Andreas Hüttemann
Biographic Data
| ID | 951494 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Andreas Hüttemann |
| GIVEN NAMES | Andreas |
| FAMILY NAME | Hüttemann |
| SIGNATURE | HÜTTEMANN A |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Cologne |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0646-3092 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 15 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 19 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 14 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1998 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Causal Bayes Nets and Token-Causation
Causal Bayes nets (CBNs) provide one of the most powerful tools for modelling coarse-grained type-level causal structure. As in other fields (e.g., thermodynamics) the question arises how such coarse-grained characterizations are related to the characterization of their underlying structure (in this case: token-level causal relations). Answering this question meets what is called a “coherence-requirement” in the reduction debate. It provides deta…
Causal modeling in multilevel settings
An important question for the causal modeling approach is how to integrate non‐causal dependence relations such as asymmetric supervenience into the approach. The most prominent proposal to that effect (due to Gebharter) is to treat those dependence relationships as formally analogous to causal relationships. We argue that this proposal neglects some crucial differences between causal and non‐causal dependencies, and that in the context of causal…
Third Conference of the GWP (2019)
Are we free to make the laws
Humeans about laws maintain that laws of nature are nothing over and above the complete distribution of non-modal, categorical properties in spacetime. ‘Humean compatibilists’ argue that if Humeanism about laws is true, then agents in a deterministic world can do otherwise than they are lawfully determined to do because of the distinctive nature of Humean laws. More specifically, they reject a central premise of the Consequence argument by mainta…
A Minimal Metaphysics for Scientific Practice
What are the metaphysical commitments which best 'make sense' of our scientific practice (rather than our scientific theories)? In this book, Andreas Hüttemann provides a minimal metaphysics for scientific practice, i.e. a metaphysics that refrains from postulating any structure that is explanatorily irrelevant. Hüttemann closely analyses paradigmatic aspects of scientific practice, such as prediction, explanation and manipulation, to consider th…
Minimal Metaphysics for Scientific Practice
Processes, pre-emption and further problems
Ursachen
This book presents a systematic overview of the major theories of causation: regularity theory, counterfactual theory, process theory, and more recent forms of interventionism. In addition, it develops a new variation on process theory. For this new edition, Andreas Hüttemann has included the latest scholarship and further developed his argument.
Structuralism, causation and explanation
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Science
Advertisement for the philosophy of the computational sciences / Oron Shagrir -- Part I. Overviews. Philosophy of the social sciences : naturalism and anti-naturalism in the philosophy of social science / Francesco Guala -- Philosophy of biology / Ben Fraser and Kim Sterelny -- Philosophy of the psychological and cognitive sciences / Mark Sprevak -- Philosophy of the physical sciences / Carl Hoefer and Chris Smeenk -- Having science in view : gen…
Explanation in the Special Sciences
New work in metaphysics of science
Aspects of Reductive Explanation in Biological Science
The inapplicability of variations on theory reduction in the context of genetics and their irrelevance to ongoing research has led to an anti-reductionist consensus in philosophy of biology. One response to this situation is to focus on forms of reductive explanation that better correspond to actual scientific reasoning (e.g. part–whole relations). Working from this perspective, we explore three different aspects (intrinsicality, fundamentality, …
Explanation, Emergence, and Quantum Entanglement
This paper tries to get a grip on two seemingly conflicting intuitions about reductionism in quantum mechanics. On one hand it is received wisdom that quantum mechanics puts an end to ‘reductionism’. Quantum entanglement is responsible for such features of quantum mechanics as holism, the failure of supervenience, and emergence. While I agree with these claims, I will argue that it is only part of the story. Quantum mechanics provides us with tho…
Laws and Dispositions
Laws are supposed to tell us how physical systems actually behave. The analysis of an important part of physical practice—abstraction—shows, however, that laws describe the behavior of physical systems under very special circumstances, namely when they are isolated. Nevertheless, laws are applied in cases of non-isolation as well. This practice requires an explanation. It is argued that one has to assume that physical systems have dispositions. I…
Aspects of Reductive Explanation in Biological Science
The inapplicability of variations on theory reduction in the context of genetics and their irrelevance to ongoing research has led to an anti-reductionist consensus in philosophy of biology. One response to this situation is to focus on forms of reductive explanation that better correspond to actual scientific reasoning (e.g. part–whole relations). Working from this perspective, we explore three different aspects (intrinsicality, fundamentality, …
Laws and Dispositions
Laws are supposed to tell us how physical systems actually behave. The analysis of an important part of physical practice—abstraction—shows, however, that laws describe the behavior of physical systems under very special circumstances, namely when they are isolated. Nevertheless, laws are applied in cases of non-isolation as well. This practice requires an explanation. It is argued that one has to assume that physical systems have dispositions. I…
