Crawford L Elder
Biographic Data
| ID | 953249 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Crawford L Elder |
| GIVEN NAMES | Crawford L |
| FAMILY NAME | Elder |
| SIGNATURE | ELDER C L |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Connecticut |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 15 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 14 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 15 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1989 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2007 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
On the Phenomenon of “Dog‐Wise Arrangement”
An influential line of thought in metaphysics holds that where common sense discerns a tree or a dog or a baseball there may be just many microparticles. Provided the microparticles are arranged in the right way—are “treewise” or “dogwise” or “baseballwise” arranged—our sensory experiences will be just the same as if a tree or dog or baseball were really there. Therefore whether there really are such familiar objects in the world can be decided o…
Conventionalism and Realism-Imitating Counterfactuals
Journal Article Conventionalism and Realism‐Imitating Counterfactuals Get access Crawford L. Elder Crawford L. Elder University of Connecticut Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 56, Issue 222, January 2006, Pages 1–15, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2005.00425.x Published: 29 November 2005
Real Natures and Familiar Objects
In Real Natures and Familiar Objects Crawford Elder defends, with qualifications, the ontology of common sense. He argues that we exist—that no gloss is necessary for the statement "human beings exist" to show that it is true of the world as it really is—and that we are surrounded by many of the medium-sized objects in which common sense believes. He argues further that these familiar medium-sized objects not only exist, but have essential proper…
Alexander's Dictum and the Reality of Familiar Objects
Kripkean Externalism versus Conceptual Analysis
Destruction, Alteration, Simples and World Stuff
When a tree is chopped to bits, or a sweater unraveled, its matter still exists. Since antiquity, it has sometimes been inferred that nothing really has been destroyed: what has happened is just that this matter has assumed new form. Contemporary versions hold that apparent destruction of a familiar object is just rearrangement of microparticles or of 'physical simples' or 'world stuff'. But if destruction of a familiar object is genuinely to be …
Mental Causation versus Physical Causation: No Contest
Common sense supposes thoughts can cause bodily movements and thereby bring about changes in where the agent is or how his surroundings are. Many philosophers suppose that any such outcome is realized in a complex state of affairs involving only microparticles; that previous microphysical developments were sufficient to cause that state of affairs; hence that, barring overdetermination, causation by the mental is excluded. This paper argues that …
Physicalism and the Fallacy of Composition
Physicalism, as I treat it here, holds that every instance of causationreported by the special sciences is shadowed, even rivalled, by causation atthe level of microphysics. The reported ‘cause’ is embodied in one massive collection of microparticle events; the ‘event’ in another; the former brings about the latter in accordance with the laws of microphysics. I argue that while individual events in the ‘cause’ collection bring about individual ev…
Essential Properties and Coinciding Objects
Essential Properties and Coinciding ObjectsCommon sense believes in objects which, if real, routinely lose component parts or particles.Statues get chipped, people undergo haircuts and amputations, and ships have planks replaced.Sometimes philosophers argue that in addition to these objects, there are others which could not possibly lose any of their parts or particles, nor have new ones added to them--objects which could not possibly have been b…
Natural Kinds
Content and the Subtle Extensionality of `--Explains
Journal Article Content and the Subtle Extensionality of ‘ — Explains ... ’ Get access Crawford L. Elder Crawford L. Elder University of Connecticut Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 46, Issue 184, July 1996, Pages 320–332, https://doi.org/10.2307/2956444 Published: 01 July 1996
Realism and Determinable Properties
Laws, Natures, and Contingent Necessities
Science teaches us such things as that copper conducts electricity, turns green upon prolonged exposure to air, and is composed of atoms that have 29 protons in their nuclei. Many philosophers suppose that science thereby informs us not just of uniformities that have in fact so far held, but of states of affairs that have a kind of necessity to them. But the necessity may seem at the same time not to be absolute or unconditional, even at the most…
An Epistemological Defence of Realism About Necessity
Journal Article An Epistemological Defence of Realism About Necessity Get access Crawford L. Elder Crawford L. Elder University of Connecticut Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 42, Issue 168, July 1992, Pages 317–336, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219683 Published: 01 July 1992
Realism, Naturalism, and Culturally Generated Kinds
Journal Article Realism, Naturalism, and Culturally Generated Kinds Get access Crawford L. Elder Crawford L. Elder University of Connecticut Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 39, Issue 157, October 1989, Pages 425–444, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219828 Published: 01 October 1989
Laws, Natures, and Contingent Necessities
Science teaches us such things as that copper conducts electricity, turns green upon prolonged exposure to air, and is composed of atoms that have 29 protons in their nuclei. Many philosophers suppose that science thereby informs us not just of uniformities that have in fact so far held, but of states of affairs that have a kind of necessity to them. But the necessity may seem at the same time not to be absolute or unconditional, even at the most…
Essential Properties and Coinciding Objects
Essential Properties and Coinciding ObjectsCommon sense believes in objects which, if real, routinely lose component parts or particles.Statues get chipped, people undergo haircuts and amputations, and ships have planks replaced.Sometimes philosophers argue that in addition to these objects, there are others which could not possibly lose any of their parts or particles, nor have new ones added to them--objects which could not possibly have been b…
Realism and Determinable Properties
Conventionalism and Realism-Imitating Counterfactuals
Journal Article Conventionalism and Realism‐Imitating Counterfactuals Get access Crawford L. Elder Crawford L. Elder University of Connecticut Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 56, Issue 222, January 2006, Pages 1–15, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2005.00425.x Published: 29 November 2005
Mental Causation versus Physical Causation: No Contest
