William Bondi Knowles
Biographic Data
| ID | 9505306 |
|---|---|
| NAME | William Bondi Knowles |
| GIVEN NAMES | William Bondi |
| FAMILY NAME | Knowles |
| SIGNATURE | KNOWLES W B |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Warwick |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-7986-0502 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 4 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Is imagining impossibilities impossible
According to what Hume termed an ‘establish’d maxim’, nothing absolutely impossible is imaginable. It has recently been claimed against this that given the ubiquity of stipulative imagination, where one imagines a proposition simply by adding it as a stipulation about the imagined situation, it seems that we can imagine any impossibility whatsoever, even plain contradictions: all we need to do is add them as stipulations. The aim of this article …
Free Will and Modal Responsibility
In the last half-century increased awareness of modal issues has been brought to bear on the free will debate. It has been argued that the context dependence of possibility claims can be exploited to mount a defence of compatibilism, the idea being that the kind of possibility to do otherwise ruled out by determinism is distinct from the kind of possibility to do otherwise needed for free will. The potency of this idea, however, is still under-ap…
Knowability paradox, decidability solution
Fitch's knowability paradox shows that for each unknown truth there is also an unknowable truth, a result which has been thought both odd in itself and at odds with views which impose epistemic constraints on truth and/or meaningfulness. Here a solution is considered which has received little attention in the debate but which carries prima facie plausibility. The decidability solution is to accept that Fitch sentences are unknowably true but deny…
Is Colour incompatibility analytic
It is widely believed that some a priori necessary truths are not analytic in the sense of transformable by substitution of synonyms into logical truths. One much‐cited example comes from the supposed incompatibility between colour predicates. The idea is that sentences like “Nothing is both blue all over (or uniformly or at a point ) and also red” are not transformable into a logical truth in the same way as “Nothing is both a bachelor and marri…
No prominent works on this page.
Is Colour incompatibility analytic
It is widely believed that some a priori necessary truths are not analytic in the sense of transformable by substitution of synonyms into logical truths. One much‐cited example comes from the supposed incompatibility between colour predicates. The idea is that sentences like “Nothing is both blue all over (or uniformly or at a point ) and also red” are not transformable into a logical truth in the same way as “Nothing is both a bachelor and marri…
Knowability paradox, decidability solution
Fitch's knowability paradox shows that for each unknown truth there is also an unknowable truth, a result which has been thought both odd in itself and at odds with views which impose epistemic constraints on truth and/or meaningfulness. Here a solution is considered which has received little attention in the debate but which carries prima facie plausibility. The decidability solution is to accept that Fitch sentences are unknowably true but deny…
Free Will and Modal Responsibility
In the last half-century increased awareness of modal issues has been brought to bear on the free will debate. It has been argued that the context dependence of possibility claims can be exploited to mount a defence of compatibilism, the idea being that the kind of possibility to do otherwise ruled out by determinism is distinct from the kind of possibility to do otherwise needed for free will. The potency of this idea, however, is still under-ap…
Is imagining impossibilities impossible
According to what Hume termed an ‘establish’d maxim’, nothing absolutely impossible is imaginable. It has recently been claimed against this that given the ubiquity of stipulative imagination, where one imagines a proposition simply by adding it as a stipulation about the imagined situation, it seems that we can imagine any impossibility whatsoever, even plain contradictions: all we need to do is add them as stipulations. The aim of this article …
Epistemology (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (3 works) · Bachelor (2 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works) · Nothing (2 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (2 works) · Sociology (2 works)