Leonard Wolk
Biographic Data
| ID | 9532206 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Leonard Wolk |
| GIVEN NAMES | Leonard |
| FAMILY NAME | Wolk |
| SIGNATURE | WOLK L |
| AFFILIATIONS | Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-9634-1226 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2015 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Cost-(in)effective public good provision
This paper investigates the determinants of cost-(in)effective giving to public goods. We conduct a pre-registered experiment to elucidate how factors at the institutional and individual levels shape individual contributions and the cost-effectiveness of those contributions in a novel public good game. In particular, we examine the role of consequential uncertainty over the value of public good contributions (institutional level) as well as indiv…
Small group forecasting using proportional-prize contests
We consider a proportional-prize contest to forecast future events, and show that, in equilibrium, this mechanism possesses perfect forecasting ability for any group size when the contestants share common knowledge about the probabilities by which future events realize. Data gathered in a laboratory experiment confirm the performance invariance to group size. By contrast, when realization probabilities are not common knowledge, there are some dif…
E-commerce and the art market
No prominent works on this page.
E-commerce and the art market
Small group forecasting using proportional-prize contests
We consider a proportional-prize contest to forecast future events, and show that, in equilibrium, this mechanism possesses perfect forecasting ability for any group size when the contestants share common knowledge about the probabilities by which future events realize. Data gathered in a laboratory experiment confirm the performance invariance to group size. By contrast, when realization probabilities are not common knowledge, there are some dif…
Cost-(in)effective public good provision
This paper investigates the determinants of cost-(in)effective giving to public goods. We conduct a pre-registered experiment to elucidate how factors at the institutional and individual levels shape individual contributions and the cost-effectiveness of those contributions in a novel public good game. In particular, we examine the role of consequential uncertainty over the value of public good contributions (institutional level) as well as indiv…
Computer Science (2 works) · Economics (2 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · Actuarial science (1 work) · Ambiguity (1 work) · Art (1 work) · Art history (1 work) · Art History and Market Analysis (1 work) · Art market (1 work)