Donnchadh O’Conaill
Biographic Data
| ID | 9490603 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Donnchadh O’Conaill |
| GIVEN NAMES | Donnchadh |
| FAMILY NAME | O’Conaill |
| SIGNATURE | O’CONAILL D |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Fribourg |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0317-6020 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2014 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Subjectivity and Non-Objectifying Awareness
We are each aware of our own experiences as they occur, but in this inner awareness our experiences do not seem to be presented to us as objects in the way that they typically are when we reflect on them. A number of philosophers, principally in the phenomenological tradition, have characterised this in terms of inner awareness being a non-objectifying mode of awareness. This claim has faced persistent objections that the notion of non-objectifyi…
Laying ghosts to rest
One of the most widely-discussed arguments against physcialism appeals to the conceivability of zombies, being which are physically or functionally identical to humans but which have no conscious experiences. Philip Goff (Philos Phenomenol Res 81(1): 119–139, 2010; Consci Cognit 21(2): 742–746, 2012a; in Sprevak M, Kallestrup J (eds) New waves in philosophy of mind. Palgrave, 2014) has recently presented a number of different anti-physicalist arg…
Panpsychism, Emergence, and Pluralities
Einar Bohn [AJP 2019] has proposed a version of panpsychism on which consciousness is fundamentally a property of pluralities of basic objects. I argue that this pluralized panpsychism is structurally similar to emergentism, and faces the problem of explaining how a plurality of basic objects could be a subject of experiences. Because of these issues, pluralized panpsychism is not a substantial improvement on orthodox panpsychism
In Defence of Facts
A common conception of facts is as worldly entities, complexes made upof non-factual constituents such as properties, relations andproperty-bearers. Understood in this way facts face the unityproblem, the problem of explaining why various constituents arecombined to form a fact. In many cases the constituents could haveexisted without being unified in the fact---so in virtue of what arethey so unified? I shall present a new approach to the unity …
Ontic Structural Realism and Concrete Objects
Ontic structural realism (OSR) claims that reality is fundamentally structural. One way of developing this position is the claim that the identities of objects are determined by their positions in the structures to which they belong. This raises worries particularly with regard to the identity of concrete objects. In this paper, I examine whether the structures on which concrete objects are dependent should themselves be thought of as concrete or…
Ontic Structural Realism and Concrete Objects
Ontic structural realism (OSR) claims that reality is fundamentally structural. One way of developing this position is the claim that the identities of objects are determined by their positions in the structures to which they belong. This raises worries particularly with regard to the identity of concrete objects. In this paper, I examine whether the structures on which concrete objects are dependent should themselves be thought of as concrete or…
Ontic Structural Realism and Concrete Objects
Ontic structural realism (OSR) claims that reality is fundamentally structural. One way of developing this position is the claim that the identities of objects are determined by their positions in the structures to which they belong. This raises worries particularly with regard to the identity of concrete objects. In this paper, I examine whether the structures on which concrete objects are dependent should themselves be thought of as concrete or…
In Defence of Facts
A common conception of facts is as worldly entities, complexes made upof non-factual constituents such as properties, relations andproperty-bearers. Understood in this way facts face the unityproblem, the problem of explaining why various constituents arecombined to form a fact. In many cases the constituents could haveexisted without being unified in the fact---so in virtue of what arethey so unified? I shall present a new approach to the unity …
Laying ghosts to rest
One of the most widely-discussed arguments against physcialism appeals to the conceivability of zombies, being which are physically or functionally identical to humans but which have no conscious experiences. Philip Goff (Philos Phenomenol Res 81(1): 119–139, 2010; Consci Cognit 21(2): 742–746, 2012a; in Sprevak M, Kallestrup J (eds) New waves in philosophy of mind. Palgrave, 2014) has recently presented a number of different anti-physicalist arg…
Panpsychism, Emergence, and Pluralities
Einar Bohn [AJP 2019] has proposed a version of panpsychism on which consciousness is fundamentally a property of pluralities of basic objects. I argue that this pluralized panpsychism is structurally similar to emergentism, and faces the problem of explaining how a plurality of basic objects could be a subject of experiences. Because of these issues, pluralized panpsychism is not a substantial improvement on orthodox panpsychism
Subjectivity and Non-Objectifying Awareness
We are each aware of our own experiences as they occur, but in this inner awareness our experiences do not seem to be presented to us as objects in the way that they typically are when we reflect on them. A number of philosophers, principally in the phenomenological tradition, have characterised this in terms of inner awareness being a non-objectifying mode of awareness. This claim has faced persistent objections that the notion of non-objectifyi…
Epistemology (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (3 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (3 works) · Appeal (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Consciousness (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Metaphysics (2 works) · Philosophy of mind (2 works)