Andrew D Bassford
Biographic Data
| ID | 9505340 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Andrew D Bassford |
| GIVEN NAMES | Andrew D |
| FAMILY NAME | Bassford |
| SIGNATURE | BASSFORD A D |
| AFFILIATIONS | The University of Texas at Austin |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-7118-4236 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
PTSD and Rilkean Memory
Counterfactual similarity, nomic indiscernibility, and the paradox of quidditism
Aristotle is essentially human; that is, for all possible worlds metaphysically consistent with our own, if Aristotle exists, then he is human. This is a claim about the essential property of an object. The claim that objects have essential properties has been hotly disputed, but for present purposes, we can bracket that issue. In this essay, we are interested, rather, in the question of whether properties themselves have essential properties (or…
Ambifictional Counterfactuals
In this paper, I argue that David Lewis’s possible world semantics for counterfactual discourse and for fictional discourse are apparently inconsistent and in need of revision. The problem emerges for Lewis’s account once one considers how to evaluate ambifictional counterfactuals. Since this is likely not a concept familiar to most, and since it does not appear that the problem has been previously recognized in the critical literature, I will be…
No prominent works on this page.
Ambifictional Counterfactuals
In this paper, I argue that David Lewis’s possible world semantics for counterfactual discourse and for fictional discourse are apparently inconsistent and in need of revision. The problem emerges for Lewis’s account once one considers how to evaluate ambifictional counterfactuals. Since this is likely not a concept familiar to most, and since it does not appear that the problem has been previously recognized in the critical literature, I will be…
Counterfactual similarity, nomic indiscernibility, and the paradox of quidditism
Aristotle is essentially human; that is, for all possible worlds metaphysically consistent with our own, if Aristotle exists, then he is human. This is a claim about the essential property of an object. The claim that objects have essential properties has been hotly disputed, but for present purposes, we can bracket that issue. In this essay, we are interested, rather, in the question of whether properties themselves have essential properties (or…
PTSD and Rilkean Memory
Epistemology (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Counterfactual conditional (2 works) · Counterfactual thinking (2 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works) · Linguistics (2 works) · Metaphysics (2 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (2 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (2 works) · Possible world (2 works)