Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette
Biographic Data
| ID | 9518252 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette |
| GIVEN NAMES | Simon-Pierre |
| FAMILY NAME | Chevarie-Cossette |
| SIGNATURE | CHEVARIE-COSSETTE S |
| AFFILIATIONS | King's College London |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9520-2032 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Blameworthiness Implies ‘Ought not’
Here is a crucial principle for debates about moral luck, responsibility, and free will: a subject is blameworthy for an act only if, in acting, she did what she ought not to have done. That is, ‘blameworthiness’ implies ‘ought not’ (BION). There are some good reasons to accept BION, but whether we accept it mainly depends on complex questions about the objectivity of ought and the subjectivity of blameworthiness. This paper offers an exploratory…
Excuses and Alternatives
A version of the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP) claims that one is only blameworthy for actions which one was able to avoid. Much of the discussion about PAP concerns Frankfurt’s counterexamples to it. After fifty years of refined debates, progress might seem hopeless. Yet, we can make headway by asking: “what’s our reason for believing PAP?” The best answer is this: lacking eligible alternatives—alternatives whose cost is not too hig…
Sceptical Deliberations
Suppose I am a leeway sceptic: I think that, whenever I face a choice between two courses of action, I lack true alternatives. Can my practical deliberation be rational? Call this the Deliberation Question . This paper has three aims in tackling it. Its constructive aim is to provide a unified account of practical deliberation. Its corrective aim is to amend the way that philosophers have recently framed the Deliberation Question. Finally, its di…
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Sceptical Deliberations
Suppose I am a leeway sceptic: I think that, whenever I face a choice between two courses of action, I lack true alternatives. Can my practical deliberation be rational? Call this the Deliberation Question . This paper has three aims in tackling it. Its constructive aim is to provide a unified account of practical deliberation. Its corrective aim is to amend the way that philosophers have recently framed the Deliberation Question. Finally, its di…
Excuses and Alternatives
A version of the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP) claims that one is only blameworthy for actions which one was able to avoid. Much of the discussion about PAP concerns Frankfurt’s counterexamples to it. After fifty years of refined debates, progress might seem hopeless. Yet, we can make headway by asking: “what’s our reason for believing PAP?” The best answer is this: lacking eligible alternatives—alternatives whose cost is not too hig…
Blameworthiness Implies ‘Ought not’
Here is a crucial principle for debates about moral luck, responsibility, and free will: a subject is blameworthy for an act only if, in acting, she did what she ought not to have done. That is, ‘blameworthiness’ implies ‘ought not’ (BION). There are some good reasons to accept BION, but whether we accept it mainly depends on complex questions about the objectivity of ought and the subjectivity of blameworthiness. This paper offers an exploratory…
Epistemology (3 works) · Free Will and Agency (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Law and economics (2 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · Subject (documents) (2 works) · War, Ethics, and Justification (2 works)