Robert Watt
Biographic Data
| ID | 9341670 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Robert Watt |
| GIVEN NAMES | Robert |
| FAMILY NAME | Watt |
| SIGNATURE | WATT R |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Cambridge |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-7905-3855 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 4 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Bergson on Kant and the freedom of the moi en général
This article provides the first detailed discussion of an objection to Kant's theory of freedom in Henri Bergson's 1904‐05 lectures at the Collège de France. According to Bergson, if Kant succeeds in defending the possibility of human freedom, this is not the freedom of any particular human being, but rather the freedom of the ‘moi en général’. I compare this objection to arguments against Kant's theory of freedom by other late nineteenth/early t…
Bergson on number
This article reconstructs Henri Bergson’s argument at the beginning of the second chapter of his Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience for his view that every idea of number involves space. It begins by criticizing previous interpretations of this view. Most controversially, it argues that Bergson’s view specifically relates to our ideas of what Bertrand Russell calls ‘pluralities’, i.e. particular trios, quadruples, etc., and not to …
Bergson by Mark Sinclair (Abingdon
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Kant’s Transcendental Deduction, Non-Conceptualism, and the Fitness-for-Purpose Objection
The subject of this article is a powerful objection to the non-conceptualist interpretation of Kant’s transcendental deduction of the categories. Part of the purpose of the deduction is to refute the sort of scepticism according to which there are no objects of empirical intuition that instantiate the categories. But if the non-conceptualist interpretation is correct, it does not follow from what Kant is arguing in the transcendental deduction th…
No prominent works on this page.
Kant’s Transcendental Deduction, Non-Conceptualism, and the Fitness-for-Purpose Objection
The subject of this article is a powerful objection to the non-conceptualist interpretation of Kant’s transcendental deduction of the categories. Part of the purpose of the deduction is to refute the sort of scepticism according to which there are no objects of empirical intuition that instantiate the categories. But if the non-conceptualist interpretation is correct, it does not follow from what Kant is arguing in the transcendental deduction th…
Bergson on Kant and the freedom of the moi en général
This article provides the first detailed discussion of an objection to Kant's theory of freedom in Henri Bergson's 1904‐05 lectures at the Collège de France. According to Bergson, if Kant succeeds in defending the possibility of human freedom, this is not the freedom of any particular human being, but rather the freedom of the ‘moi en général’. I compare this objection to arguments against Kant's theory of freedom by other late nineteenth/early t…
Bergson on number
This article reconstructs Henri Bergson’s argument at the beginning of the second chapter of his Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience for his view that every idea of number involves space. It begins by criticizing previous interpretations of this view. Most controversially, it argues that Bergson’s view specifically relates to our ideas of what Bertrand Russell calls ‘pluralities’, i.e. particular trios, quadruples, etc., and not to …
Bergson by Mark Sinclair (Abingdon
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Epistemology (3 works) · Philosophical and Theoretical Analysis (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Philosophy, Science, and History (3 works) · Academic and Historical Perspectives in Psychology (1 work) · Ambiguity (1 work) · Conceptualism (1 work) · Conscience (1 work) · Content (measure theory) (1 work) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (1 work)