Scott E Graves
Biographic Data
| ID | 9365396 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Scott E Graves |
| GIVEN NAMES | Scott E |
| FAMILY NAME | Graves |
| SIGNATURE | GRAVES S E |
| AFFILIATIONS | Georgia State University, Atlanta, |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 5 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 3 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2006 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2014 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Judicial Independence
In this article, we directly test the presence of judicial independence by examining judicial recess appointees who have later been confirmed by the Senate to full‐time Article III judicial positions. Specifically, we compare the votes of recess‐appointed courts of appeals judges during their temporary appointment tenure with a similar period following Senate confirmation. We find substantial differences in pre‐ and postconfirmation voting, sugge…
Ignoring Advice and Consent? The Uses of Judicial Recess Appointments
The authors seek to answer the questions of why presidents use the power to temporarily seat federal court judges during recesses of the Senate. The use of the recess power can upset the carefully calculated separation of powers envisioned by the framers, shifting power away from one branch of government toward another. Examining every judicial recess appointment from 1789 to 2004, the authors discover that presidents are conditionally strategic …
State Courts, the U.S. Supreme Court, and the Protection of Civil Liberties
Advocates of federalism, both in the United States and elsewhere, often cite the potential for enhanced protection of individual civil liberties as an emerging rationale for a federal system dividing governmental responsibilities between central and regional governments and central and regional judiciaries. Echoing this, some judicial officials and scholars, confronting an increasingly conservative U.S. Supreme Court, have called for state suprem…
Ignoring Advice and Consent? The Uses of Judicial Recess Appointments
The authors seek to answer the questions of why presidents use the power to temporarily seat federal court judges during recesses of the Senate. The use of the recess power can upset the carefully calculated separation of powers envisioned by the framers, shifting power away from one branch of government toward another. Examining every judicial recess appointment from 1789 to 2004, the authors discover that presidents are conditionally strategic …
Judicial Independence
In this article, we directly test the presence of judicial independence by examining judicial recess appointees who have later been confirmed by the Senate to full‐time Article III judicial positions. Specifically, we compare the votes of recess‐appointed courts of appeals judges during their temporary appointment tenure with a similar period following Senate confirmation. We find substantial differences in pre‐ and postconfirmation voting, sugge…
State Courts, the U.S. Supreme Court, and the Protection of Civil Liberties
Advocates of federalism, both in the United States and elsewhere, often cite the potential for enhanced protection of individual civil liberties as an emerging rationale for a federal system dividing governmental responsibilities between central and regional governments and central and regional judiciaries. Echoing this, some judicial officials and scholars, confronting an increasingly conservative U.S. Supreme Court, have called for state suprem…
Ignoring Advice and Consent? The Uses of Judicial Recess Appointments
The authors seek to answer the questions of why presidents use the power to temporarily seat federal court judges during recesses of the Senate. The use of the recess power can upset the carefully calculated separation of powers envisioned by the framers, shifting power away from one branch of government toward another. Examining every judicial recess appointment from 1789 to 2004, the authors discover that presidents are conditionally strategic …
Judicial Independence
In this article, we directly test the presence of judicial independence by examining judicial recess appointees who have later been confirmed by the Senate to full‐time Article III judicial positions. Specifically, we compare the votes of recess‐appointed courts of appeals judges during their temporary appointment tenure with a similar period following Senate confirmation. We find substantial differences in pre‐ and postconfirmation voting, sugge…
Judicial and Constitutional Studies (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Legal and Constitutional Studies (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Constitution (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems (2 works) · Politics (2 works) · Supreme court (2 works) · American Constitutional Law and Politics (1 works)