Işık Sarıhan
Biographic Data
| ID | 9522823 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Işık Sarıhan |
| GIVEN NAMES | Işık |
| FAMILY NAME | Sarıhan |
| SIGNATURE | SARIHAN I |
| AFFILIATIONS | Budapest Hungary |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-1299-4597 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 2 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Disagreement and Progress in Philosophy and in Empirical Sciences
The fact that philosophy has not made much progress in finding answers to its big questions is often demonstrated with a comparison to natural sciences. Some have recently argued that the state of progress in philosophy is not so different than the sciences: there are many unresolved big questions in the sciences too, and philosophy has made progress on its smaller questions just like the sciences. I argue that this comparison is misleading: the …
Deflating the hard problem of consciousness by multiplying explanatory gaps
Recent philosophy has seen a resurgence of the realist view of sensible qualities such as colour. The view holds that experienced qualities are properties of the objects in the physical environment, not mentally instantiated properties like qualia or merely intentional, illusory ones. Some suggest that this move rids us of the explanatory gap between physical properties and the qualitative features of consciousness. Others say it just relocates t…
No prominent works on this page.
Deflating the hard problem of consciousness by multiplying explanatory gaps
Recent philosophy has seen a resurgence of the realist view of sensible qualities such as colour. The view holds that experienced qualities are properties of the objects in the physical environment, not mentally instantiated properties like qualia or merely intentional, illusory ones. Some suggest that this move rids us of the explanatory gap between physical properties and the qualitative features of consciousness. Others say it just relocates t…
Disagreement and Progress in Philosophy and in Empirical Sciences
The fact that philosophy has not made much progress in finding answers to its big questions is often demonstrated with a comparison to natural sciences. Some have recently argued that the state of progress in philosophy is not so different than the sciences: there are many unresolved big questions in the sciences too, and philosophy has made progress on its smaller questions just like the sciences. I argue that this comparison is misleading: the …
Epistemology (2 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (2 works) · Cognitive psychology (1 work) · Consciousness (1 work) · Explanatory model (1 work) · Metaphysics (1 work) · Naturalism (1 work) · Perception (1 work)