Nathan Huffine
Biographic Data
| ID | 9505656 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Nathan Huffine |
| GIVEN NAMES | Nathan |
| FAMILY NAME | Huffine |
| SIGNATURE | HUFFINE N |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Colorado Boulder |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0348-3514 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 2 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Limits on god, freedom for humans
My plan has three parts. First, I address the concern that the problem between divine foreknowledge and free will is merely a pseudo-problem, arguing that it remains philosophically serious and warrants attention. To support this case, I consider Dennett’s dismissal of the divine foreknowledge-freedom problem, arguing that this dismissal is too hasty. Second, I argue that the eternity solution popularized by Stump and Kretzmann, and later defende…
Penal Substitutionism, Divine Justice, and the Existence of God
Professor William Lane Craig argues that a particular set of concerns about the Christian doctrine of penal substitution (namely, that Jesus of Nazareth was sacrificed for the sins of humanity) can be satisfied. This article provides rebuttals to said replies in an attempt to render plausible the claim that God exists to the extent that God is perfectly just, and that divine justice requires, among other things, that God never engage in the harmi…
No prominent works on this page.
Penal Substitutionism, Divine Justice, and the Existence of God
Professor William Lane Craig argues that a particular set of concerns about the Christian doctrine of penal substitution (namely, that Jesus of Nazareth was sacrificed for the sins of humanity) can be satisfied. This article provides rebuttals to said replies in an attempt to render plausible the claim that God exists to the extent that God is perfectly just, and that divine justice requires, among other things, that God never engage in the harmi…
Limits on god, freedom for humans
My plan has three parts. First, I address the concern that the problem between divine foreknowledge and free will is merely a pseudo-problem, arguing that it remains philosophically serious and warrants attention. To support this case, I consider Dennett’s dismissal of the divine foreknowledge-freedom problem, arguing that this dismissal is too hasty. Second, I argue that the eternity solution popularized by Stump and Kretzmann, and later defende…
Epistemology (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · American Constitutional Law and Politics (1 work) · Doctrine (1 work) · Economic freedom (1 work) · Economic Justice (1 work) · Free Will and Agency (1 work) · Humanity (1 work)