Colin Mclear
Biographic Data
| ID | 950461 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Colin Mclear |
| GIVEN NAMES | Colin |
| FAMILY NAME | Mclear |
| SIGNATURE | MCLEAR C |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Nebraska–Lincoln |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2687-8412 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 38 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 9 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2014 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Thinking of Necessity
Thinking of Necessity is an interesting and extremely rich book. In it Leech offers an account of alethic modality she calls “Modal Transcendentalism,” partly inspired by what she considers to be the most important prior articulation of such a theory, Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Modal Transcendentalism is an account of modality according to which logical necessity is derived from “laws of thought” and metaphysical necessity is derive…
Kant on Freedom and Rational Agency
Markus Kohl’s Kant on Freedom and Rational Agency is a thorough reconstruction and qualified philosophical defense of Kant’s views concerning the metaphysics of freedom, the nature of rational agency, and their connection to one another and to Kant’s broader philosophical commitments. As Kohl puts it, a “central goal of this book is to explicate the Kantian link between freedom as autonomy and normative concepts like rationality, objectivity, cog…
Rationality: What difference does it make
A variety of interpreters have argued that Kant construes the animality of human beings as ‘transformed’, in some sense, through the possession of rationality. I argue that this interpretation admits of multiple readings and that it is either wrong, or doesn't result in the conclusion for which its proponents argue. I also explain the sense in which rationality nevertheless significantly differentiates human beings from other animals
On the Transcendental Freedom of the Intellect
Kant holds that the applicability of the moral 'ought' depends on a kind of agent-causal freedom that is incompatible with the deterministic structure of phenomenal nature. I argue that Kant understands this determinism to threaten not just morality but the very possibility of our status as rational beings. Rational beings exemplify "cognitive control" in all of their actions, including not just rational willing and the formation of doxastic atti…
Motion and the affection argument
Kant's Modal Metaphysics
Anglophone philosophers with even a passing knowledge of Kant are no doubt familiar with some of his most notable arguments and positions. His conception of the synthetic a priori, the ideality of space and time, and the connections between self-consciousness and the objectivity of representation are all well known. Even more so are Kant's negative arguments against various metaphysical views popular in his day. His critiques of a priori argument…
Getting Acquainted with Kant
A central question for Kant scholars concerns whether Kant thinks that experience has nonconceptual content, or whether, on his view, experience is essentially conceptual. McLear argues that in a certain sense this question is ill-conceived. He presents an alternative means of framing what is at issue in terms of a debate about the dependence relations, if any, that exist between different cognitive capacities. We should distinguish between Intel…
Two Kinds of Unity in the Critique of Pure Reason
I argue that Kant’s distinction between the cognitive roles of sensibility and understanding raises a question concerning the conditions necessary for objective representation. I distinguish two opposing interpretive positions, namely Intellectualism and Sensibilism. According to Intellectualism, all objective representation depends, at least in part, on the unifying synthetic activity of the mind. In contrast, Sensibilism argues that at least so…
The Kantian (Non)-conceptualism Debate
One of the central debates in contemporary Kant scholarship concerns whether Kant endorses a "conceptualist" account of the nature of sensory experience. Understanding the debate is crucial for getting a full grasp of Kant's theory of mind, cognition, perception, and epistemology. This paper situates the debate in the context of Kant's broader theory of cognition and surveys some of the major arguments for conceptualist and non-conceptualist inte…
Two Kinds of Unity in the Critique of Pure Reason
I argue that Kant’s distinction between the cognitive roles of sensibility and understanding raises a question concerning the conditions necessary for objective representation. I distinguish two opposing interpretive positions, namely Intellectualism and Sensibilism. According to Intellectualism, all objective representation depends, at least in part, on the unifying synthetic activity of the mind. In contrast, Sensibilism argues that at least so…
On the Transcendental Freedom of the Intellect
Kant holds that the applicability of the moral 'ought' depends on a kind of agent-causal freedom that is incompatible with the deterministic structure of phenomenal nature. I argue that Kant understands this determinism to threaten not just morality but the very possibility of our status as rational beings. Rational beings exemplify "cognitive control" in all of their actions, including not just rational willing and the formation of doxastic atti…