Explanation, Emergence, and Quantum Entanglement
This paper tries to get a grip on two seemingly conflicting intuitions about reductionism in quantum mechanics. On one hand it is received wisdom that quantum mechanics puts an end to ‘reductionism’. Quantum entanglement is responsible for such features of quantum mechanics as holism, the failure of supervenience, and emergence. While I agree with these claims, I will argue that it is only part of the story. Quantum mechanics provides us with tho…
Causal modeling in multilevel settings
An important question for the causal modeling approach is how to integrate non‐causal dependence relations such as asymmetric supervenience into the approach. The most prominent proposal to that effect (due to Gebharter) is to treat those dependence relationships as formally analogous to causal relationships. We argue that this proposal neglects some crucial differences between causal and non‐causal dependencies, and that in the context of causal…
Processes, pre-emption and further problems
Laws and Dispositions
Laws are supposed to tell us how physical systems actually behave. The analysis of an important part of physical practice—abstraction—shows, however, that laws describe the behavior of physical systems under very special circumstances, namely when they are isolated. Nevertheless, laws are applied in cases of non-isolation as well. This practice requires an explanation. It is argued that one has to assume that physical systems have dispositions. I…
Explanation, Emergence, and Quantum Entanglement
This paper tries to get a grip on two seemingly conflicting intuitions about reductionism in quantum mechanics. On one hand it is received wisdom that quantum mechanics puts an end to ‘reductionism’. Quantum entanglement is responsible for such features of quantum mechanics as holism, the failure of supervenience, and emergence. While I agree with these claims, I will argue that it is only part of the story. Quantum mechanics provides us with tho…
Aspects of Reductive Explanation in Biological Science
The inapplicability of variations on theory reduction in the context of genetics and their irrelevance to ongoing research has led to an anti-reductionist consensus in philosophy of biology. One response to this situation is to focus on forms of reductive explanation that better correspond to actual scientific reasoning (e.g. part–whole relations). Working from this perspective, we explore three different aspects (intrinsicality, fundamentality, …
Explanation in the Special Sciences
New work in metaphysics of science
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Science
Advertisement for the philosophy of the computational sciences / Oron Shagrir -- Part I. Overviews. Philosophy of the social sciences : naturalism and anti-naturalism in the philosophy of social science / Francesco Guala -- Philosophy of biology / Ben Fraser and Kim Sterelny -- Philosophy of the psychological and cognitive sciences / Mark Sprevak -- Philosophy of the physical sciences / Carl Hoefer and Chris Smeenk -- Having science in view : gen…
Structuralism, causation and explanation
Ursachen
This book presents a systematic overview of the major theories of causation: regularity theory, counterfactual theory, process theory, and more recent forms of interventionism. In addition, it develops a new variation on process theory. For this new edition, Andreas Hüttemann has included the latest scholarship and further developed his argument.
Processes, pre-emption and further problems
A Minimal Metaphysics for Scientific Practice
What are the metaphysical commitments which best 'make sense' of our scientific practice (rather than our scientific theories)? In this book, Andreas Hüttemann provides a minimal metaphysics for scientific practice, i.e. a metaphysics that refrains from postulating any structure that is explanatorily irrelevant. Hüttemann closely analyses paradigmatic aspects of scientific practice, such as prediction, explanation and manipulation, to consider th…
Minimal Metaphysics for Scientific Practice
Third Conference of the GWP (2019)
Are we free to make the laws
Humeans about laws maintain that laws of nature are nothing over and above the complete distribution of non-modal, categorical properties in spacetime. ‘Humean compatibilists’ argue that if Humeanism about laws is true, then agents in a deterministic world can do otherwise than they are lawfully determined to do because of the distinctive nature of Humean laws. More specifically, they reject a central premise of the Consequence argument by mainta…
Causal modeling in multilevel settings
An important question for the causal modeling approach is how to integrate non‐causal dependence relations such as asymmetric supervenience into the approach. The most prominent proposal to that effect (due to Gebharter) is to treat those dependence relationships as formally analogous to causal relationships. We argue that this proposal neglects some crucial differences between causal and non‐causal dependencies, and that in the context of causal…
Causal Bayes Nets and Token-Causation
Causal Bayes nets (CBNs) provide one of the most powerful tools for modelling coarse-grained type-level causal structure. As in other fields (e.g., thermodynamics) the question arises how such coarse-grained characterizations are related to the characterization of their underlying structure (in this case: token-level causal relations). Answering this question meets what is called a “coherence-requirement” in the reduction debate. It provides deta…
Epistemology (13 works) · Philosophy (13 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (11 works) · Philosophy of science (9 works) · Metaphysics (8 works) · Causation (7 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (4 works) · Philosophy of language (4 works) · Political science (4 works)