Torsten Odland
Biographic Data
| ID | 9505314 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Torsten Odland |
| GIVEN NAMES | Torsten |
| FAMILY NAME | Odland |
| SIGNATURE | ODLAND T |
| AFFILIATIONS | UCLA |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-3961-3245 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 3 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Open texture and capacious pluralism about content
The traditional view of propositional content presupposes that there is a privileged classification of token representations that partitions them with respect to sameness of content. I argue that there is no such thing: we utilize multiple distinct standards of sameness of content, none of which is privileged. My argument is based on the existence of semantic underdetermination. Plausibly, we use expressions (e.g. ‘sandwich’) that do not have det…
Can sentential quantification tell us what truth is
Traditional theories of truth attempt to answer the question ‘What is truth?’ This question can be taken as a request for a real definition or a conceptual analysis. I assess whether MOD, Künne 2003's definition of truth in terms of sentential quantification ∀x(True(x)↔∃p(x=[p]∧p)), succeeds as an explanation of either of these kinds. I argue that MOD does not succeed as a conceptual analysis: it does not reduce the concept truth to its more prim…
The problem of unarticulated truths
No prominent works on this page.
The problem of unarticulated truths
Can sentential quantification tell us what truth is
Traditional theories of truth attempt to answer the question ‘What is truth?’ This question can be taken as a request for a real definition or a conceptual analysis. I assess whether MOD, Künne 2003's definition of truth in terms of sentential quantification ∀x(True(x)↔∃p(x=[p]∧p)), succeeds as an explanation of either of these kinds. I argue that MOD does not succeed as a conceptual analysis: it does not reduce the concept truth to its more prim…
Open texture and capacious pluralism about content
The traditional view of propositional content presupposes that there is a privileged classification of token representations that partitions them with respect to sameness of content. I argue that there is no such thing: we utilize multiple distinct standards of sameness of content, none of which is privileged. My argument is based on the existence of semantic underdetermination. Plausibly, we use expressions (e.g. ‘sandwich’) that do not have det…
Epistemology (2 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (2 works) · Artificial Intelligence (1 work) · Artificial Intelligence (1 work) · Computer Science (1 work) · Content (measure theory) (1 work) · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies (1 work) · History of Science and Medicine (1 work)