Common sense supposes thoughts can cause bodily movements and thereby bring about changes in where the agent is or how his surroundings are. Many philosophers suppose that any such outcome is realized in a complex state of affairs involving only microparticles; that previous microphysical developments were sufficient to cause that state of affairs; hence that, barring overdetermination, causation by the mental is excluded. This paper argues that …
Physicalism and the Fallacy of Composition
Physicalism, as I treat it here, holds that every instance of causationreported by the special sciences is shadowed, even rivalled, by causation atthe level of microphysics. The reported ‘cause’ is embodied in one massive collection of microparticle events; the ‘event’ in another; the former brings about the latter in accordance with the laws of microphysics. I argue that while individual events in the ‘cause’ collection bring about individual ev…
An Epistemological Defence of Realism About Necessity
Journal Article An Epistemological Defence of Realism About Necessity Get access Crawford L. Elder Crawford L. Elder University of Connecticut Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 42, Issue 168, July 1992, Pages 317–336, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219683 Published: 01 July 1992
Realism, Naturalism, and Culturally Generated Kinds
Journal Article Realism, Naturalism, and Culturally Generated Kinds Get access Crawford L. Elder Crawford L. Elder University of Connecticut Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 39, Issue 157, October 1989, Pages 425–444, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219828 Published: 01 October 1989
Realism, Naturalism, and Culturally Generated Kinds
Journal Article Realism, Naturalism, and Culturally Generated Kinds Get access Crawford L. Elder Crawford L. Elder University of Connecticut Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 39, Issue 157, October 1989, Pages 425–444, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219828 Published: 01 October 1989
An Epistemological Defence of Realism About Necessity
Journal Article An Epistemological Defence of Realism About Necessity Get access Crawford L. Elder Crawford L. Elder University of Connecticut Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 42, Issue 168, July 1992, Pages 317–336, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219683 Published: 01 July 1992
Laws, Natures, and Contingent Necessities
Science teaches us such things as that copper conducts electricity, turns green upon prolonged exposure to air, and is composed of atoms that have 29 protons in their nuclei. Many philosophers suppose that science thereby informs us not just of uniformities that have in fact so far held, but of states of affairs that have a kind of necessity to them. But the necessity may seem at the same time not to be absolute or unconditional, even at the most…
Content and the Subtle Extensionality of `--Explains
Journal Article Content and the Subtle Extensionality of ‘ — Explains ... ’ Get access Crawford L. Elder Crawford L. Elder University of Connecticut Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 46, Issue 184, July 1996, Pages 320–332, https://doi.org/10.2307/2956444 Published: 01 July 1996
Realism and Determinable Properties
Natural Kinds
Essential Properties and Coinciding Objects
Essential Properties and Coinciding ObjectsCommon sense believes in objects which, if real, routinely lose component parts or particles.Statues get chipped, people undergo haircuts and amputations, and ships have planks replaced.Sometimes philosophers argue that in addition to these objects, there are others which could not possibly lose any of their parts or particles, nor have new ones added to them--objects which could not possibly have been b…
Physicalism and the Fallacy of Composition
Physicalism, as I treat it here, holds that every instance of causationreported by the special sciences is shadowed, even rivalled, by causation atthe level of microphysics. The reported ‘cause’ is embodied in one massive collection of microparticle events; the ‘event’ in another; the former brings about the latter in accordance with the laws of microphysics. I argue that while individual events in the ‘cause’ collection bring about individual ev…
Mental Causation versus Physical Causation: No Contest
Common sense supposes thoughts can cause bodily movements and thereby bring about changes in where the agent is or how his surroundings are. Many philosophers suppose that any such outcome is realized in a complex state of affairs involving only microparticles; that previous microphysical developments were sufficient to cause that state of affairs; hence that, barring overdetermination, causation by the mental is excluded. This paper argues that …
Alexander's Dictum and the Reality of Familiar Objects
Kripkean Externalism versus Conceptual Analysis
Destruction, Alteration, Simples and World Stuff
When a tree is chopped to bits, or a sweater unraveled, its matter still exists. Since antiquity, it has sometimes been inferred that nothing really has been destroyed: what has happened is just that this matter has assumed new form. Contemporary versions hold that apparent destruction of a familiar object is just rearrangement of microparticles or of 'physical simples' or 'world stuff'. But if destruction of a familiar object is genuinely to be …
Real Natures and Familiar Objects
In Real Natures and Familiar Objects Crawford Elder defends, with qualifications, the ontology of common sense. He argues that we exist—that no gloss is necessary for the statement "human beings exist" to show that it is true of the world as it really is—and that we are surrounded by many of the medium-sized objects in which common sense believes. He argues further that these familiar medium-sized objects not only exist, but have essential proper…
Conventionalism and Realism-Imitating Counterfactuals
Journal Article Conventionalism and Realism‐Imitating Counterfactuals Get access Crawford L. Elder Crawford L. Elder University of Connecticut Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 56, Issue 222, January 2006, Pages 1–15, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2005.00425.x Published: 29 November 2005
On the Phenomenon of “Dog‐Wise Arrangement”
An influential line of thought in metaphysics holds that where common sense discerns a tree or a dog or a baseball there may be just many microparticles. Provided the microparticles are arranged in the right way—are “treewise” or “dogwise” or “baseballwise” arranged—our sensory experiences will be just the same as if a tree or dog or baseball were really there. Therefore whether there really are such familiar objects in the world can be decided o…
Philosophy (14 works) · Epistemology (10 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (8 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (7 works) · Philosophy (6 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (5 works) · Realism (5 works) · Sociology (4 works) · Aesthetics (3 works) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (3 works)