Caspar Oesterheld
Biographic Data
| ID | 9511462 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Caspar Oesterheld |
| GIVEN NAMES | Caspar |
| FAMILY NAME | Oesterheld |
| SIGNATURE | OESTERHELD C |
| AFFILIATIONS | Duke University, NC, USA |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 2 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
The Evidentialist's Wager
Suppose that an altruistic agent who is uncertain between evidential and causal decision theory finds herself in a situation where these theories give conflicting verdicts. We argue that even if she has significantly higher credence in CDT, she should nevertheless act in accordance with EDT. First, we claim that the appropriate response to normative uncertainty is to hedge one's bets. That is, if the stakes are much higher on one theory than anot…
Extracting Money from Causal Decision Theorists
Newcomb’s problem has spawned a debate about which variant of expected utility maximisation (if any) should guide rational choice. In this paper, we provide a new argument against what is probably the most popular variant: causal decision theory (CDT). In particular, we provide two scenarios in which CDT voluntarily loses money. In the first, an agent faces a single choice and following CDT’s recommendation yields a loss of money in expectation. …
No prominent works on this page.
Extracting Money from Causal Decision Theorists
Newcomb’s problem has spawned a debate about which variant of expected utility maximisation (if any) should guide rational choice. In this paper, we provide a new argument against what is probably the most popular variant: causal decision theory (CDT). In particular, we provide two scenarios in which CDT voluntarily loses money. In the first, an agent faces a single choice and following CDT’s recommendation yields a loss of money in expectation. …
The Evidentialist's Wager
Suppose that an altruistic agent who is uncertain between evidential and causal decision theory finds herself in a situation where these theories give conflicting verdicts. We argue that even if she has significantly higher credence in CDT, she should nevertheless act in accordance with EDT. First, we claim that the appropriate response to normative uncertainty is to hedge one's bets. That is, if the stakes are much higher on one theory than anot…
Computer Science (2 works) · Decision theory (2 works) · Economics (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works) · Altruism (biology) (1 work) · Artificial Intelligence (1 work) · Artificial Intelligence (1 work) · Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference (1 work) · Complex Systems and Time Series Analysis (1 work) · Credence (1 work)