Erez Firt
Biographic Data
| ID | 9292767 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Erez Firt |
| GIVEN NAMES | Erez |
| FAMILY NAME | Firt |
| SIGNATURE | FIRT E |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Haifa |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 6 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Pragmatics-zombies
This paper examines theoretical aspects of human-AI communication, arguing that current AI systems, or ‘pragmatics-zombies,’ can mimic human-like pragmatic competence without genuine understanding. While these systems are increasingly adept at natural language interaction, their lack of subjective experience, intentionality, and embodied cognition creates a fundamental trust deficit, particularly in high-stakes scenarios. We argue that forcing hu…
The understanding gap
The rapid proliferation of conversational AI systems has led many users to attribute understanding, emotional sensitivity, and experiential qualities to AI chatbots. While these systems produce highly fluent and contextually appropriate responses, whether such attributions reflect genuine understanding or conflate functional performance with cognitive capacity remains unclear. This paper examines this attribution by integrating a rigorous philoso…
What makes full artificial agents morally different
In the research field of machine ethics, we commonly categorize artificial moral agents into four types, with the most advanced referred to as a full ethical agent, or sometimes a full-blown Artificial Moral Agent (AMA). This type has three main characteristics: autonomy, moral understanding and a certain level of consciousness, including intentional mental states, moral emotions such as compassion, the ability to praise and condemn, and a consci…
Artificial understanding
Calibrating machine behavior
The missing G
No prominent works on this page.
The missing G
Calibrating machine behavior
Artificial understanding
What makes full artificial agents morally different
In the research field of machine ethics, we commonly categorize artificial moral agents into four types, with the most advanced referred to as a full ethical agent, or sometimes a full-blown Artificial Moral Agent (AMA). This type has three main characteristics: autonomy, moral understanding and a certain level of consciousness, including intentional mental states, moral emotions such as compassion, the ability to praise and condemn, and a consci…
Pragmatics-zombies
This paper examines theoretical aspects of human-AI communication, arguing that current AI systems, or ‘pragmatics-zombies,’ can mimic human-like pragmatic competence without genuine understanding. While these systems are increasingly adept at natural language interaction, their lack of subjective experience, intentionality, and embodied cognition creates a fundamental trust deficit, particularly in high-stakes scenarios. We argue that forcing hu…
The understanding gap
The rapid proliferation of conversational AI systems has led many users to attribute understanding, emotional sensitivity, and experiential qualities to AI chatbots. While these systems produce highly fluent and contextually appropriate responses, whether such attributions reflect genuine understanding or conflate functional performance with cognitive capacity remains unclear. This paper examines this attribution by integrating a rigorous philoso…
Artificial Intelligence (4 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Ethics and Social Impacts of AI (3 works) · Artificial general intelligence (2 works) · Cognitive science (2 works) · Epistemology (2 works) · Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works) · Performing arts (2 works) · Psychology (2 works)