Ripley Stroud
Biographic Data
| ID | 9518319 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Ripley Stroud |
| GIVEN NAMES | Ripley |
| FAMILY NAME | Stroud |
| SIGNATURE | STROUD R |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of North Carolina Chapel Hill North Carolina USA |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-4035-0959 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 2 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
“Gaslighting” Refocused
I argue that all extant philosophical accounts of gaslighting overgenerate or undergenerate cases, either because they fail to include the internal felt experience of the gaslit or because they include this internal experience in the wrong way. I contend that some act A counts as gaslighting iff : (1) the gaslighter’s act A expresses disagreement with the gaslit without adequately expressing respect for the gaslit, and this makes it the case that…
Epistemic Respect
I propose that listeners have a moral duty to believe anyone's testimony, on pain of disrespect, unless they have independent reasons to think that the testifier is not credible. What typically entitles a person to standard‐issue respect is having the capacity for practical reasoning: practical agency and moral norm‐responsiveness. I show that the capacity for theoretical reasoning also involves agency and norm‐responsiveness, making it structura…
No prominent works on this page.
“Gaslighting” Refocused
I argue that all extant philosophical accounts of gaslighting overgenerate or undergenerate cases, either because they fail to include the internal felt experience of the gaslit or because they include this internal experience in the wrong way. I contend that some act A counts as gaslighting iff : (1) the gaslighter’s act A expresses disagreement with the gaslit without adequately expressing respect for the gaslit, and this makes it the case that…
Epistemic Respect
I propose that listeners have a moral duty to believe anyone's testimony, on pain of disrespect, unless they have independent reasons to think that the testifier is not credible. What typically entitles a person to standard‐issue respect is having the capacity for practical reasoning: practical agency and moral norm‐responsiveness. I show that the capacity for theoretical reasoning also involves agency and norm‐responsiveness, making it structura…
Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (2 works) · Action (physics) (1 works) · Agency (philosophy) (1 works) · Agnosticism (1 works) · Analytic philosophy (1 works) · Duty (1 works) · Entitlement (fair division) (1 works) · Epistemic virtue (1 works) · Extant taxon (1 works)