Claudi Brink
Biographic Data
| ID | 9341671 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Claudi Brink |
| GIVEN NAMES | Claudi |
| FAMILY NAME | Brink |
| SIGNATURE | BRINK C |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of New Hampshire |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-5778-7340 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Kant’s distinction between absolute and relative spontaneity reconsidered
Kant famously claims that the understanding is a spontaneous power; he also distinguishes between relative and absolute spontaneity, and Kant scholars have debated whether the understanding is absolutely or relatively spontaneous. I argue that this debate has suffered from a faulty understanding of the absolute/relative spontaneity distinction. I identify and reject two problematic assumptions of the standard interpretation of the distinction, an…
Nonpositional Consciousness and the Form of Thinking
In Transparency and Reflection , Matthew Boyle offers a Sartrean account of prereflective self-awareness to explain the essential link between self-consciousness and rationality, moving away from standard Kantian interpretations that he claims presuppose rather than explain this connection. I argue that Boyle’s account provides useful tools for re-interpreting Kant’s claim that the “I think” must accompany all representations as a form of nonposi…
Cognitive Spontaneity and the Organisation of the Understanding
I offer an interpretation of Kant’s doctrine of cognitive spontaneity that explains how the understanding can function outside of the efficient-causal structure of nature, without being part of what McDowell calls ‘the domain of responsible freedom’. Contemporary literature is dominated by the ‘cognitive agency’ approach, which identifies cognitive spontaneity with a kind of freedom. Against this view, the ‘cognitive processing view’ banishes age…
No prominent works on this page.
Nonpositional Consciousness and the Form of Thinking
In Transparency and Reflection , Matthew Boyle offers a Sartrean account of prereflective self-awareness to explain the essential link between self-consciousness and rationality, moving away from standard Kantian interpretations that he claims presuppose rather than explain this connection. I argue that Boyle’s account provides useful tools for re-interpreting Kant’s claim that the “I think” must accompany all representations as a form of nonposi…
Cognitive Spontaneity and the Organisation of the Understanding
I offer an interpretation of Kant’s doctrine of cognitive spontaneity that explains how the understanding can function outside of the efficient-causal structure of nature, without being part of what McDowell calls ‘the domain of responsible freedom’. Contemporary literature is dominated by the ‘cognitive agency’ approach, which identifies cognitive spontaneity with a kind of freedom. Against this view, the ‘cognitive processing view’ banishes age…
Kant’s distinction between absolute and relative spontaneity reconsidered
Kant famously claims that the understanding is a spontaneous power; he also distinguishes between relative and absolute spontaneity, and Kant scholars have debated whether the understanding is absolutely or relatively spontaneous. I argue that this debate has suffered from a faulty understanding of the absolute/relative spontaneity distinction. I identify and reject two problematic assumptions of the standard interpretation of the distinction, an…
Philosophy and Theoretical Science (3 works) · Epistemology (2 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (1 work) · Cognition (1 work) · Cognitive psychology (1 work) · Cognitive science (1 work) · Consciousness (1 work) · Contemporary philosophy (1 work)