William F Vallicella
Biographic Data
| ID | 9266302 |
|---|---|
| NAME | William F Vallicella |
| GIVEN NAMES | William F |
| FAMILY NAME | Vallicella |
| SIGNATURE | VALLICELLA W F |
| AFFILIATIONS | Archaeology Southwest |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1993 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2002 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
The creation–conservation dilemma and presentist four-dimensionalism
On traditional theism, God is not only a creator but also a conserver. The doctrine of conservation, however, appears to face a dilemma. Either conservation is continuous re-creation with consequences inimical to diachronic identity, or conservation is an operation upon a pre-existent entity, which, because it is pre-existent, is in no clear need of conservation. This article first makes a case for the dilemma, and then proposes a way between its…
God, causation and occasionalism
The doctrine that there are no logically necessary connections in nature can be used to support both occasionalism, according to which God alone can be a cause, and ‘anti-occasionalism’, according to which God cannot be a cause. Quentin Smith has recently invoked the ‘no logically necessary connections in nature’ doctrine in support of the latter. I bring two main objections against his thesis that God (logically) cannot be a cause. The first is …
Has the Ontological Argument been Refuted
Suppose we say that a deductive argument is probative just in case it is (i) valid in point of logical form, (ii) possesses true premises, and (iii) is free of informal fallacy. We can then say that an argument is normatively persuasive for a person if and only if it is both probative and has premises that can be accepted, without any breach of epistemic propriety, by the person in question. If the premises of a probative argument would be accept…
No prominent works on this page.
Has the Ontological Argument been Refuted
Suppose we say that a deductive argument is probative just in case it is (i) valid in point of logical form, (ii) possesses true premises, and (iii) is free of informal fallacy. We can then say that an argument is normatively persuasive for a person if and only if it is both probative and has premises that can be accepted, without any breach of epistemic propriety, by the person in question. If the premises of a probative argument would be accept…
God, causation and occasionalism
The doctrine that there are no logically necessary connections in nature can be used to support both occasionalism, according to which God alone can be a cause, and ‘anti-occasionalism’, according to which God cannot be a cause. Quentin Smith has recently invoked the ‘no logically necessary connections in nature’ doctrine in support of the latter. I bring two main objections against his thesis that God (logically) cannot be a cause. The first is …
The creation–conservation dilemma and presentist four-dimensionalism
On traditional theism, God is not only a creator but also a conserver. The doctrine of conservation, however, appears to face a dilemma. Either conservation is continuous re-creation with consequences inimical to diachronic identity, or conservation is an operation upon a pre-existent entity, which, because it is pre-existent, is in no clear need of conservation. This article first makes a case for the dilemma, and then proposes a way between its…
Epistemology (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Doctrine (2 works) · Linguistics (2 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (2 works) · Theology (2 works) · Theology and Philosophy of Evil (2 works) · Aesthetics (1 work) · Argument (complex analysis) (1 work) · Argument map (1 work)