Roy Baharad
Biographic Data
| ID | 9532235 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Roy Baharad |
| GIVEN NAMES | Roy |
| FAMILY NAME | Baharad |
| SIGNATURE | BAHARAD R |
| AFFILIATIONS | Hebrew University of Jerusalem |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 6 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Contract Remedies and Search Efforts
Informative Jury Disagreement
The article introduces a counterintuitive argument, contending that jury disagreement on the defendant’s guilt—a nonunanimous conviction—may well provide a more informative signal, compared to consensus. Because stronger consensus implies higher likelihood of herding, it is shown that beyond some threshold, further accumulation of votes to convict would carry negligible epistemic contribution, barely enhancing the posterior probability of guilt. …
Deterrence by Insurance
Against the theory of third-party moral hazard—focusing on third parties who decline their risk-reducing effort in light of insurance—I analyze the mirror-image phenomenon of third-party deterrence: cases in which third parties engage in activities designed to counterbalance the insured’s moral hazard. I characterize the settings in which third-party deterrence replaces third-party moral hazard; address the economic foundations of this problem; a…
On the degree of generalizability of Condorcet jury theorem
One person, one weight
Litigation with adversarial efforts
No prominent works on this page.
One person, one weight
Litigation with adversarial efforts
Deterrence by Insurance
Against the theory of third-party moral hazard—focusing on third parties who decline their risk-reducing effort in light of insurance—I analyze the mirror-image phenomenon of third-party deterrence: cases in which third parties engage in activities designed to counterbalance the insured’s moral hazard. I characterize the settings in which third-party deterrence replaces third-party moral hazard; address the economic foundations of this problem; a…
On the degree of generalizability of Condorcet jury theorem
Contract Remedies and Search Efforts
Informative Jury Disagreement
The article introduces a counterintuitive argument, contending that jury disagreement on the defendant’s guilt—a nonunanimous conviction—may well provide a more informative signal, compared to consensus. Because stronger consensus implies higher likelihood of herding, it is shown that beyond some threshold, further accumulation of votes to convict would carry negligible epistemic contribution, barely enhancing the posterior probability of guilt. …
Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems (4 works) · Business (3 works) · Economics (3 works) · Jury (3 works) · Law and economics (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Condorcet method (2 works) · Counterintuitive (2 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (2 works) · Law (2 works)