |
| FAMILY NAME | ENGSTRØM |
| SIGNATURE | ENGSTRÖM Å |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Copenhagen |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 2 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1999 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2001 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Metaphor and Truth‐conditional Semantics
A criticism is offered of the chief argument employed by Davidson to debunk the notion of “metaphorical meaning”, which exploits the static nature of standard truth‐conditional semantics. We argue, first, that Davidson's argument fails, and go on to suggest, secondly, that truth‐conditional semantics would profit if the static feature were abandoned and were replaced by a processual, dynamic conception of meaning. We try to show that this process…
The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor Revisited
It is argued that Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) contemporary theory of metaphor conflates the structure of the target-concept before the metaphoric process has taken place with the structure of the target-concept after the process. A revision of the theory is suggested. A consequence of this revision is that conventional conceptual metaphors are propositional in nature-namely, as propositions expressing identity. The revision hereby reinforces the …
No prominent works on this page.
The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor Revisited
It is argued that Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) contemporary theory of metaphor conflates the structure of the target-concept before the metaphoric process has taken place with the structure of the target-concept after the process. A revision of the theory is suggested. A consequence of this revision is that conventional conceptual metaphors are propositional in nature-namely, as propositions expressing identity. The revision hereby reinforces the …
Metaphor and Truth‐conditional Semantics
A criticism is offered of the chief argument employed by Davidson to debunk the notion of “metaphorical meaning”, which exploits the static nature of standard truth‐conditional semantics. We argue, first, that Davidson's argument fails, and go on to suggest, secondly, that truth‐conditional semantics would profit if the static feature were abandoned and were replaced by a processual, dynamic conception of meaning. We try to show that this process…
Computer Science (2 works) · Epistemology (2 works) · Language, Metaphor, and Cognition (2 works) · Linguistics (2 works) · Metaphor (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Action Observation and Synchronization (1 work) · Aesthetics (1 work) · Argument (complex analysis) (1 work) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (1 work)