Jason R Raibley
Biographic Data
| ID | 9500350 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jason R Raibley |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jason R |
| FAMILY NAME | Raibley |
| SIGNATURE | RAIBLEY J R |
| AFFILIATIONS | California State University, Long Beach |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2010 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Less than Zero: Ill-Being, Robust Bads, and the Value-Fulfillment Theory
Adequate theories of well-being must also explain ill-being. While it is formally possible to explain ill-being without postulating robust bads, certain experiential states do qualify as robust bads and thus require theoretical recognition. Experiential bads are recognized by some hedonists, experientialists, and pluralists, but these theories face well-known difficulties. This paper considers whether perfectionist and value-fulfillment accounts …
George Sher, Equality for Inegalitarians
Values, Agency, and Welfare
The values-based approach to welfare holds that it is good for one to realize goals, activities, and relationships with which one strongly (and stably) identifies. This approach preserves the subjectivity of welfare while affirming that a life well lived must be active, engaged, and subjectively meaningful. As opposed to more objective theories, it is unified, naturalistic, and ontologically parsimonious. However, it faces objections concerning t…
Welfare over Time and the Case for Holism
Theories of personal well-being are typically developed so that they render verdicts on (a) how well-off a person is at a moment, (b) how well-off a person is over an interval of time, and (c) how good a whole life is for the person who lives it. Conative theories of welfare posit welfare-atoms that consist, e.g., in episodes of desire-satisfaction, aim-achievement, or values-realisation. Most extant conative theories are additive: they compute w…
Well-Being and the Priority of Values
Personal well-being or welfare is the thing at issue when we ask after someone's best interests, when we debate what would be for someone's own good, and when we discuss what would benefit or harm someone. The theory of welfare value attempts to explain what it is that constitutes being well off or badly off, that is, what facts about well-being turn on. Consequently, it aims to specify those states or conditions that are direct ly or noninstrume…
No prominent works on this page.
Well-Being and the Priority of Values
Personal well-being or welfare is the thing at issue when we ask after someone's best interests, when we debate what would be for someone's own good, and when we discuss what would benefit or harm someone. The theory of welfare value attempts to explain what it is that constitutes being well off or badly off, that is, what facts about well-being turn on. Consequently, it aims to specify those states or conditions that are direct ly or noninstrume…
Welfare over Time and the Case for Holism
Theories of personal well-being are typically developed so that they render verdicts on (a) how well-off a person is at a moment, (b) how well-off a person is over an interval of time, and (c) how good a whole life is for the person who lives it. Conative theories of welfare posit welfare-atoms that consist, e.g., in episodes of desire-satisfaction, aim-achievement, or values-realisation. Most extant conative theories are additive: they compute w…
Values, Agency, and Welfare
The values-based approach to welfare holds that it is good for one to realize goals, activities, and relationships with which one strongly (and stably) identifies. This approach preserves the subjectivity of welfare while affirming that a life well lived must be active, engaged, and subjectively meaningful. As opposed to more objective theories, it is unified, naturalistic, and ontologically parsimonious. However, it faces objections concerning t…
George Sher, Equality for Inegalitarians
Less than Zero: Ill-Being, Robust Bads, and the Value-Fulfillment Theory
Adequate theories of well-being must also explain ill-being. While it is formally possible to explain ill-being without postulating robust bads, certain experiential states do qualify as robust bads and thus require theoretical recognition. Experiential bads are recognized by some hedonists, experientialists, and pluralists, but these theories face well-known difficulties. This paper considers whether perfectionist and value-fulfillment accounts …
Philosophy (5 works) · Epistemology (4 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (4 works) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (4 works) · Economics (3 works) · Positive economics (2 works) · Psychology (2 works) · Social Psychology (2 works) · Sociology (2 works) · Welfare (2 works)