Rationality: What difference does it make
A variety of interpreters have argued that Kant construes the animality of human beings as ‘transformed’, in some sense, through the possession of rationality. I argue that this interpretation admits of multiple readings and that it is either wrong, or doesn't result in the conclusion for which its proponents argue. I also explain the sense in which rationality nevertheless significantly differentiates human beings from other animals
Motion and the affection argument
The Kantian (Non)-conceptualism Debate
One of the central debates in contemporary Kant scholarship concerns whether Kant endorses a "conceptualist" account of the nature of sensory experience. Understanding the debate is crucial for getting a full grasp of Kant's theory of mind, cognition, perception, and epistemology. This paper situates the debate in the context of Kant's broader theory of cognition and surveys some of the major arguments for conceptualist and non-conceptualist inte…
The Kantian (Non)-conceptualism Debate
One of the central debates in contemporary Kant scholarship concerns whether Kant endorses a "conceptualist" account of the nature of sensory experience. Understanding the debate is crucial for getting a full grasp of Kant's theory of mind, cognition, perception, and epistemology. This paper situates the debate in the context of Kant's broader theory of cognition and surveys some of the major arguments for conceptualist and non-conceptualist inte…
Two Kinds of Unity in the Critique of Pure Reason
I argue that Kant’s distinction between the cognitive roles of sensibility and understanding raises a question concerning the conditions necessary for objective representation. I distinguish two opposing interpretive positions, namely Intellectualism and Sensibilism. According to Intellectualism, all objective representation depends, at least in part, on the unifying synthetic activity of the mind. In contrast, Sensibilism argues that at least so…
Getting Acquainted with Kant
A central question for Kant scholars concerns whether Kant thinks that experience has nonconceptual content, or whether, on his view, experience is essentially conceptual. McLear argues that in a certain sense this question is ill-conceived. He presents an alternative means of framing what is at issue in terms of a debate about the dependence relations, if any, that exist between different cognitive capacities. We should distinguish between Intel…
Motion and the affection argument
Kant's Modal Metaphysics
Anglophone philosophers with even a passing knowledge of Kant are no doubt familiar with some of his most notable arguments and positions. His conception of the synthetic a priori, the ideality of space and time, and the connections between self-consciousness and the objectivity of representation are all well known. Even more so are Kant's negative arguments against various metaphysical views popular in his day. His critiques of a priori argument…
On the Transcendental Freedom of the Intellect
Kant holds that the applicability of the moral 'ought' depends on a kind of agent-causal freedom that is incompatible with the deterministic structure of phenomenal nature. I argue that Kant understands this determinism to threaten not just morality but the very possibility of our status as rational beings. Rational beings exemplify "cognitive control" in all of their actions, including not just rational willing and the formation of doxastic atti…
Rationality: What difference does it make
A variety of interpreters have argued that Kant construes the animality of human beings as ‘transformed’, in some sense, through the possession of rationality. I argue that this interpretation admits of multiple readings and that it is either wrong, or doesn't result in the conclusion for which its proponents argue. I also explain the sense in which rationality nevertheless significantly differentiates human beings from other animals
Thinking of Necessity
Thinking of Necessity is an interesting and extremely rich book. In it Leech offers an account of alethic modality she calls “Modal Transcendentalism,” partly inspired by what she considers to be the most important prior articulation of such a theory, Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Modal Transcendentalism is an account of modality according to which logical necessity is derived from “laws of thought” and metaphysical necessity is derive…
Kant on Freedom and Rational Agency
Markus Kohl’s Kant on Freedom and Rational Agency is a thorough reconstruction and qualified philosophical defense of Kant’s views concerning the metaphysics of freedom, the nature of rational agency, and their connection to one another and to Kant’s broader philosophical commitments. As Kohl puts it, a “central goal of this book is to explicate the Kantian link between freedom as autonomy and normative concepts like rationality, objectivity, cog…
Epistemology (9 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (8 works) · Philosophy (7 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (4 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (4 works) · Metaphysics (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Analytic philosophy (2 works) · Cognition (2 works) · Contemporary philosophy (2 works)